Mental Images in Cinema:Flashback, Imagined Voices, Fantasy, Dream, Hallucination and Madness in Film by Luchoomun, Lawrence
 
DOCTORAL THESIS
Mental Images in Cinema







Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.



















Mental Images in Cinema:  




Lawrence Luchoomun BA, MA 
 




Department of Media, Culture and Language 
 




In this thesis we consider cinema’s representations of mental images.  Our central concerns 
are the formal aspects of the presentation of memory and imagination, and the various 
functions which the different types of mental images perform.  While along the way we 
engage with a number of expedient theories, on the whole the argument is free of any over-
arching theoretical approach, instead focusing largely on the evidence of the wide range of 
films — from different eras, genres and national cinemas — with which we engage.  We 
begin with a consideration of filmic representations of memory, tackling such questions as: 
What exactly is a flashback?  What different functions do flashbacks perform?  What is the 
relationship between flashback and the mental images of memory?  Identifying an 
inadequacy in current terminology, we here introduce the concept of ‘act of memory’ in order 
to distinguish between representations of the past which constitute an analogue of the mental 
images of memory and more properly subjective representations of mental images.  In Part II 
we develop a taxonomy of the major forms of imagination.  Here our discussion of 
imagination draws on cognitive and phenomenological theories of imagination, and the 
chapter on dreams draws substantially on Freud.  In our consideration of the functions of the 
various sorts of mental images we establish a series of character types who are prone to 
experiencing mental images.  Throughout Part II we argue that representations of mental 
images are often closely related to themes of madness — that many representations of mental 
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Each of us carries within us a private world, the confluence of our past experience, 
our libidinal drives, our intelligence: the mental images of memory and imagination.  
It can be a place of sanctuary, consolation, escape from the realities of life, it can be a 
resource which fosters pensiveness or precipitates action, but it can also oppress, 
torment and tyrannise.  By turns an oasis or a prison, the world of imagination and 
memory is irreducibly subjective.  To a large extent, we are responsible for our mental 
images — our images present to us a mirror, reflecting our past actions, decisions, our 
drives and passions.  But our existence in society, the inevitable and necessary 
interaction with other people that this entails, means that there is perforce a significant 
aleatory aspect to our mental images for which we cannot, in all fairness, be 
responsible.  (For instance, we may remember with pain something hurtful that 
someone once said to us.  We did nothing to provoke such an insult and, we feel, we 
are not responsible for the fact that we have remembered it; we were reminded of it by 
accident.)  Nietzsche has a singularly pessimistic conception of memory.  Memory — 
or ‘historical thinking’ — is pernicious, a ‘dark, invisible burden’.
1
 Indeed, for 
Nietzsche, happiness is defined by 
 
the ability to forget or […] the capacity to feel unhistorically during its 
duration.  He who cannot sink down on the threshold of the moment and 
forget all the past, who cannot stand balanced like a goddess of victory 
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without growing dizzy and afraid, will never know what happiness is — 




But, unlike the cows grazing in the field, or the toddler bouncing on her father’s knee 
— who exist as if immured in a perpetual present, impervious to past and future — 
man remains in thrall: he ‘clings relentlessly to the past: however far and fast he may 




Such mental work as remembering and imagining is in essence a solitary enterprise.  
While there is, to be sure, a useful function to mental imagery, it generally tends 
toward the foreclosure of discourse.  If not beyond communication, mental images are 
generally opposed to it.  Others remain shut off, excluded from the great majority of 
our remembering and imaginative work.  Our images are, in any case, often of limited 
interest to others.  The raptures, despairs, elations and anxieties of our imagination are 
enveloped in a carapace of silence.  Our mental images are expressions of an inner 
realm for which we are accountable to no one but ourselves.   
 
Topic 
The subject of this thesis is the representation of mental images in cinema.  The idea 
for the subject of the thesis was conceived after reading Proust’s À la recherche du 
temps perdu (1913-27), and Sartre’s L’Imaginaire (1940), and by a viewing of Dennis 
Potter’s The Singing Detective (1986).  Sartre’s early phenomenological writings will 
form a key point of reference throughout the thesis. 
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I became interested in the flashback as a narrational device, and began to ask myself 
questions.  To what extent has the flashback been theorised in film studies?  How far 
back do these studies go and how exhaustive are they?  What is the value of a mental 
image in a film?  Is it merely used as a shortcut, to avoid long verbal renderings?  
What other functions does it perform?  Are mental images primarily liberating — as 
in The Pianist (Roman Polanski, 2002), when the pianist imagines the music which 
would issue from the piano were he to play it — or are they fundamentally oppressive 
— as in Scarlet Street (Fristz Lang, 1945), where Christopher Cross is haunted by the 
ghosts of his victims, Kitty and Johnny?  Do certain situations or character types lend 
themselves to the experiencing of mental images?  These are the core questions which 
will be addressed in the following chapters. 
 
When we consider how cinema has represented memory and imagination, one thing is 
immediately apparent: though they may prompt speech or action, mental images 
unfold in a private and subjective sphere, as opposed to the objective world of speech 
and action.  There are some striking and memorable representations of characters in 
the act of remembering or imagining.  The whole second half of Vertigo (1958, Alfred 
Hitchcock), for instance — in which, after discovering Judy, Scotty monomaniacally 
moulds her to his desire until finally she (physically) conforms exactly to his memory 
of Madeleine — is all about memory.  And yet, with just two brief exceptions — their 
kiss, the necklace — Hitchcock forbears from offering representations of Scotty’s 
memory.  Rather, we see him remembering, and the onus is on James Stewart (aided 
by Hitchcock and Herrmann) to dramatise the act of remembering, the experience of 




Madeleine is dead) in the present.  Frequently, however, we depart from the objective 
world of the diegesis and enter a new dimension, representing the internal thoughts of 
a character. 
 
Among the first to recognise the potential of cinema for the representation of mental 
images were the surrealists.  In ‘Crossing the Bridge’, Jacques Brunius writes of 
cinema, ‘[i]t is impossible to imagine a truer mirror of mental performance.’
4
 Brunius 
criticises dualistic thinking, which understands the objective and the subjective, the 
real and the world of fantasy, to be separated by an unbridgeable abyss.  ‘Surrealism 
long since went beyond these attitudes [...] and threw a bridge between the seemingly 
most distant activities of understanding’.  Film, he continues,   
 
enjoys an incomparable facility for crossing the bridge in both directions, 
thanks to the extraordinary and sumptuous solidity it attributes to the mind’s 
creations, objectifying them in the most convincing manner, while it makes 




Looking back from the vantage point of the 1950s, Robert Benayoun writes,  
 
Every means of expression has, at one phase or another of its development, 
found itself faced with the dilemma its creative potential imposed on it: to 
represent nature in all its nakedness or to rise above it [...] through the power 
of illusion.  Barely pubescent, the cinema found itself facing the same choice 
                                                 
4
 Brunius, J. (2000) ‘Crossing the Bridge,’ in Hammond, P. (ed.) The Shadow and its Shadow, San 
Francisco: City Lights (first published 1954), p. 100 
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[...] And yet the very essence of its power ought to have enlightened it: was it 
merely a registering device [...]?  Or was it not, rather, the open sesame of a 




The suitability of film for the representation of mental images is, for several writers, 
intrinsically bound up with the specific technological apparatus of the cinema.  For 
Benayoun, ‘unreal by nature’, the only function of cinematic language ‘should be to 
seek satisfaction in the unreal’.
7
 Antonin Artaud writes, ‘the cinema seems to me to be 




We accept recollections, fantasies, dreams and hallucinations as part of the content 
and language of cinema, but questions such as precisely what constitutes 
representations of mental images, how we are able to identify a given sequence as a 
representation of mental images, and the various functions of mental images in film, 
have not hitherto been adequately explored by film theory.  This study is the first 
systematic investigation of representations of mental images in cinema.  The 
questions it confronts are: What is a mental image and how is it represented on the 
screen?  What are the various types of mental image, and do these types have specific 
criteria for filmic representation?  Which characters experience mental images?  What 
do these characters have in common?  What prompts them to form mental images?  
                                                 
6
 Benayoun, R. (2000) ‘Remarks on Cinematic Oneirism’, in The Shadow and its Shadow (first 
published 1951), p.107  
 
7
 Ibid., p.108  
 
8
 Artaud, A. (2000) ‘Sorcery and Cinema’, in The Shadow and its Shadow (first published 1928), 





What do they imagine or remember?  Why do they imagine or remember?  What are 
the narrative situations which engender representations of mental images? 
 
Aims 
The primary aim of this project is to explore the functions of and to investigate the 
full import of representations of mental images in cinema.  While viewing films for 
this thesis I was forcibly struck by the link between films in which there is a 
prevalence of representations of mental images and themes of madness.  My 
fundamental aim in Part II is to demonstrate this connection.  In order to do this I will 
need to consider what madness is, and to identify the different forms in which it 
manifests itself.   
 
We will also need to define what a mental image is, and what constitutes a cinematic 
representation of a mental image.  A major concern for us in Part I is to distinguish 
between those representations of the past which represent the mental images of 
memory and those which do not, or which only apparently do so.  In order to explore 
fully the gamut of cinema’s representations of mental images, we identify and 
distinguish between various types of mental image, and consider each on a systematic 
basis.  We must also consider the ways in which cinema has represented mental 
images.  To this end we will analyse formal aspects of their presentation, addressing 
such questions as: What are the grammatical principles according to which we can 
identify mental images?  What alternatives to conventionally established codes have 
developed for the representation of mental images?  We will draw on neofromalist 




theories of mental imagery, and psychoanalytic dream theory in order to understand 
the form and content of filmic representations of mental images.   
 
We commence each chapter by addressing questions of form, that is, the language 
with which cinema represents mental images.  But our primary interest is in the image 
as a psychic phenomenon, the utility and value of images, and what images can tell us 
about the psychology of the characters who experience them.  We will therefore 
identify the contexts and situations which engender mental images, and the different 
functions that each variety of mental image performs.  Our study of the character 
types prone to experiencing acts of imagination will lead us to consider the relation 
between representations of mental images and themes of madness.   
 
Terminology 
We might reasonably ask: to whom should one attribute mental images in a film?  To 
the director?  To the scriptwriter?  To the cameraman, who helps to realise the mental 
image?  To the actor, who must assume the facial expression apposite to the emotion, 
situation, time, and place?  The ‘mental images’ of which we speak are those of a 
character within the film.  When we speak of ‘representations of imagination and 
memory’ we do not mean a depiction of a character as she is in the process of 
imagining or remembering.  Representations of mental images are often bracketed by 
such shots of the subject remembering/imagining in the present, but as far as we are 
concerned the representation of what the subject imagines or remembers is a 





The most advanced theories of imagination come from phenomenology where the 
term ‘image’ means ‘mental image’ and encompasses all of memory and imagination.  
However, in writing about film we often use this term — image — to refer to the 
continuum of pictures projected upon the screen, and to distinguish the visual from 
the auditory elements.  Thus we will speak of mental images wherever there is the 
possibility of confusion.  Our definition of the mental image encompasses both image 
and sound.  Sound is often synchronous with the visual aspect of the mental image, 
but may also constitute such an image in its own right.  
 
We will use the terms ‘classical’ and ‘modern’ cinema to refer to the different eras of 
filmmaking which are essentially separated by the end of World War II (pre-1945 
cinema is classical, post-1945 modern).  But in using these terms, even in the most 
general way, we must remember that much contemporary cinema still adheres to 
classical principles, just as much pre-1945 cinema, particularly in Europe and Russia, 
can be described as modern.  Since, in classical cinema, the distinctions between past 
and present are clear, I use the term present to refer to the temporal space which 
serves as the ground from which we can distinguish both the past and the various 
forms of imagination (dream, hallucination, etc.). 
 
In Chapter 2 we will come to consider the different functions of recollection through 
the prism of film narrative theory.  In Narration in the Fiction Film, David Bordwell 
uses the Russian formalist terms, fabula and syuzhet, to distinguish the chronological 
succession of narrative events from the order in which they are presented.  These 




(syuzhet).  Through flashback the syuzhet presents fabula events out of sequence.
9
 
Generally speaking, memories which present fabula events which occur subsequent to 
the first syuzhet event (what Bordwell calls internal flashback), and those which, on 
the contrary, precede the first syuzhet event (external flashback), perform distinct 
functions.  
 
In Chapter 2 we will also come to consider the amplitude of various recollections. 
‘“Amplitude” is Genette’s term for the duration of the event within the analepse 
[flashback]’.
10
 Compare, for instance, the amplitude of Jedediah Leland’s flashback in 
Citizen Kane (Orson Welles, 1941) — which features the famous montage sequence 
in which nine years pass at the breakfast table — with that of the flash-inserts in The 
Pawnbroker (Sidney Lumet, 1965), in which the amplitude of the recollection 
coincides precisely with the time which elapses in the present. 
 
Corpus 
Representations of mental images in the cinematic and televisual media is such a vast 
topic that, in deciding on a corpus, we had to take some firm decisions about what to 
exclude.  Therefore, we decided early on that we would focus on cinema and not on 
television, although there are many compelling representations of mental images in 
television.
11
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The corpus of films discussed is determined by the relevance of each film to the 
themes of the topic.  That is, in selecting films for analysis, the sole criterion was this: 
does the film contain representations of mental images?  We discuss films wherever 
the answer to this question is affirmative.  The corpus covers a broad range of 
cinema’s history, from some silent films, through classical Hollywood films, Latin 
American cinema and European art cinema, up to present-day modern cinema.  We 
have deliberately sought to engage with as wide a range of films — from different 
generic, national and historical contexts — as possible.  We focus throughout on 
narrative cinema, because representations of mental images of people in documentary 
films are extremely unusual.
12
 We develop our argument through the analyses of a 
great number of films.  (Where the film was produced in another country, as far as 
possible, we have included the title in the language of origin.)  We are not concerned 
to hierarchise or assert preference between eras of cinema, national cinemas, genres or 
specific directors.  The disadvantages of this system are that some eras, genres and 
national cinemas are inevitably underrepresented, and there is no room for discussion 
of fascinating cases from television, such as Dennis Potter’s Pennies from Heaven 
(1978), The Singing Detective, and Lipstick on Your Collar (1993). 
 
Thesis structure 
In this section we will preview the structure of the thesis — the organisation of 
chapters — as well as discussing some of the key literature and theories which we 
will draw on in each section.  The thesis consists of two main parts: memory and 
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imagination.  In Part I there are two chapters — 1. Flashback and 2. Act of memory.  
The chapters in Part II comprise a taxonomy of the various forms of imagination 
(Chapters 3-7).   
 
Chapter 1 focuses on flashback, assessing the relationship between this device and 
memory.  In this chapter we establish important distinctions between various forms of 
flashback.  In 1916, psychologist Hugo Münsterberg went some way towards 
introducing the fundamental distinction that we establish here, between those 
flashbacks which are prompted by acts of recollection and those prompted by acts of 
narration.
13
 Since Münsterberg, however, few film theorists have shared this interest 
in the capacity of cinema to depict mental images.  And so here, heedful of the 
historical developments in film practice since Münsterberg’s writings, we revisit and 
develop his important distinction.   
 
In its current usage, the term ‘flashback’ applies equally to all filmic representations 
of anteriority.  No doubt this is convenient, but in speaking and writing about film, we 
must aspire toward greater specificity than this.  From a phenomenological 
perspective, what is the ontological status of a given sequence?  Does it represent the 
mental images of a remembering subject, or is it something else, an analogue of the 
mental images of memory or the realisation of a recounted narrative?  The term 
‘flashback’ is entrenched in the terminology and discourse about film, but in its 
current generally accepted usage, the term covers the gamut of filmic representations 
of the past.  If ‘flashback’ is to remain the term that we use to designate anterior 
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scenes, then we must surely begin to introduce some qualifying terminology that 
would increase specificity.  Bordwell’s distinction between internal and external 
flashbacks is a significant move in this direction.  But more important than this, for 
us, is the ontological question. 
 
In Chapter 2, we distinguish flashback from what we call act of memory, arguing that 
act of memory has more to do with the process of remembering, since it represents 
mental images.  In positing this distinction, we aim to redress an inadequacy in 
current terminology.  However, structuring the argument on the basis of this 
distinction has some notable implications.  Firstly, it is not only film criticism which 
thus far has not recognised our proposed distinction, but — and this is what has 
undesirable implications for the presentation of our argument — the vast majority of 
filmmakers, too, are, have been, and will continue to be impervious to any such 
distinction.  That is, many films mix or alternate freely between what we will call 
flashback-for-memory and act of memory, indifferent to the — for us significant — 
differences which we will identify between the two procedures.   
 
Ideally, all references to a given film would be limited to the same passage of writing.  
But our identification of mental images is established on the basis of an ontological 
distinction, and if this distinction truly warrants the significance which we attribute to 
it, then it must form the template for the organisation of our argument.  The thesis is 
thus structured on the basis of a phenomenological taxonomy, which means that 
discussion of some films — often the most interesting films, those that present a 
variety of forms of mental images — rather than being presented all together, will 




this is the case, through our discussion of the functions of the various forms of mental 
images, we will re-establish thematic continuity.  (In cases where it is impractical to 
fragment the discussion of a given film, we confine discussion of the film to as few 
separate sections as possible, while making clear any phenomenological distinctions 
between given sequences.)   
 
While Part I discusses representations of the remembered past, Part II aims to cover 
the broader field of imagination (the imagined past, present and future).  Part II is 
organised in terms of Sartre’s ‘pathology of imagination’, with the theme of madness 
becoming more and more prominent in each successive chapter.  Thus we commence 
Part II with a chapter exploring imagination in general (Chapter 3).  Chapter 4 
concentrates on imagined voices.  In Chapters 5-7, we deal with the three broad 
classes of imagination imagery: fantasy (Chapter 5), dream (Chapter 6), and 
hallucination (Chapter 7).  After an initial discussion of the basic form and function of 
representations of imagination in cinema, Part II assumes a taxonomical aspect, 
distinguishing between the major forms of imagination, the different scenarios or 
narrative situations which give rise to, and the various character types who 
experience, such imaginings.  The specific organisation of Part II, rather than simply 
presenting an inventory of various states of imagination, is in fact, the necessary 
framework for the elaboration of our central argument in this section, namely, that 
many of cinema’s representations of imagination are closely related to themes of 
madness.   
 
It may be argued that all recollections are, in fact, acts of imagination, that whenever 




more imaginary embellishments than we realise.  This is a compelling argument, to 
which we shall return in Part II when we discuss Sartre’s notion of ‘quasi observation’ 
(the specific mode of consciousness with which we confront the image).  
Nevertheless, for now I urge the reader to accept the broad distinction I posit, for 
purposes of expositional clarity, between memory and imagination. 
 
Methodology 
In Chapter 1 we draw on film narrative theory, since it is here that theorists have 
sought to distinguish between different varieties of flashback.  Towards the end of 
Chapter 1, however, we introduce the question of the ontological status of filmic 
representations of anteriority.  Overall, as the argument develops henceforth, our 
method is primarily phenomenological.  We consider questions of form — the 
cinematic language in which representations of mental images are articulated and are 
recognisable or momentarily strategically disguised — and utility — the functions 
which representations of mental images perform.  In Chapter 2 we introduce Alan 
Richardson’s cognitive psychological theory of the image, as outlined in his Mental 
Imagery (1969), in an effort to understand possible reasons for the specific form of 
some representations of memory.  Richardson remains an important point of reference 
in Part II. 
 
We commence Chapter 3 with a brief review of Richardson’s theory of mental 
imagery, before exploring Sartre’s phenomenology of the image, as elaborated in his 
L’Imaginaire.  Chapter 4 consists of an analysis of imagined voices in film.  Here our 
approach is neoformalist and we have no recourse to any overarching theoretical 




5, we draw on Sartre’s phenomenology of daydreaming, and how this state is 
distinguished from normal waking consciousness and the dream state.  In this chapter 
we also draw on Francine Stock’s cognitive analysis of fantasy in film, from her 
article ‘Fantasy, Imagination, and Film’.
14
 In Chapter 6, Freud’s psychoanalytic 
approach to dreams is an important point of reference, as is Sartre’s phenomenology 
of dreaming.  In Chapter 7, we draw on Sartre’s theory of hallucination, as well as on 
Richardson’s cognitive theory.  Overall, however, our approach remains 
phenomenological — to the extent that we are concerned with mental images — and 
neoformalist, in that we are concerned with how these images are depicted in filmic 
language.   
 
Our argument is formed around close textual analyses of the films themselves.  In 
analysing a significant number of films, themes emerge, and our argument is 
structured around the identification, development and analysis of these themes.  
Because the argument is structured in this way, the reader will find that upon 
concluding a discussion of one film, we proceed to discuss another from a quite 
different era or generic context.  In proceeding in this way the intention is not to 
disorient the reader, but to demonstrate that phenomenological trends in cinematic 
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I encountered problems in undertaking a search of relevant literature, to the extent that 
nobody has hitherto undertaken a comprehensive study of representations of mental 
images in cinema.  In this section I will therefore identify the major texts and theories 
that I draw from throughout the thesis and explain how and why they are of relevance 
to my project. 
 
The major point of reference in Chapter 1 is Maureen Turim’s Flashbacks in Film 
(1989).  Turim’s book is the most comprehensive study of the flashback as a 
narrational device.  This thesis is both broader and, in another sense, narrower than 
Turim’s book in scope.  Broader, in that we are not concerned solely with memory — 
in Part II we deal with the various forms of imagination.  However, our scope in Part I 
is significantly narrower than Turim’s in that, because we are concerned exclusively 
with representations of mental images, many of the films and flashbacks which Turim 
discusses are irrelevant for our purposes.  In Part I, rather than considering the history 
of filmic representations of anteriority (which is essentially what Turim does), our 
concern is to identify the essential characteristics of those flashbacks which do not 
represent the mental images of memory.  Having demonstrated why they do not, we 
can then dispense with them in order to focus on those representations of anteriority 
which do represent the mental images of memory.  Turim considers questions as to 
the phenomenological status of flashbacks — whether or not they can be said to 
represent the mental images of memory — only in a cursory way.  She makes no 
attempt to systematise, as we will, a method of distinction between those filmic 
representations of anteriority which represent the mental images of memory and those 





Turim’s book remains an important point of reference throughout Chapter 2, where 
we also examine and compare Henri Bergson’s theory of memory as outlined in 
Matière et Mémoire (1912) and Marcel Proust’s theory of memory, elaborated in À la 
recherche du temps perdu, considering what each of these theories can tell us about 
representations of memory in cinema.  The style and approach of these two authors is 
clearly very different, but there are some important points of comparison between 
their respective theories of memory, which we will aim to bring out here.  In Part II, 
we draw on Sartre’s phenomenology of imagination as developed in his early 
theoretical works Imagination: A Psychological Critique (1936) and L’Imaginaire.  In 
Imagination: A Psychological Critique, Sartre explores the history of theories of 
imagination, as elaborated by a variety of philosophers, and exposes the weaknesses 
of each theory, before finally advocating Husserl’s theory, and sketching an outline of 
his own phenomeonological theory of imagination.  This theory is comprehensively 
expanded in L’Imaginaire, which elaborates a ‘pathology of imagination’, from 
daydreaming, through hypnagogic images and the dream proper, to hallucination.   
 
In Part II, we also examine cognitive theories of imagination, as outlined in 
Richardon’s Mental Imagery (1969) and E.R Jaensch’s Eidetic Imagery and 
Typological (1930), both of which examine the results of psychological tests of 
memory imagery, after-imagery, eidetic imagery, and imagination imagery.  In 
Chapter 6 there are several references to Freud’s Die Traumdeutung (The 
Interpretation of Dreams) (1900), which remains arguably the most significant 





Much of the work on memory and imagination in film studies comes from the field of 
spectatorship.
15
  To the extent that spectatorship studies deal with themes of memory 
and imagination they are, in a sense, thematically related to the concerns of this 
project.  However, this work, fascinating as much of it is, is of limited relevance to 
our project, which is concerned not with the mental work of the spectator, but with 
that of the characters on screen.   
 
We now commence our study of representations of mental images in cinema with a 
discussion of the form and use of flashback, examining its relation to the mental 
images of memory. 
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Not all filmic representations of anteriority represent the mental images of memory.  
We must therefore establish a means of distinguishing the mental images of memory 
from other filmic representations of the past which do not represent the mental images 
of memory, or which only apparently do so.  In this chapter we explore the relation 
between flashback and memory.  The term ‘flashback’ currently covers the entire 
field of cinema’s representations of anteriority.  But what is the value of such a ductile 
term?  Of fundamental importance for us is the ontological status of the images 
presented.  Are they the mental images of a remembering subject, or are they 
autonomous acts of narration, their development essentially independent from the 
mental processes of the remembering subject?  Having examined flashback we will be 
in a position to distinguish it from more properly subjective representations of the 
past.   
 
We commence the chapter with a brief discussion of flashback in silent film, which 
draws significantly on Maureen Turim’s research in this area.  We then introduce a 
taxonomy of flashbacks, distinguishing most importantly between those flashbacks 
which are prompted by the recounting of a narrative and those which are prompted by 
recollection.  We will then consider the various objects and situations which trigger 
those flashbacks which are prompted by acts of recollection.  Next we examine 
aspects of presentation, such as the elements of filmic language which enable us to 
recognise flashbacks, and the ways in which flashback has been explored and 
redefined with the innovations of modern cinema.  Then we discuss the various 




flashback, which distinguish it from more properly subjective filmic representations 
of anteriority, which will be the subject of Chapter 2. 
 
Flashback in silent film 
In Flashbacks in Film (1989) Turim notes the importance of the “vision” scene in 
early film.  Prior to 1910, flashbacks ‘are difficult to distinguish from vision scenes 
that are meant to be understood as imaginary, or actions that happen simultaneously, 




[t]he notion of a “vision” scene seems to have predominated over that of the 
flashback in films before 1910...The very notion of vision, of an imaginary 
seeing, may be closer to the spirit of much early cinema than the more 




In considering flashback in early film, Turim acknowledges that there is a dearth of 
extant material from this period, and so she has recourse to secondary sources.  Early 
criticism of the flashback, such as that of Epes Winthrop Sargent, in his Technique of 
the Photoplay (1911), 
 
not only indicates a certain prominence of flashbacks prior to 1911 to which 
he is reacting, but also an attitude that, if not successful in suppressing the 
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flashback, perhaps led to its more dynamic narrative coding and its 




Citing early screenwriting manuals, such as Marguerite Bertsch’s How to Write for 
Moving Pictures (1917) and Howard Dimick’s Modern Photoplay Writing (1922), 
Turim further demonstrates that there was contemporary resistance to the flashback.
19
 
Psychologist and early film theorist Hugo Münsterberg embraced flashback as a 
technique for objectifying the subjective experience of memory, but with the caveat 
that flashback is ineffective wherever the film ‘as not seldom happens, uses this 
pattern as a mere substitute for words’.
20
   
 
When we consider Turim’s review of the use of flashback in silent cinema, it seems 
Münsterberg had good reason to be wary of the trend for flashback to substitute for 
verbal dialogue.  Flashbacks first developed in silent cinema as a means of bypassing 
‘cumbersome verbal titles’.
21
 Given the verbal restriction of silent cinema, the 
flashback emerged as a ‘visual means of compensation for the eloquent narrative 
alternatives offered by the word in the novel and verbal theatrical forms’.
22
 In silent 
cinema, writes Turim, flashbacks frequently ‘substitute images for dialogue or voice-
over commentary [...] Titles, freed by an image flashback from the responsibility of 
narrating the entire story from the past,’ could then be reserved for significant 
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dialogue, or as ‘the equivalent of voice-over commentary’.
23
 Thus the flashback 
which is substituted for the recounting of a story emerged in silent cinema as an 
economic means to convey narrative anteriority, freeing up written titles to perform a 
more dynamic role.  In late silent cinema flashback is   
 
used increasingly as a semiotic substitution.  As more and more American 
films of the twenties are adaptations [...] the flashback becomes a means of 
filmically presenting theatrical and novelistic modes of narration [...] the 




Indeed, ‘[i]t is possible to see the use of the flashback in the late silent period as part 
of the compensation for the lack of sound and as an anticipation of the use of 
sound.’
25
 The development of this use of flashback in silent cinema, Turim notes, ‘has 
broad aesthetic consequences’ which ‘carry over to sound film’.
26
 Though a past 
event can be narrated in sound much more easily than by written titles, where a past 
event is to be recounted in the sound film, ‘the rich functions’ of flashback narration 
will often remain ‘an aesthetic choice’.
27
 In the sound film flashback becomes ‘a 
means [...] to avoid the static aspects of long verbal renderings […] The flashback as 
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Taxonomy of flashbacks 
In classical cinema there soon developed a variety of forms of flashback.  In this 
section we identify the major forms of flashback in narrative cinema. 
 
Flashback-for-narrative (to listening subject) 
As Turim’s discussion has established, a great many flashbacks are prompted by one 
character recounting a story to another.  In such cases, flashback replaces the verbal 
account of a past event by a character in the present.  An alternative to simply 
watching and listening to the subject narrate the event, flashback offers a realisation 
of the recounted scenes.  We will henceforth designate such episodes flashback-for-
narrative (to listening subject), since in such cases flashback substitutes the verbal 
narration of a past event to a listening subject (a character within the diegesis).
 29
 
Citizen Kane is structured around a series of such flashbacks.   
 
Flashback-for-narrative (to spectator) 
Alternatively, the voice of the recounting subject may be internal.  We will call those 
flashbacks which replace (or are the proper realisation of) a narrative that is recounted 
to and for the spectator, flashback-for-narrative (to spectator).  Brief Encounter 
(David Lean, 1945) consists of a series of such flashbacks.  In her voiceover, Laura 
inwardly speaks to herself, and, at the same time, addresses her thoughts to the 
spectator.  Like the ‘narrational voice’ in a novel, such voices implicitly acknowledge 
the fact of the fiction.   
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 We find early examples of this device in silent films such as Du skal aere din hustra (Master of 







A subsidiary form of flashback-for-narrative is the (usually short) flashback, in which 
the voice of the recounting subject continues throughout the past scene.  Here 
flashback is not so much substituted for narrative, as it appears with narrative (the 
voiceover of the recounting subject), as a supplement.  Thus we will term these, 
flashback-with-narrative.  JFK (Oliver Stone, 1991) is replete with flashback-with-
narrative.  The stories of witness after witness, speaker after speaker, are 
supplemented by images of the scenes described.  And again, within this sub-group 
the previous distinction applies: flashback-with-narrative can, as in JFK, be addressed 
to a listening subject within the diegesis, or it may be addressed to the spectator. 
 
Flashback-for-memory 
Another genus of flashbacks is motivated by recollection.  We will henceforth 
designate such episodes flashback-for-memory, since in such cases flashback is 
substituted for the memory of a past event.  Some films, such as Le jour se lève 
(Marcel Carné, 1939), are structured around a series of such flashbacks.  Very 
occasionally we find a sequence in which it is difficult to distinguish between 
flashback-for-narrative and flashback-for-memory.
30
 While flashback-for-narrative is 
prompted by the recounting of a narrative, flashback-for-memory may be prompted 
by various means.  
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Flashback-for-memory is usually triggered by a material prompt.  Some aspect of the 
present environment prompts a recollection.  There is a connection, a resemblance, 
which, if one is mentally predisposed to remember, may even be quite remote, 
between the prompt in the present and some aspect of the remembered scene.   
 
Each of the three flashbacks in A Letter to Three Wives (Joseph Mankiewicz, 1949) is 
prompted by sound: the sound of the boat while the little girl reads; the enigmatic 
Addie Ross’s haunting voice repeating the troubling questions: Why didn’t George go 
fishing … and why was he all dressed up?
31
 becomes technically modulated, 
morphing into the voice on a radio within Rita’s flashback; the rhythm of water from 
a leaking pipe dripping into a bucket in the changing room of the present becomes 
that of a dripping pipe in Lora Mae’s kitchen in her flashback.  Some flashbacks are 
prompted by the performance of music.  In Casablanca, Rick instructs Sam to play 
‘As Time Goes By’, and the song prompts a flashback, which presents an exposition 
of Rick’s romance with Ilsa in Paris prior to the German occupation.
32
 Sometimes a 
line of dialogue prompts a flashback.  In 8 ½ (Federico Fellini, 1963) the psychic duo, 
Maia and the magician, perform their magic on Guido, and Maia transcribes his 
thoughts onto a blackboard: ‘asa nisi masa’.  Guido confirms that she has read his 
mind correctly.  But what does it mean?  The nonsense phrase prompts Guido to recall 
a childhood scene.   
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Returning to a particular place often prompts a flashback.  In Once Upon a Time in 
America (Sergio Leone, 1984), Noodles visits his friend Fat Moe at the bar he owns 
and which, when they were children, was owned by Moe’s father.  Noodles looks 
through a hole in the wall of the toilet and we enter a flashback in which the young 
Noodles, through the same hole in the wall, voyeuristically observes Moe’s sister 
practise her ballet dancing.   
 
Sometimes a similarity between the present situation and some aspect of the past will 
prompt a flashback.  The early part of Il conformista (Bernardo Bertolucci, 1970) 
features several flash-forwards to the moments immediately preceding the film’s 
climactic action.  In one of these sequences, Clerici argues with the driver, 
Manganielli, and orders him to stop the car, before getting out and walking ahead.  
Then, as Manganielli drives alongside Clerici, urging him to re-enter the car, we cut 
to flashback images of a schoolboy, the young Clerici, walking, a car following 
behind him.  The intercutting between flashback and flash-forward establishes an 
association between the situations: when in the flash-forward Clerici acquiesces and 
re-enters the car, in the flashback the young Clerici steps into the road and signals for 
the car to stop.  Eventually the present re-emerges, establishing the justification for 
the flashback: in preparation for his marriage Clerici has gone to confession.  These 
flashback excerpts provide a context for the central episode of his confession: as an 
adolescent he was seduced by an effeminate homosexual chauffeur, whom he then 
murdered.  The juxtaposition of flash-forward and flashback establishes an analogy 
between the two situations.  The conduct of the young Clerici in the flashback 
becomes a metaphor for that of the adult Clerici, whose involvement with the Fascist 




with the chauffeur, but when it is time to submit himself to him, he shoots (and 
apparently kills) him.  As an adult, Clerici is courted by and then joins and works for 
the Fascist Party, but renounces Fascist ideology and denies involvement as soon as 
Mussolini is defeated.  When at the end of the film he convinces himself that a man 
whom he meets is the chauffeur he shot as a child, and accuses him of being a fascist, 
the metaphor becomes embodied.  Clerici identifies signifier (chauffeur) with 
signified (fascism): ‘Fascist!’  The personal and the political are condensed: 
‘Paederast!  Fascist!’  Clerici rejects Fascism as he had rejected homosexuality.  Just 
as a paederast corrupts innocent youths, so Fascism corrupted the Italian people.  In 
the figure of the chauffeur of his childhood, Clerici equates Fascism with 
homosexuality and violently rejects both at once.  
 
Having enumerated the various ways in which flashback is prompted, we will next 
consider some aspects of the form of flashback, both specific to the device itself and 






The ‘present’ sometimes functions as little more than a pretext which situates the 
main narrative in the past: a character recounts or remembers a past event and we 
enter a flashback, which continues sometimes for almost the duration of a film, before 
we return to the present.  From the flashback we may return to the present for a time 
before entering a further flashback, thus effectively segmenting the narrative frame.  
This segmentation may be formalised, as in Sergeant Rutledge (John Ford, 1960), a 
courtroom drama in which the testimonies of each of the six witnesses prompts a 
flashback of comparable duration.  With narration thus divided, the present functions 
as a relay-board, returning each time to a different past or to the same past but, 
recounted from a different character’s perspective.   
 
Ordinarily the processes by which flashback is conventionally motivated — 
recollection, recounting — serve to naturalise it within the fiction, but when the 
present becomes a relay-board, flashback ‘can serve to self-consciously expose the 
mechanisms of filmic narration’.
33
 The spectator then becomes ‘suspended between 
two different ways of looking at temporal manipulations within film images, one that 
is aware of the formal operations of narrative and one that forgets these elements due 
to naturalising processes within the fiction’.
34
 Near the end of Le Doulos (Jean-Pierre 
Melville, 1962), when Silien offers his grand exposition, explaining to Maurice 
precisely what he has been up to all along, we cut back and forth between the present 
of the café and the various past scenes recounted.  In such cases, the past scenes are 
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usually presented in chronological sequence.  When employed in this way, with so 
many flashbacks condensed into such a brief time, narration becomes particularly 
self-reflexive.   
 
Flashback-within-flashback 
Sometimes, within a flashback, another flashback occurs.  We find the most striking 
instance of this phenomenon in The Saragossa Manuscript (Wojciech Has, 1965), 
which presents flashbacks-within-flashbacks in an intricately layered narrative.
35
 Van 
Worden and several others listen to the stories of Señor Avadoro, who tells of his 
visiting Lopez Suarez, who is in bed with a broken leg (flashback).  Lopez recounts to 
Avadoro the story (flashback-within-flashback) of how his father, the merchant 
Gaspar Suarez, sent him to Madrid, warning him never to associate with the banker, 
Moro.  In Madrid, after meeting Don Roque Busqueros, Lopez visits Buen Retiro 
gardens where he meets Lady Inez, with whom he instantly falls in love.  But Lopez 
despairs when he learns that Inez is the daughter of Moro, and, disconsolate, returns 
to Buen Retiro to weep over his misfortune.  To cheer him up Busqueros tells him the 
story (flashback-within-flashback-within-flashback) of how one day he climbed a 
ladder outside a house and entered a woman’s bedroom through the window.  Having 
frightened her husband away, Busqueros climbs into bed with the beautiful 
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Occasionally, since it often represents the story of a given character, flashback 
remains inconclusive, the events it imparts being confined to the (limited) knowledge 
of the recounting subject.  In such cases the same event is sometimes presented from 
more than one perspective.  In The Barefoot Contessa (Joseph Mankiewicz, 1953), for 
instance, from Oscar’s perspective, Bravano’s upbraiding of Maria is inexplicable, 
and so it seems excessively malicious.  However, when the incident is revisited in 
Torlato-Favrini’s flashback, the reason for Bravano’s outburst is elucidated.   
 
Unreliable narration and the False 
Whether prompted by an act of recollection or narration, or emerging autonomously, 
the events depicted in flashback generally possess an assumed integrity.  That is, 
because of the authority which is the prerogative of flashback, unless explicitly 
directed otherwise, we generally grant the events it depicts the same credence which 
we grant events of the present.  But sometimes, where a flashback animates the verbal 
account of a recounting subject, we find interesting inconsistencies or disparities 
between flashback content and the assumed/suggested account of the narrator.  
Sometimes flashback presents events which it seems unlikely that the recounting 
subject would disclose.  In Le fantôme de la liberté (Luis Buñuel, 1974), the police 
commissioner (one of the two men who are, or claim to be, the police commissioner) 
meets, in a bar, a woman who bears an uncanny resemblance to his dead sister.  He 
tells her: ‘I remember a summer afternoon, it was unbearably hot ... ’ and we enter a 
flashback,. in which the man enters a room where his sister is sitting naked playing 




ordinary.  While she plays, he drops his matches, and as he retrieves them, we cut to a 
low-angled shot, presenting a view of the woman’s lower half as she sits at the piano.  
In cases such as this we must consider to what extent flashback corresponds to the 
account which the recounting subject verbalises.  Ordinarily, one would imagine that 
in recounting this story the narrator would omit such details, significant though they 
are.  (In this case we might consider to what extent flashback content exceeds the 
account of the recounting subject.)   
 
In other cases, there is no need to speculate as to what we imagine the verbal content 
of the recounting subject’s account to be, since the narrating voice continues 
throughout the flashback, making explicit any disparities between flashback content 
and the account of the recounting subject.  Thus, in The Beguiled (Don Siegal, 1971), 
when McBurney — insisting that he is a Quaker, on the battlefield only to help the 
wounded — tells the headmistress about how he came to be wounded, the flashback 
presents him shooting a Union soldier from his perch in a tree.  He proceeds to 
explain that he was wounded in an attempt to save a rebel officer, while the flashback 
presents him shooting a man who goes to the aid of the person he had previously shot. 
 
In Stage Fright (Alfred Hitchcock, 1950) Hitchcock makes exceptional use of 
flashback, exploiting its generally assumed integrity to lead us to understand that 
Johnny, like several previous Hitchcock protagonists, is an innocent man, implicated 
in a crime he did not commit.  Subsequently, however, we discover that he was 
lying.
36
 We will return to this question of the correlation between the 
assumed/implied account of the narrator and flashback content towards the end of this 
                                                 
36
 Other films in which there are false flashbacks include Crossfire (Edward Dmytryk, 1947), The 




chapter, when we come to consider the relation between flashback and the mental 
images of memory. 
 
Focal inconsistency 
In narrative theory, focalisation is the perspective from which an event is presented.  
In classical cinema, flashback content often exceeds the possible knowledge of the 
recounting or remembering subject, but some modern films exploit this tendency to 
the extent that it becomes conspicuous and self-reflexive.  Consider the revelatory 
flashback in Tirez sur le pianiste (François Truffaut, 1962).  Upon arriving in Léna’s 
flat, Charlie freezes before a poster of concert pianist Edouard Saroyan.  Léna says, 
‘Charlie’s a café pianist, but it used to be different, didn’t it, Edouard? ... ’ The 
flashback is thus ostensibly narrated from Léna’s perspective and, after Theresa’s 
suicide in the flashback, Léna’s voiceover recounts how Edouard became Charlie, a 
bar pianist.  But the flashback content exceeds Léna’s knowledge.  The crucial 
information which it imparts — that Theresa was depressed because of her guilt over 
sleeping with Schemeel — Léna has no access to.  Moreover, though the flashback is 
initiated by Léna, Charlie’s internal monologue continues to reveal his thoughts 
within the flashback.  Here, then, far from being surreptitiously concealed or ignored, 
illogical inconsistencies in focalisation are brazenly celebrated. 
 
Flashback and dream 
Occasionally we find that a sequence presented as a dream functions exactly like a 
flashback, that is, we grant credence to the events it presents in their relevance to the 
story outside of the dream.  Casualties of War (Brian De Palma, 1989) opens with 




Vietnamese jungle, and the film’s main narrative is thus presented as though it were a 
dream.  But dream is here utilised as a narrative contrivance; the narrative is more 
usefully understood as unfolding within a flashback frame.  The film tells the story of 
a picket of young U.S. soldiers who kidnap, rape, assault and then murder a 
Vietnamese peasant girl.  Erikson is the only one who doesn’t participate in the 
kidnap and he subsequently brings charges against his colleagues.  At the end of the 
film, the men are convicted and face heavy prison sentences.  As they exit the 
courtroom, the soundtrack presents Erikson’s recollection of the commander’s earlier 
caution: ‘Even if these men do get convicted, they’re not gonna do any real time.’  In 
recalling these words, then, Erikson is revelling in ironic vindication (the commander 
was wrong — the men received stern sentences).  But he also recalls the commander’s 
subsequent comments.  As the men file out of court, Meserve whispers something in 
Erikson’s ear, but we don’t hear what he says; rather, Erikson’s recollection of the 
commander’s warning continues: ‘ ... If I were them, I’d be looking for a little 
payback! Wouldn’t you?’  (The commander’s caution is substituted for Merserve’s 
whispered threat.)  This jolts Erikson awake and we return to the present; the entire 
narrative has unfolded within a frame while Erikson has been asleep on the bus.  The 
framing device situates the story in the past in order to demonstrate Erikson’s 
lingering psychological trauma.  But there is nothing in the narrative which resembles 
a dream until the moment Erikson awakens (it is conceivable that one could wake 
from a dream with the remembrance of such a nightmarish threat, which coincides 
with a jolt to the body as the bus stops).  Here, then, the narrative frame lends an 
equivocal status to Erikson’s recalled voice.  Since everything that occurs within the 
frame is presented as the real (not the dreamed) past, we automatically accept the 




commander’s earlier caution).  However, the moment of his waking lends a new 
quality to this voice, implying that it is part of a bad dream.  Thus the contrivance of 
the dream-frame is not entirely redundant — it has metaphorical significance.  When 
in the epilogue the girl says to Erikson, ‘You had a bad dream, didn’t you?  It’s over 
now, I think’, her words have a broader significance: while the incident on the patrol 
really did happen, Erikson remembers it as though it were a bad dream, just as, one 
might argue, in the national memory of the U.S., the Vietnam War has become a bad 
dream. 
 
Elsewhere, a matter of narrative convenience, the conflation of dream and flashback 
demonstrates an insufficient appreciation or recognition of the forms and functions 
peculiar to the dream.  This is precisely the trouble with the dream sequences in 
Solaris (Stephen Soderbergh, 2002).  The planet Solaris generates replica human 
beings from the memories of humans while they sleep.  Chris’s dream presents his 
memory of the first time he saw his dead wife Rheya, and their subsequent meeting at 
a party.  Chris sits opposite an attractive young woman on a train.  She smiles at him 
from the platform after alighting from the train.  Later, at his friend Gibarian’s party, 
Chris sees the woman again.  They flirt, leave the party together and then make love.  
The extended sequence at the party in no way resembles a dream; this is flashback, 
and functions as flashback.  Waking from this first dream to find Rheya resurrected, 
Chris soon disposes of her by sending her out into space.  However, at night he 
dreams of her again and wakes to find her regenerated.  Dream and flashback are 
confounded once more, the dream presenting a series of chronological episodes which 
resume the backstory previously established: Chris raises the issue of marriage; after 




recollection or the recounting of a narrative; sometimes, as we will see, in modern 
cinema it emerges autonomously.  Here, though, Soderbergh announces a dream and 
presents a flashback.  (This confusing of dream and flashback is confirmed when, 
subsequently, Rheya’s artificial memories resume the backstory hitherto developed 
through Chris’s dreams.)
37
     
 
Many dreams contain elements which reference aspects of the dreamer’s life, her 
obsessions, the people in her life, significant past events, apparently insignificant and 
banal recent impressions.  Very occasionally, a dream may reproduce a significant 
memory, but representations of dreams which reproduce chronological histories, or 
present past events as they occurred, free of all the distorting tendencies of the 
censorship of the ego,
38
 are prosaic, and demonstrate a failure to grasp or to respect 





Having discussed the major aspects of the form of flashback, we will now consider 
what changes modern cinema has brought about in flashback. 
 
Flashback in modern cinema 
Lonestar (John Sayles, 1996) is in many ways a conventional narrative film, but its 
specific presentation of flashback usefully demonstrates some aspects of the 
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innovative treatment of this device in modern cinema.  Several times we pass into 
flashback with no discernible cut.  For instance, when Holace tells Sam the story of 
how Sam’s father Buddy Deeds forced the tyrant Sheriff Charlie Wade out of town.  
As Holace speaks the camera tilts down to frame a bowl of tortillas on the red 
tablecloth.  Holace says, ‘It started over a basket of tortillas ... ’ The camera then 
draws back, and we are in the flashback. 
 
At the conclusion of a flashback, we do not always return to the same present from 
which the flashback emerged.  Having heard that Chucho Montoya witnessed Wade 
murder Eladio Cruz, Sam visits Chucho, over the border in Mexico.  Chucho recounts 
his narrative, and we enter a flashback.  Eladio’s van has broken down on a bridge 
while he is crossing the border; he has several Mexican friends in the back of the 
vehicle.  While urinating beneath the bridge, the young Chucho sees a vehicle 
approaching and remains hidden.  It is Sheriff Wade.  Aware that Eladio is helping 
Mexicans to cross the border illegally, Wade instructs him to surrender any firearms.  
As soon as Eladio lays his hands on his shotgun, Wade shoots him in the back.  The 
flashback concludes with a shot of the young Chucho cowering beneath the bridge, 
petrified.  A tilt up reveals Sam, now at the scene of the crime which Chucho 
described to him, looking out across the bridge immediately above where the young 
Chucho had hidden forty years earlier.  The flashback emerges from one present and 
transports narration to another, temporally and geographically distinct. 
 
Sometimes flashback is presented in such a way as to establish a reverse subjective 
causality.  In Jackie Brown (Quentin Tarantino, 1997), as she leaves Ordell’s, Jackie 




Jackie and Ray talking at lunch, before cutting to a subsequent scene, a new present, 
in which Jackie describes to Max her conversation with Ray.  Upon cutting from 
Jackie leaving Ordell, to her meal with Ray, we assume that this is a new present.  
However, when we subsequently cut to Jackie’s conversation with Max, the lunch 
with Ray is revealed as having already happened (flashback).  Edward Branigan calls 




Transgression of temporal space 
Sometimes in modern cinema the threshold separating past and present is crossed.  In 
Annie Hall (Woody Allen, 1977) Alvy narrates a flashback of his childhood days.  
When the six-year-old Alvy is reprimanded by the teacher after kissing the girl sitting 
next to him, the adult Alvy appears within the flashback and interrogates the teacher 
— ‘Why?  I was just expressing a healthy sexual curiosity’ — and the teacher and the 
girl whom he kissed both interact with him.  As a putative past, the integrity of the 
flashback is ruptured by the presence of the adult Alvy, the scene becoming a self-
reflexive interrogation of the form of flashback.   
 
A subsequent flashback tells of Alvy’s relationship with Allison.  Their sex life is 
hindered by his obsession with conspiracy theories about the Kennedy assassination.  
Allison finally confronts him: ‘You’re using this conspiracy theory as an excuse to 
avoid sex with me.’  Alvy now addresses the camera directly from within the 
flashback: ‘Oh my God!  She’s right.  Why did I turn off Allison Forchnick?  She was 
beautiful ... ’  Thus, unlike the school flashback which featured two Alvies (the six-
year-old Alvy and the adult Alvy), here, where there is less of a gap between the time 
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of the present and that of the flashback, the Alvy of the flashback suddenly becomes 
the Alvy of the present, employing the past tense in his direct address (‘Why did I? 
[...] She was [...]’).  In several subsequent scenes Alvy, Annie and other characters 
from the present appear within flashbacks.  In each case the temporal and existential 




In outlining why, as a device, flashback is inadequate for a ‘cinema of time’, Deleuze 
explains, ‘even when an author proceeds by flashback, he subordinates the flashback 
to another process which gives it foundation’.
41
 That is, conventionally, flashbacks are 
logically and subjectively motivated, either by an act of narration or recollection.  But 
in modern cinema, we find flashbacks which emerge autonomously, ‘objective’ 
flashbacks.
42
 While in classical cinema, flashback-for-memory is typically prompted 
by a dissolve, in keeping with psychological theories of memory, such as that of 
Münsterberg, which states ‘that memory operates through association of images’, the 





In This Sporting Life (Lindsay Anderson, 1963) we pass back and forth between the 
present, in which Frank visits the dentist after having his teeth knocked out at rugby, 
and two ongoing pasts, the transitions often emerging autonomously.  When Frank 
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arrives at the Weavers’ Christmas party and installs himself in a bedroom, a flashback 
emerges, presenting him and his landlady Margaret and her children enjoying a day at 
the park.  From here, rather than return to Frank in the present, a second past emerges 
in which Frank plays rugby and then goes to the pub and sings.  Here, then, we pass 
directly from one past to another.  While the first flashback seems to be precipitated 
by Frank’s remembrance, the second emerges autonomously (we cut from Frank 
walking away from the lake with the son, to him out on the rugby pitch, in a different 
past). 
 
Medium Cool (Haskell Wexler, 1969) contains an objective flashback which is 
interesting in that, though it emerges autonomously, it is nevertheless situated such 
that, in its relation to the footage of the present which immediately precedes and 
follows it, it contributes to the articulation of an unmistakable social comment.  John 
has taken Ruth and her son Harold, who is a pigeon enthusiast, to a site at which there 
are hundreds of pigeons penned in traps.  John and Ruth talk, while Harold keenly 
observes the pigeons.  A flashback emerges in which Harold’s father, who is now 
serving in Vietnam, takes him for a walk and talks to him about women.  He must 
never forget that a man is the ruler of his house.  He must dominate his wife.  A wife 
belongs to a husband, but a husband does not belong to his wife.  As we return to the 
present, the pigeons are released from their traps and fly through the air in formation.  
Harold looks on in amazement.  This shot of the birds flying free represents a 
figurative repudiation of the father’s advice to his son in the flashback.  The free 
flying birds signify the movement for women’s emancipation from the oppressive 
patriarchal ideology which the father’s speech exemplifies.  Indeed, the developing 




liberation.  But the flashback is in no way subjective.  Harold does not remember the 
conversation with his father, and then, upon seeing the birds released, realise that his 
father is wrong.  Rather, the juxtaposition of the flashback, with the freeing of the 
pigeons in the present, creates a political significance that is for the spectator alone. 
 
Yawar Mallku (Jorge Sanjinés, 1969) is structured around a series of objective 
flashbacks, though here this series is triggered by an original act of narration.  Ignacio 
is shot by the police.  In the city, his brother Sixto and his wife Paulina take him to a 
hospital.  Ignacio needs blood, and neither Sixto’s nor Paulina’s blood is compatible, 
so they must raise the necessary money to buy the blood.  Sixto asks Paulina what 
happened, and she explains how she and Ignacio had three children and were very 
happy.  As she continues — ‘Then the epidemic came and all three died.’ — we enter 
a flashback.  Thus the flashback is substituted for Paulina’s verbal account.  
Henceforth, the narrative unfolds in a series of flashbacks, returning to the present at 
regular intervals.  Such a structure is common in classical cinema.  The difference 
here is that action does not remain in stasis in the present.  Instead, there is a radical 
urgency: Ignacio is dying; Sixto must find money to buy blood.  Thus when the first 
flashback concludes, Paulina is no longer recounting her narrative to Sixto; we cut to 
a new present, in which Sixto visits a friend and asks to borrow money, while Paulina 
waits at the hospital.  In the next flashback, after visiting the site where the children 
who died in the epidemic are buried, Ignacio and the villagers visit a neighbouring 
village and question the local people about the women’s fertility and what contact 
they have had with the fertility clinic.  For the remainder of the film, we pass back 
and forth between the two ongoing narratives: in the present, Sixto tries to raise 




Americans’ ‘fertility’ clinic is systematically rendering the local women sterile.  
While to some extent the original act of narration justifies and rationalises the 
subsequent flashbacks, these nevertheless emerge autonomously. 
 
In omitting the explicit signposting and motivation to which we are accustomed, This 
Sporting Life and Blood of the Condor demonstrate a treatment of flashback quite 
distinct from that in classical cinema.  Nevertheless, the objective flashback has since 
disseminated into more popular cinema and we find it in such contemporary films as 
Reservoir Dogs (Quentin Tarantino, 1992), The Funeral (Abel Ferrara, 1996) and 
Felicia’s Journey (Atom Egoyan, 1999). 
 






Flashback is frequently used as a means of narrative economy.  Years and decades 
may be condensed within a flashback.  At the start of Moulin Rouge (John Houston, 
1952), a flashback distils key episodes of Toulouse Lautrec’s past.  He was born into 
a wealthy aristocratic family.  One day he fell down the stairs, breaking both of his 
legs.  His legs remained the same length, while his upper-body grew.  Because of his 
disability he is unappealing to women.  He moves to Paris.  Thus we learn the history 
of Lautrec before the proper narrative commences. 
 
In modern cinema, the effect of flashback is often quite the opposite of narrative 
economy.  In The Wild Bunch (Sam Peckinpah, 1969) we enter a flashback as Pike 
recounts to his friend the story of how he came to be physically scarred.  His 
mistress’s husband came home and, catching Pike with his wife, opened fire, killing 
her and wounding him.  Pike explains, ‘there isn’t a day or an hour that passes’ that he 
doesn’t think of revenging himself on this man.  Since this narrative strand remains 
unresolved (Pike doesn’t catch up with this man), one might question the purpose of 
the flashback.  Unlike Lautrec’s tragic accident in Moulin Rouge — knowledge of 
which is important for the proper functioning of the plot — the story behind Pike’s 
scar is narratively irrelevant: Pike longs for the opportunity to avenge himself, but, as 
it turns out, such an opportunity does not arise.  Rather than advancing the narrative, 
the primary function of flashback here is to contribute to the psychological realism 
with which Peckinpah invests his characters, an aspect traditionally lacking in the 




Pike’s character which supplements character traits that have already been established 
— he is resolute, wilful, determined. 
 
Clear narrative motivation 
Sometimes the narrative situation essentially dictates the emergence of a flashback.  
Films with an investigative structure often contain flashbacks, and witness’s 
testimonies in courtroom scenes frequently motivate flashbacks.  Such narrative 
situations virtually demand the emergence of flashback.  In general, wherever a 
character is required to recount a significant past event, it is likely a flashback will 
emerge.  Rather than remain in the present for the duration of the story, we enter the 
recounted scene, which represents a more animated and narratively engaging version 
of the past. 
 
But, as we have seen, many flashbacks are motivated by recollection.  And, again, 
some scenarios demand the emergence of flashback-for-memory.  In Kill Bill, Vol. 2 
(Quentin Tarantino, 2004), the Bride confronts Bud, one of the men who participated 
in the massacre at her wedding rehearsal.  However, he has anticipated her arrival and 
is prepared; he buries her alive in a wooden coffin, nailed shut.  Here we enter a 
flashback entitled ‘The Cruel Tutelage of Pai Mei’, in which the Bride becomes a 
pupil of Pai Mei, who finally teaches her his secret ‘Five Point Palm Exploding Heart 
Technique’.  In the present, after freeing her hands and feet from their binding, the 
Bride calmly begins punching through the coffin using Pai Mei’s secret technique, 
and ultimately escapes.  Buried alive, it seems the Bride’s adventure is over.  But her 




how?  Flashback emerges here as deus ex machina, rescuing the film from a narrative 
impasse.   
 
Revelation 
The most common function of flashback is as revelation.  Since early film, flashbacks 
have performed this function.
44
 Such revelatory flashbacks usually occur towards the 
end of a film.  Some revelatory flashbacks are explicitly or implicitly influenced by 
psychoanalytic theory.  Throughout Marnie (Alfred Hitchcock, 1964) Hitchcock 
scatters indications that Marnie has a psychological condition which might explain the 
fact that she is a compulsive thief: she has a pathological dread of the colour red 
(whenever she is confronted with the colour — the gladiolas, the jockey’s spotted top 
at the racecourse, the red ink spilt on her white blouse — the screen is momentarily 
immersed in red and she becomes faint); she is likewise petrified, utterly immobilised 
by thunderstorms; she is haunted by a recurrent nightmare (there is a tapping noise; 
her mother comes to wake her, but Marnie doesn’t want to get out of bed; then the 
cold starts); finally, on her honeymoon with Rutland we discover that she appears to 
be irremediably sexually frigid.  In the final scene Rutland violently urges Marnie’s 
mother Bernice to recount the fateful events of the night of her ‘accident’, in the hope 
that this will prompt Marnie to confront her repressed memories of the traumatic 
night, and thereby overcome her complex.  He reveals to Bernice that he has read the 
archived publicity about her murder trial, and knows that she used to work as a 
prostitute.  Outraged, Bernice resists Rutland’s effort to compel her to remember, 
implores him to leave, and finally raises her fists to assault him.  It is this inadvertent 
re-enactment of elements of the forgotten night — the thunder and lightning storm, 
                                                 
44




Bernice ordering a man to leave her house, the ensuing physical struggle — which 
triggers Marnie’s memory: 
‘You let my Mama go!  You’re hurting my Mama!’ 
‘Who am I, Marnie?’ 
Rutland elicits from her that he is a sailor.  He taps three times on the wall, and 
Marnie — now embodying the child that she was — explains that this means that her 
mother has a visitor and she will have to get out of bed.  The ensuing flashback 
reveals that in his struggle with Bernice, the sailor fell on her and badly injured her 
leg.  It was, in fact, Marnie who killed the sailor with the fire poker, in an effort to 
defend her mother.  The traumatising sight of the man’s blood — a reminder of her 
violent action — is the root of her pathological fear of the colour red.  The flashback 
functions as revelation in a psychoanalytic sense, enabling Marnie to confront her 
psychological trauma and thereby overcome her repressions. 
 
While most revelatory flashbacks are external, that is, they present story events which 
occurred prior to the first plotted event, some revelatory flashbacks are internal, 
representing an episode which previously was partially or completely elided.  In Sex, 
Lies and Videotape (Stephen Soderbergh, 1989), Graham’s project of filming his 
conversations with women talking about their sex lives functions for him as an 
alternative to an actual sexual relationship.  He tells Ann, ‘I’m unable to get an 
erection in the presence of another person’, and a subsequent scene suggests that he 
masturbates while viewing the tapes.  At the same time, the interview format, which 
to some extent imitates the scenario of therapy between psychiatrist and patient — 
Graham encourages the women to share with him their most intimate secrets — 




Graham’s conversation with Ann, however, the roles are reversed; she assumes the 
role of interviewer.  Interestingly, this crucial scene is presented in a flashback.  John 
watches the videotape of the interview, and we enter a flashback.  The conversation 
performs a therapeutic function for both interlocutors.  Ann helps Graham to accept 
that his project is destructive, since it negatively affects the interviewees and their 
families.  His interview with her sister Cynthia — in which Cynthia disclosed the fact 
of her affair with John — has affected her own life adversely.  At the same time, 
Graham becomes a conduit through which Ann vents her frustration and anger.  The 
realisation that his hobby has so profoundly affected Ann has a reciprocal effect on 
Graham.  They console one another and as they are about to make love, he turns off 
the camera.  The revelation of the flashback — the conversation which the flashback 
presents — has several aspects.  Firstly, viewing the tape functions as a revelation for 
John.  When John learns from Ann that she made a recording with Graham, he jokes, 
‘Well I know you didn’t fuck him!’  (Ann is portrayed as frigid and prudish about 
sex.)  However, at the conclusion of their interview it is clear that Graham does make 
love with Ann.  On a more profound level, the conversation itself functions as a 
revelation for Graham, in two important but interrelated aspects.  He previously 
confided to Ann that he was impotent.  During her tirade, Ann identifies his hobby as 
his problem, and finally convinces him of this.  In turning off the camera before he 
and Ann make love, Graham conquers both of his problems — his hobby and his 
impotence — at once; and it is clear that what Graham understood to be two distinct 
and separate aspects of his life, are in fact fundamentally interrelated.  His hobby had 
developed as consolation for the absence of an actual sexual relationship.  Ann helps 
him to understand that, far from being a consequence, his hobby had become the 





The revelatory flashback-for-memory often elucidates some past event which will 
establish psychological motivation for habitual behaviour, as in Marnie, or illuminates 
previously obscure aspects of the plot.  Sometimes, however, in modern cinema this 
anticipated revelatory function of the flashback remains unfulfilled.  The flashback 
elucidates little, and the obscurity of the motivations and habitual behaviour of the 
remembering subject can even be compounded by flashback.  In Belle de Jour (Luis 
Buñuel, 1967) various episodes in the early part of the film establish that Séverine is 
becoming increasingly intrigued by the idea of prostitution and the brothel.  After 
dropping a vase of flowers and then a bottle of perfume, she says to herself, ‘What’s 
wrong with me today?’  A flashback emerges in which, as a young girl, she is held 
closely and kissed by a middle-aged man while her mother calls her from offscreen.  
The presence of the flashback seems to imply that this incident may account for 
Séverine’s specific libidinal development (she is frigid with her husband, while 
secretly harbouring masochistic sexual fantasies and a fascination with the taboo of 
life as a prostitute).  But the suggestion that she may have been sexually abused does 
not constitute an adequate psychological explanation for Séverine’s masochism.  
Turim asks, ‘Why do these events flash through her memory at these particular 
junctures in the present?’
45
 In contrast to the psychological causality which is often 
established in the classical flashback, these flashbacks involve ‘an adamant decision 
to avoid offering explanations all the while that they remain close to a psychological 
process and evoke possible causal and associative relationships through their 
placement in the film’s structure.’
46
 In modern cinema, then, rather than illuminating 
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aspects of a character or narrative, flashback can instead compound existing 
ambiguities and obscurities.   
 
In contrast to those revelatory flashbacks which occur towards the end of a narrative, 
elucidating some strategically established obscurity, near the beginning of Distant 
Voices, Still Lives (Terence Davies, 1988), Terence Davies uses flashback as an 
element of contrast, colouring an uneasy but tranquil image of the present with the 
subjective remembrance of past scenes.
47
 On the day of one daughter’s wedding, the 
family members are assembled before the camera in a static shot which seems to be 
justified as a prolonged pose for a wedding photograph.  From this tableau, the 
brother and sister’s flashbacks recall past scenes of the father’s violence, cruelty and 
stubbornness.  A contradiction is thus established, revealing a dark aspect of the 
family’s past.  The bride would have liked her dead father to have lived to see her 
wedding day; the sister is glad he is dead and recalls his brutal cruelty and violence; 
the son’s flashback reveals a bitter rivalry.  All this problematises the tableau of the 
present.  The juxtaposition of the rather forced happiness of the posing family 
members and the brutality of the memories produces an effect of dissonance.  
Meaning is created ‘not from forward impetus but from stark contrast or conflict’.
48
    
 
Soderbergh’s Solaris presents the memories of a regenerated surrogate of a dead 
woman.  As we have seen, Chris wakes to find that his dead wife Rheya has been 
resurrected.  But Rheya gradually learns that she is not a real person.  She recalls past 
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scenes, her memory continuing the backstory previously established in Chris’s 
dreams, which charts the development of their relationship.  She discovers that she is 
pregnant; Chris becomes impatient with her secrecy; they argue at a dinner party.  In 
the present, confused and slightly agitated, Rheya tells Chris, ‘I’m not the person I 
remember ... I do remember things, but ... I don’t remember being there.  I don’t 
remember experiencing those things.’ Chris brings her some pills to calm her.  This 
prompts her to recall trying to open a bottle of pills.  Rheya then recalls the decisive 
argument which followed Chris’s discovery that she had been pregnant but aborted 
their child; devastated, Chris leaves her.  She hysterically begs him to stay, and 
subsequently commits suicide, taking an overdose of pills.  Rheya’s discovery that she 
is not human accounts for her sense of incompleteness and dissatisfaction.  Though 
they evidently do not diminish her increasing sense of alienation, her memories do 
help Rheya to establish some sense of identity.  However, by presenting her memories 
as a continuation of the backstory established in Chris’s dreams, Soderbergh fails to 
grasp the nature of the experience and process of memory.  Rheya is comparable to 
someone suffering from amnesia who gradually recovers her memory.  But the notion 
that in such a case the past experiences of the recovering amnesiac would be 
reconstituted, little by little, in precisely the sequence they occurred, is problematic.  
On the contrary, this person’s memories would surely be reconstituted in a more 
desultory fashion; one memory might prompt a memory of an earlier incident, for 
instance.  Here, however, through the combination of Chris’s dreams and Rheya’s 
memories, Solaris presents a series of past scenes, which are all fortuitously arranged 
in a linear chronological progression, so that together they chart a narrative which 
runs parallel to that in the present.  It is quite possible for a film to present two 




Sporting Life, which presents a bifuricated form with temporally distinct developing 
narratives, the passage between temporal zones effected largely by objective 
flashbacks.  By contrast, here the attempt to establish logical motivation for the 




In Merry Christmas Mr. Lawrence (Nagisa Oshima, 1982), two prisoners of war 
incarcerated in adjacent cells communicate through the wall.  As Jack explains that he 
is plagued with guilt over his betrayal of his younger brother, we enter a flashback 
which shows how he allowed his brother to suffer the ordeal of the school’s initiation 
rites.  The other boys stripped him, forced him to sing and laughed at his singing; he 
never sang again. 
 
Nostalgia 
Flashbacks sometimes perform a nostalgic function.  Examples include the scenes in 
Memorias del Subdesarrollo (Memories of Underdevelopment) (Tomás Gutiérrez, 
1968), when Sergio returns to the huge house of his childhood friend, and when he 
later recalls his first sexual experiences at a brothel.  Also, near the beginning of Cries 
and Whispers (Ingmar Bergman, 1972), when Agnes recounts her memories of her 
mother in internal monologue.  In both cases, the nostalgic flashback is prompted by 
an act of narration and shares an identical form: the sense of nostalgia is established 
by the content of the voiceover and supplemented formally by the presence of wistful 





But the nostalgic flashback can also be prompted by a recollection.  There is an 
interesting sequence in The Truman Show (Peter Weir, 1998), which offers a self-
reflexive comment on this function of flashback in cinema and television.  When 
Truman first begins to suspect that his life is not what he imagined it was, he produces 
from his trunk a cardigan which prompts a memory.  One of the two waitresses who 
are watching the show on television explains, ‘They got rid of her, but they couldn’t 
erase the memory.’  From Truman clutching the cardigan in his lap there is a 
hackneyed dissolve to a flashback which presents the story of his thwarted college 
romance with Lauren (in fact Sylvia), who, morally opposed to the exploitative 
concept of the show, is determined to reveal to Truman that his life is not real.  An 
attractive young lady catches Truman’s attention, but at the moment they make eye-
contact, Truman’s future wife Meryl deliberately trips over him, and when he looks 
up, the girl has gone.  At the college dance, as Truman dances with Meryl, the 
mysterious girl appears again and is promptly bundled away by men in suits.  They 
finally meet in the library, and Lauren anxiously urges him to leave with her.  After a 
temporal ellipse they arrive that evening at the beach.  A car approaches and Lauren 
realises that the show’s organisers have come to intervene.  She frantically tries to tell 
Truman everything — his life is a television show, her name is not Lauren, but Sylvia 
— but she is agitated and incoherent; Truman is confused and is unable to understand.  
Her ‘father’ appears and takes her away, explaining that she is insane.  Truman sees 
that she has left her red cardigan behind and calls after her.  This sequence self-
consciously acknowledges cinematic and televisual conventions for signifying 
memory.  Truman’s entire life is televised, but the show cannot faithfully render his 




in his lap, the show’s creators, aware that for him the cardigan signifies Sylvia, 
present archive scenes of their thwarted romance.   
 
Therapy 
Track 29 (Nicolas Roeg, 1988) presents the story of American housewife Linda, who 
is suffering from suppressed guilt, because twenty years earlier she was forced to give 
up her baby for adoption, after a teenage pregnancy.  In two significant flashback 
sequences Linda recalls her sexual encounter, with the fairground bumper-car man, in 
which she conceived.  In the first, she sits alone in a bar, but imagines she is with her 
long-lost son, Martin, who, a man-sized infant, urges her to tell him a story.  Sitting 
with her legs open and eyes half-closed, it is clear that for Linda, recounting the 
episode is a sensual experience.  We cut back and forth between Linda recounting the 
story to Martin in the bar, and the flashback at the fairground.  At several points, it 
seems Linda is struggling to continue, that the memory is too painful, but Martin 
desperately urges her on and Linda’s narration becomes increasingly intense, so that 
by the time she and the bumper-car man reach a climax in the flashback, so she and 
Martin reach an analogous climax in the bar — Linda in her increasingly intense 
recounting of the scene, and Martin in his exuberant encouragement.  It seems that 
Linda has repressed all memory of this event for twenty years, but now, in an alcohol-
fuelled mid-life crisis, at the behest of (the irreal) Martin, she forces herself to relive 
the event.  Subsequently, she recalls the incident again when she tells the story to her 
(actual) friend Arlene.  The process of working through the past here performs a 






A note on the elision of flashback 
Flashback is such a convention of classical Hollywood cinema, the signs which 
signify its emergence so familiar, that often it is refreshing when in a situation where 
it seems possible or likely, flashback is elided.  In The Set-up (Robert Wise, 1949), 
veteran boxer, Stoker, relaxes in the dressing-room, preparing for his fight.  One 
fighter returns from the ring victorious and exhilarated, giving a graphic account of 
how he defeated his opponent.  A young boxer, nervous immediately before his first 
fight, is disturbed by this talk, and rushes to the bathroom.  When he emerges, one of 
the changing-room attendants reassures him: 
‘Don’t worry kid — it happens to everybody first time.  Don’t it Stoker?’ 
‘Sure, sure,’ Stoker replies.  ‘I’ve done it myself ... ’ 
The camera moves in on Stoker as, momentarily lost in a reverie, he mutters to 
himself, no one else any longer paying attention: ‘Nineteen hundred and twenty-eight, 
Trenton.  Yeah, Trenton, New Jersey.  That was twenty years ago ... ’  Here, the 
institution of flashback-for-memory looms large.  While this seems a most 
unpropitious moment for the narrative to veer off into an anterior tangent, many of the 
tell-tale signs are nevertheless present: the camera movement in, framing the subject 
in close-up; Stoker is momentarily withdrawn, detached from his immediate 
surroundings, lost in nostalgic reverie.  The convention, the cliché rears its head, 
brushes up against the diegetic present, threatening, as Stoker stares off screen twenty 
years into the past.  Then off-screen sound from the changing-room intrudes, we cut 
to a longer shot and Stoker collects himself, resuming the interrupted task of untying 
his shoelace.  The moment lasts only a few seconds, but, for the spectator, the effect is 
infinitely more satisfactory than if the scriptwriter had submitted to convention by 




35-year-old veteran boxer, recalling his fledgling days as a fighter.  Perhaps the 
spectator will momentarily imagine the young Stoker preparing for his first fight.  The 
omniscient narrator, who frequently grants access to a character’s subjectivity is 
absent here; the particulars of Stoker’s memory remain obscure, opaque, just as in life 
we do not possess magical access to the memories of others.  It may be that the 
filmmaker here simply wanted to show a man remembering, and had no intention of 
invoking the possibility of a flashback.  Perhaps, then, the flashback is so 
conventional that such an image of a man remembering is inevitably interpreted in its 
shadow.  That is, this scene gives me pleasure, not only by virtue of what it is in itself 
(an image of a man remembering), but in opposition to what it seems by convention to 
withhold (flashback). 
 
Having examined formal and functional elements of flashback, we will now pose a 
significant question: What is the relationship between flashback and the mental 
images of memory?  In tackling this question we will consider the two distinguishing 
features of flashback, the characteristics above all others by which it is distinguished 
from properly subjective representations of the past: its emphasis on narration, and its 




IV. FLASHBACK, NARRATION AND TIME 
Flashback and narration 
Often the function of flashback is purely expository.  Consider, for instance, the 
flashback in Out of the Past (Jacques Tourneur, 1947).  The narrative which Jeff 
recounts to Meta is presented in a flashback.  But what is the precise status of the 
scenes presented?  These episodes are, I think, best understood as autonomous 
narrational offerings.  ‘This happened’, the flashback tells us.  The emphasis here is 
on narrating rather than remembering.  Jeff recounts his story to Meta and the 
flashback presents the scenes he recounts; it is neither necessary to attribute these 
images to Jeff’s memory nor to Meta’s imagination: the images are autonomous; they 
are offered by an authorial hand for the benefit of the spectator.   
 
Flashback and time 
The other key aspect by which flashback is distinguished from properly subjective 
representations of the past is its relation to time.  The relation of the duration of 
flashback to the intervening time which seems to elapse in the present is often 
incongruous.
49
 Frequently the duration of flashback is greater than the length of time 
that seems to elapse in the present.  This is to say that flashback has the capacity to 
insert its duration within (what is in effect) a fissure of the present.  Flashback is able, 
for its duration, to exist autonomously, independent from the temporality of the 
present.  In considering the relation between flashback duration and time elapsed in 
the present, we must return to our distinction between the two major varieties of 
flashback.  
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In flashback-for-narrative there is usually a coincidence between flashback duration 
and time elapsed in the present.  The duration of screen-time which the flashback 
consumes is equivalent to the time which we imagine it would take for the recounting 
subject to articulate her story in the present.  But in considering the relationship 
between flashback-for-narrative and the mental images of memory we must remember 
that such flashbacks may exceed or contradict the (implied/assumed) version of 
events which the recounting subject chooses to verbalise.  Branigan distinguishes 
between objective and subjective flashbacks, but argues that whether a flashback 
emerges autonomously or is subjectively motivated will not necessarily determine its 
content, since ‘what we see in a subjective flashback is often stubbornly independent 
of the character’s recollection’.
50
 That is to say, flashback often presents more than 
the recounting subject knows and/or tells.  We have established that there is 
sometimes — as in The Beguiled — a glaring disparity between the veracity of 
flashback and the factitious verbal accounts of some recounting subjects.  While many 
flashbacks present a realisation of the events a recounting subject narrates, at the same 
time flashback retains a de jure autonomy, which means that it often exceeds the 
limits of the knowledge of the recounting subject (Tirez sur le pianiste) and/or the 
information which we imagine he or she would choose to verbalise (Le fantôme de la 
liberté).
51
 Flashback-for-narrative is neither reducible to the memory of the 
recounting subject, nor to the imagination of the listening subject.  It is presented by 
an authorial hand for the benefit of the spectator.  And it is precisely because of its 
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sustained correlation with the present — because here flashback is substituted for a 
verbal account which occurs simultaneously in the present — that there is this 
approximate coincidence between flashback duration and time elapsed in the present.   
 
But if, in flashback-for-narrative, flashback is substituted for the narration of a past 
event, what relation has it, if any, to the mental images of memory?  Consider the 
sequence at the end of The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance (John Ford, 1962), in 
which we see Tom kill Valance.  This sequence in fact replaces a verbal account of a 
past event.  This is not Ransom’s memory of the event, since until this point he 
believed that it was he who shot Valance.  We might attribute the sequence to Tom’s 
memory, since it is he who knows what happened and is explaining it.  However, 
since Tom knows what happened, why should he now remember it?  Though we do 
not hear what he says, it is here that Tom explains to Ransom that it was he (Tom) 
who killed Valance.  The flashback is substituted for Tom’s account of the event in 
the present.  When recounting a story is it necessary to form mental images?  Surely 
in this case Tom simply gives expression to a scene with which he is so familiar that 
no actual recollection is necessary.   
 
It seems that the narration of a past event somehow precludes the intense form of 
remembering which we would identify as mental images.  Thus, I propose the 
following provisional hypothesis: an event cannot be narrated and remembered 
simultaneously.  Where an event is narrated, the relationship between the recounting 




consciousness is incompatible with the pure form of remembering which constitutes 
mental images.
52
   
 
Flashback-for-memory 
In flashback-for-memory there is a manifest disparity between flashback duration and 
time elapsed in the present.  Branigan writes, ‘when a character remembers the past, 
we may only be seeing the past as it might have been represented earlier in the story 
when the character was then living it as the “present”. ’
53
 This may have something to 
do with the relationship between amplitude — the duration of the event within the 
flashback — and duration.  In flashback-for-memory, amplitude is usually 
significantly greater than duration: the events depicted in the flashback are condensed 
into a certain (lesser) quantity of screen time.  To demonstrate the disparity between 
flashback duration and time elapsed in the present, we will consider an instance of 
flashback-for-memory in Raising Cane (Brian De Palma, 1992).  As Carter smothers 
his wife Jenny with a pillow, we enter a flashback in which Carter recalls sitting in the 
car park of the playground, watching Jenny walk into the woods with her ex-lover 
Jack.  Whilst a lot happens in this flashback — the young mother with the child asks 
him for a lift home; Carter follows Jenny and Jack into the woods; Carter’s maniacal 
personified alter-ego Cane appears and urges Carter to ‘go home’ while he kidnaps 
the young mother’s baby; Cane steals Jack’s coat, murders the young mother, hides 
her body in the boot of Jack’s car and steals the dead woman’s baby; finally Jenny 
sees Cane when he returns to the woods to replace Jack’s coat — all this happens and 
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yet we exit the flashback with a slow dissolve to Carter, still holding the pillow over 
Jenny’s face.  The flashback lasts over five minutes.  Are we to understand that Carter 
has been smothering Jenny with the pillow for a full five minutes?  The movement 
into the sequence (slow dissolve) suggests that in the present Carter is recalling what 
we see.  From here, as we have established, narration almost immediately supplants 
recollection.  However, the fact that when we return to the present Carter is still 
smothering Jenny impels us to believe that the duration of the recollection coincides 
with the time which has elapsed in the present, that Carter has remembered all this in 
the time that he has been smothering Jenny.  But is it plausible to present such a 
complex sequence of narration and suggest that it is recalled in a short space of time?  
When we compare the length and complexity of this flashback to the time elapsed in 
the present there appears a disparity.  But we need only consult our own experience to 
appreciate that memory often compresses time.  We do not always relive in real time 
the events which memories evoke.  Often memory functions as a trigger; a single 
fragment of the past can evoke a more substantial experience.  Thus, in regard to the 
above example, we can postulate an alternative explanation: when Carter suffocates 
Jenny he recalls the events which the flashback presents, but while he experiences 
these memories in a compressed form, we are offered a more complete version of 
events.  But let us be absolutely clear: I accept that memory tends to collapse and 
compress time, and that in the above example Carter may experience this memory in 
compressed time, and that this is why when we emerge from the flashback little time 
seems to have elapsed in the present.  But this only bolsters my point: flashbacks are 
not representations of mental images; they are ultimately characterised by narrational 
autonomy.  In flashback-for-memory flashback acts as an analogue of the mental 





Just as in flashback-for-narrative there is a shift of emphasis, by which the account of 
the recounting subject gives way to an autonomous act of narration, so flashback-for-
memory, though motivated by an act of recollection, in fact conceals a shift of 
emphasis — from recollection to autonomous narration.  The dominant characteristic 
in all flashbacks is autonomous narrational exposition.  Flashback has a narrational 
functionality; it is a means to a very specific end: the narration of a past event.  It can 
be argued that the tense of narrative cinema is the ‘historical present’ — it presents 
past events as though they were present.  Branigan writes, ‘flashback may be taken as 
merely a special instance of the historical present tense where a character makes the 
past present for the spectator by providing narration from a (diegetic) “future” ’.
54
 
Flashback is not content only to narrate past events (as would be the case, for 
instance, if a character recounted a past event and there was no flashback), but, in 
order to do so, places itself within that past, making it present.   
 
Conclusion 
As early as 1916 Hugo Münsterberg emphasised the distinction between different 
varieties of flashback, hierarchising those which represent memory over those which 
are substituted for verbal discourse, which are ‘much less artistic [...] aesthetically on 
a much lower level’.
55
 Comparing his preferred use of flashback — as a 
representation of memory — with the close-up, Münsterberg writes that in both 
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[i]t is as if reality has lost its own continuous connection and becomes shaped 
by the demands of our soul.  It is as if the outer world itself became moulded 





But, as Turim notes, Münsterberg’s insistence on the similarity between the filmic 
flashback and the experience of memory might imply a ‘rather naïve view of human 
memory [...] a picture theory of memory, in which recall takes the form of complete 
images appearing to the mind and in which memories conform to the linearity and 
clarity of filmic narrative’.
57
 She then tempers this interpretation, arguing that one 
might also understand ‘that he never meant his enthusiasm for the parallels between 
film and subjective memory to be taken so literally’.
58
 I concur with this latter 
qualification, and feel that from the evidence of the use of the device that he had seen 
in contemporary cinema (the language and technique of which was at that time 
developing at a much faster rate than it is today, for instance) of the two prime forms 
of flashback, Münsterberg was merely prescribing flashback-for-memory as a 
tendency which cinema ought to embrace, at the same time as positing flashback-for-
narrative (which has subsequently enjoyed a rich cinematic history) as unexceptional 
from a psychological perspective.  (At around the same time that Münsterberg was 
writing, one might argue that the cinema was already progressing beyond the 
analogical representations of flashback-for-memory, moving closer to more properly 
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subjective depictions of memory in the ‘tableau memory image’ of the melodrama.)
59
 
With Münsterberg, we value representations of mental images over depictions of past 
events, the motivation for which is fundamentally narrational.  But we feel that we 
must go further and distinguish the analogical depictions of flashback-for-memory 
from more properly subjective representations of the past. 
 
The majority of relevant existing theory — the neo-formalist theory of Bordwell, the 
film narrative theory of Branigan, the flashback theory of Turim — has tended to 
collapse all scenes of anteriority under the banner ‘flashback’.  This is an 
oversimplification, and for this reason we will endeavour to distinguish flashback 
from more properly subjective representations of the past (mental images).  Bordwell 
writes, ‘most flashback sequences are motivated to some degree as representing 
character memory [...] flashback is usually motivated psychologically, as character 
recollection [...] narration motivates the presentation of the flashback realistically, 
letting us eavesdrop on the character’s memory.’
60
 To some extent this is true, but at 
this stage it is apparent that these comments are unsatisfactory.  Here Bordwell 
essentially discounts flashback-for-narrative altogether, at the same time as grouping 
all other representations of the past as ‘flashback’.  By contrast, we insist on a 
distinction.  Having distinguished flashback-for-narrative from flashback-for-
memory, in considering the relation between flashback and the mental images of 
memory, we can dismiss flashback-for-narrative out of hand, since such sequences are 
more to do with narrating than with remembering.  The following question remains: 
what is the relation between flashback-for-memory and the mental images of 
memory?  We have established that in flashback-for memory the relation between 
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flashback duration and time elapsed in the present is incongruous: flashback duration 
appears longer than the time which seems to elapse in the present.  The relation 
between flashback-for-memory and the mental images of memory is analogical.  We 
will presently see that cinema in fact possesses far more effective means of 
representing the experience of memory in time.  Thus we shall henceforth distinguish 





Chapter 2. Act of Memory 
On the distinction between flashback-for-memory and act of memory  
There are several aspects by which act of memory is distinguished from flashback-
for-memory as we defined it in Chapter 1.  Firstly, the dissolve and nondiegetic music 
cue, which frequently mark the passage into flashback-for-memory in classical 
cinema, are generally absent from act of memory.  Flashback-for-memory is typically 
presented as a deliberate and motivated act of recollection.  By contrast, act of 
memory is often involuntary, overwhelming the remembering subject.  Unlike 
flashback-for-memory, the duration of act of memory coincides with the time which 
seems to elapse in the present.  Moreover, the amplitude of act of memory usually 
coincides with the duration of the recollection, while in flashback-for-memory there is 
typically a disparity between amplitude and duration.
61
 We will come to consider the 
form of act of memory more closely, but for now we may note that, generally 
speaking, it is formally distinguished from flashback-for-memory inasmuch as the 
image often cuts back and forth between the remembering subject in the present and 
the recollection itself, thereby establishing a sense of the intensity of the experience of 
memory in time.  By contrast, flashback-for-memory generally follows the essential 
form of what we will call the recollection circuit.  The basic form of the recollection 
circuit is this: an opening parenthetic shot of the remembering subject in the present is 
followed by a dissolve/cut to the remembered scene, and the circuit resolves with a 
closing parenthetic return to the remembering subject in the present.   
 
The fundamental difference, however, between flashback-for-memory and act of 
memory is that flashback-for-memory is concerned primarily — as is flashback-for-
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narrative — with narration, while act of memory is a depiction of the experience of 
memory.  These are two quite distinct modes of representing the past and each has a 
very different relation to memory: flashback-for-memory is motivated and justified by 
an act of recollection, but here the remembering subject is a tool, the moment of 
recollection a convenience.  In place of representations of actual mental images, we 
are offered objective representations of the remembered scene, the relation of which 
to the mental images of memory is analogical.  By contrast, act of memory is a 
depiction of the experience of memory itself; it consists of representations of mental 
images.  The table below offers a sketch of the terms of the distinction, which are 
further explained on the following page: 
 
Factor Flashback-for-memory Act of memory 
1. Time: relation 
between duration 
of sequence to time 
elapsed in present 
 
fundamental disparity / 
impossible to determine 
(see factor 2) 
identical; exact 
coincidence (see factor 2) 
2. Circuit resolution usually resolved, though 
in modern cinema many 
recollection sequences 
remain unresolved.  We 
will (negatively) identify 
such sequences as 
flashback-for-memory 
 
always resolved (if the 
closing parenthesis of the 
circuit is omitted the 
sequence is flashback-for-
memory) 






recollection – we typically 
cut back and forth between 
remembering subject in 
present and the recalled 
scene 
4. Length generally longer generally shorter 
 
The above table does not represent an exhaustive system of distinction, but it does 
offer an overview of the relevant factors in the comparison.  The hierarchical 




we may distinguish between the two sorts of representations of the past in practice.  
We have already established the two most significant factors in the distinction: 1. 
‘Time’ — factor 1 can only be determined if there is circuit resolution (factor 2), and 
so factors 1 and 2 will be considered together — and 3. ‘Emphasis’ (narration or 
recollection?).  We are able to identify act of memory as representing the mental 
images of memory primarily because of (factor 1) the identity between its duration 
and time elapsed in the present.  For this reason, the closing parenthesis of the 
recollection circuit is indispensable if we are to distinguish a sequence as act of 
memory.  The relevance of factor 4 is this: given that acts of memory are 
representations of mental images as they are experienced in time, in general these are 
necessarily of short duration, owing to the contingent factors of the remembering 
subject’s environment.  Factor 4 becomes active where it is difficult to determine 
(factor 1) the relation between sequence duration and time elapsed in the present 
because of a continuous distraction (such as listening to music or watching 
television), which arrests action in the present. 
 
Saint Augustine’s discussion of time 
We may better understand the form of the past which flashback presents and the ways 
in which it is distinct from more properly subjective representations of the past (the 
mental images of memory) through recourse to Saint Augustine’s discussion of time.  
The notion, common in our everyday language, of the ‘present’ is an abstraction.  
Augustine writes,    
 
the only time that can be called present is an instant, if we can conceive of 




time as small as this passes so rapidly from the future to the past that its 




What we call the ‘present’ is an infinitely renewed instant which cannot be grasped.  
The moment I think or speak of the present, it is already past.  The present contains 
within it the past which it once was and the future which it will be.  Thus when we 
speak of the present, we must remember that it is an abstraction.  But it is not only the 
present that does not exist.  In his meandering discussion, Augustine considers the 
existential properties of the past and the future.  He posits an opposition between one 
who declares that past and future do not exist, and another who insists that they do: 
‘people who describe the past could not describe it correctly unless they saw it in their 




Circling around, proffering arguments now in favour of one thesis and now opposing 
these with the arguments of the other, Augustine finally accepts that past and future 
do not exist, but nevertheless insists on discovering ‘where they are’, concluding, 
‘wherever they are, they are not there as future or past, but as present.  For if, 
wherever they are, they are future, they do not yet exist; if past, they no longer 
exist.’
64
 The past no longer exists; the future does not yet exist.  Whenever we 
remember the past or imagine the future, we do so from the present.  All that exists is 
the infinitely renewed point of the present, and it is only in terms of this pure 
abstraction that past and future have any claim to existence.  The three times of which 
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we speak with such assurance in everyday language — past, present, and future — do 
not exist.  We may speak of three times on the condition that we remember that they 
exist only in the mind: ‘a present of past things, a present of present things, and a 
present of future things [...] The present of past things is the memory; the present of 




This is relevant to our discussion of cinema, since in cinema’s representations of 
anteriority, the past generally appears as it was when it was present.
66
 (And 
representations of the future — objective flash-forwards or representations of 
imagination which we might call ‘anticipation’ — generally depict the future as 
though it were present.)  We see this clearly in Deleuze’s discussion of flashback, 
which is based on Henri Bergson’s notion of the ‘recollection image’.
67
 An 
abstraction, Bergson’s ‘pure recollection’ is a virtuality.  The Recollection image 
‘actualises a virtuality’.  Thus ‘the recollection-image does not deliver the past to us, 




Through flashback, which generally appears in an objective representation of the past 
as it was, with all its details, localised in time, cinema magically grants access to 
Bergson’s ‘pure recollection’.  The pointed end of Bergson’s diagrammatic cone
69
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represents the present, and the broad base pure recollection; where cinema presents 
the past in the rich and full form of flashback, this seems to correspond to the ‘wider 
planes of consciousness’ that are closer to the base of pure recollection.
70
 In contrast 
to the magically full depiction of memory which flashback presents, act of memory 
places emphasis on the experience — often fragmented and atrophied — of memory 
in time.   
 
By declaring ‘act of memory is memory’ or ‘act of memory consists of 
representations of mental images’, I anticipate the following objections: What 
constitutes a representation of a mental image?  What are the characteristics by which 
we can define a mental image? Are mental images memories of perceptions (in which 
case all memory images would take the form of point-of-view shots from the past)?  If 
so, why, in so much of what you define as act of memory, does the remembering 
subject appear within the memory-image?  No doubt these are pertinent questions.  In 
this connection Branigan offers some instructive comments, reminding us, 
 
when we see what we believe a character to be thinking about, we may only be 
seeing the object of his or her thought as it exists independently in the world 




Just as we often see the object of a character’s gaze while he or she remains 
onscreen,
72
 so the mental images of memory and imagination often assume an 
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objective form, in which the remembering subject imagines herself within the 
remembered scene.  This seems to be cinema’s equivalent of the free-indirect mode in 
literature.  
 
As suggested above, sometimes the distinction between act of memory and flashback-
for-memory will hinge on factor 2 — whether or not the recollection circuit is 
resolved. 
 
The unresolved recollection circuit 
Many modern films do not recognise classical cinema’s recollection circuit.  Often the 
post-recollection shot of the remembering subject in the present is omitted, conferring 
a bridging function upon the past scene.  What relation do such sequences have to the 
mental images of memory?  Consider, for instance, the episode in 8 ½ which is 
prompted by the words ‘asa nisi masa’, which Maia, the psychic woman, writes on a 
blackboard.  As we have said, act of memory represents the experience of memory in 
time, and only the resolution of the recollection circuit will confer upon it this quality.  
Here, then, the crucial aspect in the distinction is the absence of the closing 
parenthetic shot of the recollection circuit (factor 2); we are unable to determine 
(factor 1) the relation between sequence duration and time elapsed in the present, 
since upon exiting the sequence we shift to a new scene altogether.  The omission of 
the closing parenthetic shot distinguishes the sequence as flashback-for-memory: 
narration supplants recollection.  The sight of the words upon the blackboard, the 
uncanny thrill of Maia’s trick, prompts Guido’s recollection.  Thus we are given to 
understand that Guido is remembering.  At the same time, the question — ‘What does 





that [asa nisi masa] mean?’ — which the magician puts to Maia immediately before 
we enter the sequence, though it does not elicit a verbal response (from either Maia or 
Guido) that would lead us into the sequence (as in flashback-for-narrative), might 
nevertheless be understood as justifying Guido’s recollection, the question to which 
the sequence is the response.  But it is only possible to discern the shift from 
recollection to narration retrospectively, when the sequence ends without returning to 
the original present.   
 
Complicated cases and exceptions 
As noted above, in some cases, despite the presence of the closing parenthetic shot of 
the recollection circuit, it is difficult to determine (factor 1) the relation between the 
duration of a past scene and the time which elapses in the present, and consequently 
difficult to distinguish between act of memory and flashback-for-memory, since 
action in the present remains in stasis.  Consider, for instance, the flashback in 
Casablanca.  In the present, Rick instructs Sam to play ‘As Time Goes By’.  Sam 
plays, the camera moves in toward Rick and we enter a flashback, which presents an 
exposition of Rick and Ilsa’s romance in Paris as the German Army progress through 
France.  When the German forces enter Paris, Rick arranges to meet Ilsa at the train 
station, but she jilts him.  When we return to the present, Sam is still playing ‘As 
Time Goes By’.  How, in a case such as this, are we to determine (factor 1) the 
relation between sequence duration and time elapsed in the present?  How long has 
Sam been playing?  Factor 1 does not help us here; and the fact that the sequence has 
a resolving shot (factor 2) simply means that it is not necessarily flashback-for-
memory — in principle it might still be act of memory.  In this case, consideration of 




sequence, enables us to distinguish the sequence as flashback-for-memory: throughout 
the sequence we do not once return to Rick in the present (primary emphasis = 
narration rather than remembering); also, the length of the sequence opposes the 
notion that the scenes presented are experienced as memories by Rick in the time of 
the present.  The sequence seems to exist outside the temporality of the present; its 
duration is inserted within a fissure of the present.   
 
Modern anomalies 
Modern cinema presents many cases in which it is difficult to distinguish act of 
memory from flashback-for-memory.  This Sporting Life features both flashback-for-
memory and act of memory, but establishes no formal distinction between the two.  In 
the first minutes of the film we cut back and forth autonomously between the present 
— Frank is injured playing rugby and arrives at the dentist’s — and the past — Frank 
drills in a mine and then converses with Margaret.  When, in the present, Frank 
inhales chloroform at the dentist’s, a past scene emerges — Frank invites Margaret for 
a walk and an argument ensues — which seems to be an act of memory.  But when, in 
the present, satisfied that Frank is unconscious, the dentist removes the tube from his 
mouth, and we enter a new past — Frank and team-mates try to gain access to a 
dancing hall — narration again assumes an autonomous aspect (these are no longer 
memory images, since Frank is unconscious).  Later, when Frank arrives at the 
Christmas party and ensconces himself in a bedroom, the brief excerpts of the past 
which emerge — Frank takes Margaret and the children for a drive and announces 
that they will make a day of it — are presented as acts of memory.  But as we return 
to the past scene, in an extended sequence of their day out in the park, and from here 




drunk, and the next day makes love to Margaret — these sequences are flashbacks, 
and, as we have seen, the second flashback emerges from the first autonomously.  
Nevertheless, the film posits a reverse causality between the conclusion of this second 
flashback — the image becomes blurred as the camera moves in and Frank unfastens 
Margaret’s skirt — and the present to which we return — Frank grips the bed post 
tightly, a figure for the sexual satisfaction imminent in the flashback — suggesting 
that Frank is recalling these scenes.  In bed in the present, Frank continues to 
remember, and a flashback presents the scene the next morning, in which he is upset 
when Margaret gives him a cold reception.  Again, from within this past a new past 
emerges autonomously — Frank patronises the rugby club bar and then visits Mrs 
Weaver.  When, after flirting with her, Frank rejects Mrs Weaver, we return to the 
present, and again it is clear that Frank is remembering this scene.  In each case there 
is subjective causality (recollection) in the shift from the present to the initial past 
scene; this past is then ruptured by an autonomous incision, from which emerges, 
apparently arbitrarily, a second past; upon passing from this second past to the 
present, the film again posits a reverse subjective causality, presenting this second 
past as Frank’s memory.  Objective flashback and act of memory are here merged in a 
sophisticated narration which does not recognise the terms of our distinction, 
combining subjective causality with authorial fiat.   
   
But ambiguous cases such as this, which refuse to fit neatly into our system, in no 
way diminish the value of the proposed distinction.  In order to explore cinema’s 
mental images, we must first of all distinguish acts of remembering from narration.  In 
this way we have thus far considered and largely rejected the relation between 




(Narration and the Fiction Film), Branigan (Narrative Comprehension and Film), 
Turim (Flashbacks in Film) — has tended to collapse all representations of the past 
under the banner ‘flashback’.  Current terminology is inadequate and, more 
importantly, the use of current terminology is inconsistent and insubstantial.  In order 
to establish a more effective terminology which accounts for the various forms, we 
might begin by considering the precise shortcomings of existing vocabulary.  Let us 
consider the term recollection more closely.  We have established that act of memory 
depicts mental images, while the primary concern of flashback is the narration of a 
past event.  Now we will endeavour to situate this term more precisely in the context 
of this distinction.  Does the verb ‘to recollect’ seem to have more to do with 
narrating or remembering?  The word derives from the Latin recolligere, ‘to gather 
again’ (re- = ‘again’, colligere = ‘to collect’).  This etymology, supported by a simple 
consideration of everyday usage of the term — ‘Do you recollect the time when...?’, 
etc. — demonstrates that the term ‘recollection’ is more or less synonymous with 
‘remembrance’.  And if the notion of ‘gathering again’ is an image apposite to the 
representation of memory, then we might here introduce a second term, equally 
etymologically appropriate, which is synonymous with ‘narrating’.  I propose the verb 
‘to recount’, which derives from the Old French reconter, ‘to relate again’ (conter = 
‘to relate’/‘to reckon’).  The term ‘relate’ necessarily implies an act involving more 
than one person, and is thus consistent with our understanding of flashback-for-
narrative, which is narrated to someone — either directly to the spectator, or indirectly 
through the intermediary of another character.  We have shown, too, that flashback-
for-memory, though prompted by memory, in fact conceals a shift of emphasis from 
remembering to narrating, and is thus ultimately concerned with narration.  And, 




anecdote’, etc. — further supports this proposition.
73
 Flashback is a recounting, and is 
primarily concerned with the narration of a past event; act of memory is recollection, 
an audiovisual rendering of mental images, a depiction of the experience of memory 
in time. 
 
In the remainder of this chapter we will first consider the prompts of act of memory; 
then we will examine cognitive and philosophical theories of memory.  Next we will 
examine grammatical aspects of act of memory, such as how it is formally 
distinguished from flashback-for-memory, and the variations in form which modern 
cinema has brought to act of memory.  Here we will also examine purely auditory 
memories, and consider how Bergson’s theory of memory can help us to understand 
the specific form of fragmented and atrophied representations of memory.  This will 
lead us to consider the role of imagination in certain representations of memory, and 
depictions of distorted and false memories.  Then we will discuss recalled voices as a 
sub-branch of act of memory.  Finally we will consider the functions of act of 
memory proper (that is visual- and sound-images, as opposed to the asynchronous 
representations of recalled voices). 
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Proust stresses that memory exists potentially; it dwells in the objects and events 
which can prompt it: 
 
The past is hidden somewhere outside the realm, beyond the reach of intellect, 
in some material object (in the sensation which that material object will give 
us) of which we have no inkling.  And it depends on chance whether or not we 




Bergson, too, insists that the realisation of memory is dependent upon chance.  
‘Essentially fugitive,’ memories, ‘become materialised only by chance, either when 
an accidentally precise determination of our bodily attitude attracts them, or when the 





Since, like flashback-for-memory, act of memory is prompted by an act of 
recollection, we find many consistencies between the materials and situations which 




Sometimes the act of listening to an audio recording prompts memory images.  In The 
Passenger (Michelangelo Antonioni, 1975) it is the audio recording of his 
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conversation with the dead man, Robertson, which prompts Locke’s recollection of 
their conversation.
76
 In Memorias del Subdesarrollo, Sergio, rather masochistically, 
listens to an audio recording he made of himself and his wife Laura having an 
argument which led to their separation.  Throughout most of the sequence we remain 
with Sergio in the present, as he absent-mindedly fiddles with the belongings Laura 
left behind.  But occasionally the scene in the present is interrupted with brief 
memory images.  For instance, when Sergio wears the monocle, we cut to Laura 
sitting in bed with her book, looking up at him.  This appears to be a genuine memory 
image from the scene of their conversation.  But the next memory image seems to 
represent another past entirely.  While in the recording he mocks Laura, saying that 
her beauty is artificial but that he is all the more attracted to her for that reason, in the 
present Sergio fiddles with her knickers, stretching them between his hands.  An 
insert then appears — a memory image of Laura, naked, stepping into the shower.  
But as the recorded conversation continues it is clear that Laura does not take a 
shower, thus this image apparently belongs to another scene entirely; it is prompted 
by the knickers with which Sergio is fiddling, and is unrelated to the audio recording. 
 
Later, Sergio listens to the recording again and this time, as in The Passenger, we 
enter the past scene.  But these images cannot be designated as representations of 
memory.  We enter the past scene with a shot of Laura’s shoes and a garment of 
clothing lying by the foot of the bed.  From here, while the conversation continues 
and the argument escalates, the camera embarks on a forensic exploration of the room 
and the incidental scattered objects therein.  When Sergio reveals to Laura that he has 
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recorded their argument for his subsequent amusement, the argument reaches a 
climax: Laura tries to grab the cassette recorder, and she and Sergio both enter the 
shot.  (Henceforth the camera remains on Laura as she breaks down hysterically and 
declares that she is leaving.)  But up until this point, while the camera autonomously 
explores the objects around the room without filming either interlocutor, what is the 
status of the images?  Certainly during the conversation, Sergio’s attention would 
have been concentrated on himself and Laura.  On the other hand, it is not necessary 
that his mental images while listening to the recording should reproduce those 
perceptions he experienced during the conversation.  One might argue that the 
autonomous exploration of the camera prior to the climactic point in the argument 
represents Sergio’s imaginative memory of the scene of the argument, that here the 
physical space of the scene of the argument has assumed enhanced significance; he 
invests the arbitrary details of the scene (which we might articulate thus: ‘her shoes 
were on the floor ... there were some magazines on the bed’) with hyperbolic 
significance.   
 
Photograph 
Like the memories prompted by audio recordings, the recollections of a character who 
looks at a photograph are voluntary memories; the photograph is a memory-producing 
tool, and one rarely stumbles across such a photograph by accident (in cinema or in 
life).
77
 Thus these recollections are often maudlin, sentimental, and are therefore 
accompanied by nondiegetic score, creating an idealisation of the past.  Near the end 
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of The Wings of Eagles (John Ford, 1957) Stig reminisces about his family life prior 
to the accident which left him paralysed.  The recollection is prompted by a 
photograph of one of his now grown-up daughters in a swimming costume.  As Stig 
looks at the photograph we dissolve to his wife, Min, as a young woman, in an 
identical pose to that of the daughter in the photograph.  But the memories prompted 
by photographs are not necessarily nostalgic — we will later see how in Esta Noite 
Encarnarei no Teu Cadáver (This Night I’ll Possess Your Corpse) (José Mojica 
Marins, 1966) a photograph prompts a harrowing memory. 
 
Visual resemblance 
Often the prompt is simply a visual resemblance between a present perception and a 
memory image.  In Twin Peaks: Fire Walk With Me (David Lynch, 1992), when 
Leland Palmer arrives home and sees his daughter Laura sitting with her best friend 
Donna, the posture of the two girls (one of Platonic intimacy) prompts a memory of 
his view through the trailer window of Laura and Ronnette Polanski.   
 
Sometimes a person perceived revives a memory of that same person.  In the opening 
scene of Gangs of New York (Martin Scorsese, 2002), the young Amsterdam marches 
with his father the Priest, who leads a gang of Irish immigrants through a catacomb 
and out of a warehouse, to a battle with a rival gang of ‘natives’.  Here, at the 
legendary ‘Battle of the Five Points’, the boy witnesses his father slain by Bill ‘the 
Butcher’.  Later, when Amsterdam, a grown man, returns to the city to avenge his 
father’s death, he encounters various people who prompt him to recall his passage 







Occasionally the act of returning to a specific place prompts a recollection.  The 
memories prompted by place are often nostalgic, as in Great Expectations (David 
Lean, 1946), Magnificent Obsession (Douglas Sirk, 1954) and Wild Strawberries 
(Ingmar Bergman, 1955).  We find an interesting contrast to the maudlin memories 
evoked by place in Pursued (Raoul Walsh, 1947).  Jeb is haunted by a violent incident 
from his childhood, of which he retains only vague half-forgotten fragments of 
memories.  As a child he is plagued by involuntary memories and nightmares, but 
with time he comes to believe that these memory fragments conceal a dark secret 
which will explain his life’s sufferings, that his future happiness depends upon 
knowledge of this forgotten night.  He becomes mysteriously drawn to a derelict 
ranch which engenders in him a sense of the uncanny: ‘I came straight to this place 
just as if I’d known the way.  There was something in my life as ruined as that house.  
That house was myself.  I’d seen it a million times...’ In the film’s dénouement, 
hounded by Grant Callum, the man who for some unknown reason has always wanted 
him dead, Jeb returns to the dilapidated ranch, fatalistically anticipating that re-
enacting the violent threat of the dreadful forgotten night — same protagonists, same 
place — will engender the memory which will provide the ‘one big answer’ which 
has always eluded him. 
 
Dialogue 
Dialogue between characters can occasionally prompt an act of memory.  As with 
flashback, it sometimes happens that act of memory is virtually dictated by a given 




his glove, bears his hand without a thumb, and challenges Silence: ‘Look at my hand! 
... Remember what you did?’  This challenge to remember more or less dictates the 
emergence of a recollection. 
 
Parallel situation 
Sometimes a similarity between the situation of the present and some aspect of a past 
scene prompts a recollection.  In A Fistful of Dynamite (Sergio Leone, 1974), for 
instance, the excitement of preparing for a revolutionary operation prompts Mallory to 
recall romantic scenes of his first involvement in the Republican movement in 
Ireland.  Later, when he witnesses Dr Villega collaborating with the enemy, 
condemning men to execution, Mallory recalls a similar scene from his past in an 
Irish pub.   
 
Pre-disposition to remember 
Underlying the chance encounter with an object or situation — which serves as the 
immediate factor in activating memory — there is often present a psychological pre-
disposition to remember.  This pre-disposition is critical in our understanding of the 
experience of memory.  To a consciousness suitably predisposed to remember, 
anything can potentially act as the prompt for remembering.  In Proust’s À la 
recherche du temps perdu, while grieving for Albertine, the narrator experiences a 
series of powerful memories, occasioned by often comically banal prompts: 
 
And if Françoise on her return were accidentally to ruffle the folds of the lined 
curtains, I would smother a cry escaping from the inner wound that had just 




façade of Bricqueville l’Orgueilleuse seem beautiful, when Albertine had said, 
‘It has been restored.’  Not knowing how to explain my sighs to Françoise, I 
said, ‘Oh, I am so thirsty.’  She went out and then returned, but I had to turn 
away abruptly, assailed by the painful charge of one of those thousands of 
invisible memories which erupted in the shadows around me at every moment: 
I had just noticed that she had brought me cider and cherries […] It was no 
longer enough to draw the curtains, I tried to plug the eyes and ears of my 
memory, so as not to see those orange-tinted strips of sunset, so as not to hear 
those invisible birds […] The wave of such tender memories, coming to break 
over the idea that Albertine was dead, overwhelmed me with the clash of such 
contrary tides that I could not stay still; I got up, but suddenly I stopped dead 
in my tracks; the same early light of dawn that I used to see at the time when I 
had just left Albertine, feeling still warm and radiant from her kisses, had just 
drawn over my curtains its now funereal blade, whose cold, dense and 




And a short while later: 
 
One morning I thought that I glimpsed the oblong shape of a hill surrounded 
by mist, and felt the warmth of a cup of chocolate, while my heart was 
horribly wrung by the memory of the afternoon when Albertine had come to 
see me and when I had kissed her for the first time: it was because I had just 
heard the boiler gurgle as it was relit.
79
 
                                                 
78
 Proust, M. (2002) À la recherche du temps perdu, Volume V: La Prisionnière, trans. Clark, C and La 
Fugitive, trans. Collier, P., London: Penguin., pp.446-49 
 
79




   
Sunlight, cider and cherries, the gurgling of a boiler — to a mind suitably predisposed 
to remember the most banal and remote sensations and incidents, can prompt 
memories.  As the narrator subsequently explains,  
 
so many paths branch out from each idea within us, as from a crossing in a 
forest, that at the moment when I least expected it I found myself faced with a 
fresh memory […] After a certain age our memories are so interwoven with 
each other [...] We have left traces of ourselves everywhere, everything is 




In The Pawnbroker (Sidney Lumet, 1965) it is such a predisposition to remember (the 
approaching twenty-fifth anniversary of his wife’s death in a concentration camp) 
which dictates that virtually any object or situation — his sister-in-law mentioning the 
anniversary in conversation, a dog barking and some youths assaulting a man behind a 
barbed wire fence, a young woman’s wedding ring, a half-naked black woman 
presenting her body to him, the cramped claustrophobic conditions of a subway train 
— reminds Nazerman of his experience in the concentration camp.  But despite the 
explicit visual and acoustic associations between present and past, the approaching 
anniversary is the constant factor which is in each case the underlying motive for 
remembering.  In his criticism of the presentation of Nazerman’s memories, Stanley 
Cavell asks, ‘And why do the breasts of the beautiful black woman, offering to trade 
herself to him, flash to him his wife’s suffering at the hands of Nazi officers?’
81
 It 
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seems to me the black woman’s breasts remind him of his wife’s breasts because they 
are breasts (the intimate scene with the widow of his dead friend occurs in the dark, 
and it seems reasonable to speculate that this is always the case), and because on the 
anniversary of her death he is mentally predisposed to make such an association.  That 
is, six months before or after, the sight of the woman’s breasts might not have 
prompted this memory. 
 
Having enumerated the various ways in which recollections are prompted, we will 
soon consider some general aspects of the form of act of memory.  But first a brief 
excursus is necessary.  We have said that flashback-for-memory bears an analogical 
relationship to the mental images of memory, while act of memory is a depiction of 
the experience of memory.  In order to understand more fully the significance of this 
proposition, we must have recourse to theories of memory.  Thus we will now 
consider Alan Richardson’s cognitive psychology of memory, before proceeding to 
examine some aspects of Henri Bergson and Marcel Proust’s respective theories of 
memory. 
 
Cognitive theories of memory imagery 
John Frow has argued that since the ancient Greeks, philosophers have employed 
material and spatial metaphors to describe the process by which experiences are 
retained and revived as memories: 
 
the metaphor of the surface of inscription, traditionally a wax writing table 
(tabula rasa); and that of the thesaurus (the storehouse [...]).  Both metaphors 





suppose a direct relation between space and mental categories [...] and both 




Aristotle, for instance, writes ‘Memory involves an image in the soul, which is among 
other things a sort of imprint in the body of a former sense-image.’
83
 Frow cites Mary 
Carruthers, who argues that ‘[t]his model [...] continues to hold sway right through the 
Middle Ages.’
84
 By the Enlightenment, however, John Locke puts forth a far more 
nuanced model, invoking the notion of memory as a ‘store-house’, only to 
demonstrate its inadequacy: 
 
our Ideas being nothing, but actual Perceptions in the Mind, which cease to be 
any thing, when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our Ideas in 
the Repository of the Memory, signifies no more but this, that the Mind has a 
Power, in many cases, to revive Perceptions, which it has once had, with this 
additional Perception annexed to them, that it has had them before.  And in 
this Sense it is, that our Ideas are said to be in our Memories, when indeed, 
they are actually no where, but only there is an ability in the Mind, when it 
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Frow argues that even models which understand memory as analogous to a computer 
retrieval system still rely on notions of memory as a physical location in the brain, 
which stores memories as matter.  ‘[A] version of this conception’, he writes, ‘is still 
the predominant metaphor in contemporary cognitive psychology’.
86
 We will now 
briefly consider how memory is understood in cognitive theory.  I have selected 
Richardson’s Mental Imagery (1969) as a key text representative of cognitive theories 
of mental imagery.  In considering Richardson’s findings, however, we must 
remember that neuro-science and cognitive theory are constantly developing fields of 
research, and that Richardson’s book is now over forty years old.  Nevertheless, many 
of his findings remain relevant today.  As Richardson defines it, ‘memory imagery’ 
refers particularly to instances of voluntary memory.  Memory imagery ‘is far more 
amenable to voluntary control than all other forms of imagery.’
87
 In terms of its utility 
the memory-image must be understood in the context of the automated memory 
processes which operate in our day to day life.  For the completion of routine tasks 
‘imageless thought’ is often adequate.  ‘Images of a concrete quasi-sensory type or of 
a verbal auditory-motor type are more likely to form when some barrier to further 
thought is encountered and the solution is not immediately available.’
88
 As a 
phenomenal experience the memory-image is often vitiated, atrophied.  It is distinct 
from the eidetic-image in its qualitative poverty — it is of brief duration, ‘indefinitely 
localised’, ‘incomplete’, ‘unstable’.
89
 Richardson suggests that this is due to the bias 
in modern western society towards verbal as opposed to visual cognitive modes.  
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Experience is registered through the original act of perception, but in time the version 
of this experience which memory yields becomes qualitatively diminished.  
Richardson quotes a passage from Schachtel which describes this phenomenon: 
 
The processes of memory thus substitute the conventional cliché for the actual 
experience.  It is true that the original experience or perception usually is 
already, to a large extent, determined by conventional cliché, by what the 
person expected to see or hear, which means by what he has been taught to 
expect.  However, everybody who has paid attention to these processes in 
himself and others can observe that there is, especially at first, some awareness 
of the discrepancy between the experience itself and the thought or words 
which articulate, preserve, and express it.  The experience is always fuller and 
richer than the articulate formula by which we try to be aware of it or to 
recover it.  As time passes, this formula comes to replace more and more the 
original experience and, in addition, to become itself increasingly flat and 
conventionalised […] What is remembered is usually, more or less, only the 




With regard to the material prompts of vivid involuntary memories, Richardson notes 
that when examined such memories are ‘typically found to operate through a contact 
sense, like smell or touch, rather than a distance sense, like sight or hearing.’
91
 In this 
connection Richardson cites Schachtel’s analysis of memory in Proust: 
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The accidental recurrence of a bodily posture or of a sensory perception which 
he had experienced in the past, on some occasions brings with it the entire 
vision of that past, of the person he was then and of the way he saw things 
then.  It is a sensation-feeling of a body posture or sensation of the perspective 
apparatus — not a thought, as in willed recall, which revives the past.  In 
Proust’s account, visual sensations are far out-numbered as carriers of such 
memories by those of the lower more bodily senses such as the feeling of his 
own body in a particular posture, the touch of a napkin, the smell and taste of a 
flavour, the hearing of a sound — noise or melody, not the sound of words.  
All these sensations are far from conceptual thought, language, or 
conventional memory schemata.  They renew a state of the psychosomatic 
entity, that in some respect, this entity had experienced before, felt before.  It 
is as though they touched directly the unconscious memory trace, the record 
left behind by a total situation out of the past, whereas voluntary recall tries to 
approach and construct this past indirectly, coached and deflected by all these 
ideas, wishes and needs which tell the present person how the past could, 




Cognitive psychology cannot adequately account for the fact that remote memories 
are occasionally experienced with such vivacity.  Richardson cites the experiments of 
William Penfield in which vivid memory images are produced by the electrical 
stimulation of the exposed cortex of epileptic patients.  Such results suggest that 
sensory perception is a kind of recording device and that everything perceived and felt 
can potentially be re-experienced.  This might prompt one to hypothesise that all our 
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past experiences are stored in some region or other of the brain.
93
 But Bergson states 
emphatically and repeatedly that no such storehouse exists,
94
 and Richardson notes 
that since the thirties memory theorists have been in agreement that the experience of 
memory ‘involves a process of reconstruction and not the reviving’ of images.
95
 
Instead of the notion of a storehouse, a computer analogy has emerged.  Memories are 
catalogued in a kind of binary system by coordinates of numbers and words: 
 
words and numbers appear to carry information in an economical but 
skeletonised form.  We retrieve the fact that I went sun bathing yesterday and 
that I saw Bill on the beach, but we do not typically retrieve in quasi sensory-
affective form a re-experience of the sights, sounds, smells, tastes, pressures 




But such a quotidian and familiar experience of memory as this bears little 
resemblance to the rich, vivid existential metamorphoses described by Proust.  In the 
next section we will explore some aspects of the respective theories of memory of 
Bergson and Proust, and then consider what they can tell us about representations of 
the mental images of memory in cinema.
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II. Bergson and Proust 
Memory and perception 
Bergson posits the abstractions of ‘pure perception’ and ‘pure recollection’.  Just as 
‘there is no perception which is not full of memories’
97
 so there is no such thing as a 
pure memory image.  Pure recollection is a ‘virtuality’: ‘a memory [...] only becomes 
actual by borrowing the body of some perception into which it slips.’
98
 But memory is 
never confused with perception, as Bergson stresses in a description of voluntary 
recall: ‘our recollection still remains virtual [...] as its outlines become more distinct 
and its surface takes on colour, it tends to imitate perception.  But it remains attached 




Actualised in perception, the memory image nevertheless retains ‘something of its 
original virtuality’, by which it ‘stands out distinct from the present.’
100
 Bergson 
criticises the notion that between memory and perception there is only a difference of 
degree and not a difference in kind.  This illusion stems from a failure to grasp the 
utility of perception.
101
 Nevertheless, between actual sensations and pure memory ‘the 
difference is radical.’  Pure memory ‘interests no part of my body.  No doubt, it will 
beget sensations as it materialises; but at that very moment it will cease to be a 
memory’.
102
 A virtuality, pure memory remains inert and ‘powerless’, depending for 
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its realisation upon its potential utility in the present.  ‘Memory actualised in an image 




Inert and powerless, the past can nevertheless act ‘by inserting itself into a present 
sensation of which it borrows the vitality’.  Not only does it then ‘cease to be 
memory’, but ‘from the moment when the recollection actualises itself in this manner, 
it [...] becomes once more a perception.’
104
 Our variously vague or intense images of 
‘memory’ are, then, a mixture of memory and perception.  Between perception and 
pure memory are infinite ‘degrees of tension’ which correspond to our variously weak 





Several times Bergson employs the figure of light and darkness.  Pure memory is a 
virtuality which resides in ‘darkness’; memory can be realised only in the ‘light’ of an 
image; in becoming materialised, memory follows a ‘continuous progress [...] from 
darkness into light.’
106
 While pure memory is theoretically independent, it ‘manifests 
itself [...] only in the coloured and living image which reveals it.’
107
 Correlative with 
the figure of light is that of heat: ‘it is from the sensori-motor elements of present 
action that a memory borrows the warmth which gives it life.’
108
 Then there is the 
figure of relative abstraction or actuality, vitality.  A virtuality, pure memory is 
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‘materialised’ in the memory-image, which in turn ‘embodies itself’ in a 
perception.
109
 The more or less remote images which form part of our perception ‘go 
out to meet the perception, and, feeding on its substance, acquire sufficient vigour and 
life to abide with it in space.’
110
 The memory-image is materialised in the present 
sensation from which it ‘borrows life and strength’.
111
 Linked to the ‘continuous 
progress’ by which memory becomes materialised in image is the figure of force: the 
memory-image is produced when pure memory is ‘attracted’ by a perception.
112
 
Bergson also introduces a spatial hierarchy in describing the mechanism of memory: 
‘memory does not consist in a regression from the present to the past, but, on the 
contrary, in a progress from the past to the present’: from a virtual state we progress 
‘onwards, step by step, through a series of different planes of consciousness, up to the 
goal where it is materialised in an actual perception’.
113
 In describing the process 
whereby the abstraction of pure memory is realised in an image, Bergson thus 
employs figures of light, heat, space, force and life, vitality.  It is worth noting that 
Proust draws on a similar range of metaphors in the narrator’s famous account of the 
sensations and memories prompted by the taste of the Madeleine biscuit and tea.
114
   
 
Two memories 
Bergson posits a fundamental theoretical distinction between two forms of memory:  
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The first records [...] all the events of our daily life as they occur in time [...] 
Regardless of utility or of practical application, it stores up the past by the 
mere necessity of its own nature.  By this memory is made possible the [...] 
intellectual recognition of a perception already experienced […] But […] 
while the images are taking their place and order in this memory, the 
movements which continue them […] create in the body new dispositions 
towards action.  Thus is gradually formed an experience of an entirely 
different order, which accumulates within the body, a series of mechanisms 
wound up and ready with reactions to external stimuli [...] this consciousness 
of a whole past of efforts stored up in the present is [...] a memory profoundly 
different from the first, always bent upon action, seated in the present and 




The first of Bergson’s memories ‘appears to be memory par excellence.  The second 
[...] is habit interpreted by memory’.
116
 Of the first ‘backward-turning’ memory, 
Bergson writes, ‘our past psychical life [...] survives [...] with all the detail of its 
events localised in time.  Always inhibited by the practical and useful consciousness 




The form of this first backward-turning memory seems to be consistent with Proust’s 
descriptions of memory: ‘each past day remains deposited with us as in some vast 
library where there are copies even of the oldest books, which probably no one will 
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ever ask to consult.’
118
 But the two memories are theoretical abstractions which 
Bergson posits for the sake of expositional convenience.  In fact these two memories 
are interactive poles of the same movement, functions which ‘lend each other a 
mutual support.’
119
 Proust seems to recognise such a distinction of two memories 
when, in his account of his ‘realisation’, a year after the event, of his grandmother’s 
death, the narrator explains, 
 
if they [memories] do remain inside us, it is for most of the time in an 
unknown domain where they are of no service to us, and where even the most 
ordinary of them are repressed by memories of a different order, which 




Bergson illustrates his concept of the two memories and the movement and tensions 
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Bergson’s diagram illustrates the manner in which the recordings of past experience, 
‘exactly localised’ in pure recollection are arranged in a circular envelope, ‘the series 
of which represents the course of our past existence’.
122
   
 
this outermost envelope contracts and repeats itself in inner and concentric 
circles, which in their narrower range enclose the same recollections grown 
smaller, more and more removed from their personal and original form, and 




Thus recollections ‘take a more common form when memory shrinks most, more 
personal when it widens out’.
124
 Past images, 
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reproduced exactly as they were, with all their details and even with their 
affective colouring, are the images of idle fancy or of dream; to act is just to 
induce this memory [...] to become thinned and sharpened, so that it presents 
nothing thicker than the edge of a blade to actual experience, into which it will 




The pointed end of Bergson’s cone (S) corresponds to the sensori-motor state of 
action in the present, the infinite space of its base (AB) represents pure memory.  ‘Our 
psychical life,’ writes Bergson, ‘oscillates normally between these two extremes.’
126
 It 
is striking to note that the conical framework of Bergson’s diagram is echoed by 
Proust in his ‘mountain’ metaphor in The Fugitive: 
 
Our selves are composed of our successive states, superimposed.  But this 
superimposition is not immutable like the stratification of a mountain.  A 




Proust likens the experience of involuntary memory to the eruption of a volcano.  At 
the same time, while in spatial terms memory is analogous to a mountain — and to 
Bergson’s conical diagram — it is distinct from a mountain in that its 
superimpositions are mutable.  While in the second sentence of the above quotation 
Proust questions the validity of his analogy, by extending the metaphor through the 
words of the following sentence — ‘tremor’, ‘layers’, ‘surface’ — he affirms it.  In 
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spatial terms memory is like a mountain; in terms of motion it is more like a mountain 
in motion, a volcano which perpetually remains potentially active. 
 





III. Form  
Recollection circuit (flashback) 
In order the better to illustrate the essential formal distinctions between act of memory 
and flashback we must first briefly review the typical formal presentation of 
flashback.  As we have seen, the flashback typically adheres to the recollection circuit 
which we described at the start of this chapter: pre-recollection shot of the 
remembering subject in the present – memory image – post-recollection shot of the 
remembering subject in the present.  (Of course we except from this pattern those 
instances from modern cinema — which we have identified as flashbacks — in which 
the closing parenthetic shot is omitted.)  Many acts of memory which are of 
particularly short duration also take this form.   
 
But flashback does not always appear within the opening and closing parentheses of a 
recollection circuit.  In Memorias del Subdesarrollo we shift from one flashback — 
Sergio and his friend get into trouble with a priest at school — to another — Sergio’s 
nostalgic account of his first sexual experiences at a brothel.  Sergio’s friend 
introduces him to a fat prostitute, but he does not find her attractive, and so finds 
another woman.  Since the point of departure for this latter flashback is not the 
present, there is no specific present to which we might expect it to return.  At the 
conclusion of the sequence we shift to a new present — over images of Sergio in a 
book shop, his voiceover expresses his dissatisfaction with Elena.  Thus there is a 
metonymic link between the content of the brothel flashback — the young Sergio 
‘cannot do anything’ with the plump prostitute — and the subsequent scene in the 





Often, where the opening parenthetic shot is absent, we can only identify a sequence 
as flashback after the fact (retrospective flashback).  In Traffic (Stephen Soderbergh, 
2000), Mexican policemen Javier and Manolo are driven out to the desert by General 
Salazar’s men, who execute Manolo.  We then cut to the separate narrative strand of 
the drugs tsar’s search for his teenage daughter.  He arrives home to his wife without 
having found her.  We now cut to an exterior shot of Manolo’s house, and then a view 
onto the city from his doorstep.  Inside, having given her the news of Manolo’s death, 
Javier consoles his widow Ana.  Slow dissolve to Javier driving; tears well up in his 
eyes and he stops the car and beats the dashboard in frustration.  The specific 
relationship between these shots and the preceding scene prompts us to reinterpret the 
previous shots of Javier consoling Ana as flashback-for-memory.   
 
The intercutting model (act of memory) 
The object of flashback is narration of a past event; recollection is supplanted by 
narration.  By contrast, the object of act of memory is the representation of the 
experience of memory in time.  This radical distinction is manifest in its formal 
presentation.  We typically intercut between the remembering subject in the present 
and the recollection itself.  Often, each successive shot of the remembering subject 
employs a zoom in.  This conveys an impression of increasing intensity which 
expresses the process by which the memory-images come to dominate consciousness.  
Shots of the remembering subject in the present with an apposite facial expression, 
complementing the presentation of the recollection itself, are a significant aspect in 
creating the impression of memory as it is experienced in time.  In this typical filmic 
grammar we see the relevance to Bergson and Proust’s descriptions of memory.  




continuing track in towards the remembering subject, in the intercutting between the 
remembering subject and the recollection itself, each separate shot of the 
remembering subject a little closer. 
 
Modern variations on the intercutting model 
Split-screen 
Some films offer alternatives to this intercutting, presenting the memory and the 
remembering subject simultaneously.  Thus we find memory superimpositions in 
Hitchcock’s The 39 Steps (1935) and The Saboteur (1942).  In Dressed to Kill (Brian 
De Palma, 1980), Kate Miller’s three recollections — the gloved hand, the knickers, 
the wedding ring — are all presented using split screen: her expression as she 
remembers in the present continues in frame-left, while a generic representation of the 
remembered object or incident appears on the right.   
 
Entering memory 
In The Passenger we enter recollection via a panning movement.  While Locke 
compares his passport photograph with that of the dead man Robertson, there is a 
knock at the door and he looks up.  While the camera remains on Locke we hear him 
say ‘come in’, though the Locke before us does not speak.  As he proceeds to 
substitute Robertson’s passport photograph for his own, it becomes clear that the 
continuing conversation on the soundtrack between Locke and Robertson is from an 
earlier time.  (A shot of the sound source — a tape recorder — confirms this.)  The 
conversation continues as the camera pans across the wall before settling on a view on 
to the desert from the ground-floor balcony; Robertson enters the frame followed by 








Two of the past scenes in Buffalo ’66 (Vincent Gallo, 1998) end with a freeze-frame 
— the first of Billy’s face, all blotchy because of his allergic reaction to eating 
chocolate; the second of Billy begging his father not to hurt the dog after it has 
urinated in the house — as though such memories contain definite cut-off points: 
there is no more to remember; what happened subsequent to this is beyond the power 
of recall because it has no relevance to the present situation.   
 
Audio-visual overlapping 
Audio-visual overlapping is frequently employed in the service of continuity.  
However, where the passage is not simply between one scene and the next, but 
between the space of the present and the mental images of memory, audiovisual 
overlap — recalled voices or sounds heard over images of the present, anticipating act 
of memory and/or recalled voices or sounds lingering into the present, subsequent to 
act of memory — becomes a temporal juxtaposition, whereby intricate resonances 
between past and present may be established.  In such cases, memory invariably 
appears first of all on the soundtrack, while the image momentarily remains in the 
present.   
 
In general, sequences in which the present retains a presence in the presentation of 
memory — either through intercutting, audiovisual asynchrony, or both — place 




representations of memory.  We find this in both flashback-for-memory and act of 
memory.  Thus, though we have established that the relation between flashback-for-
memory and the mental images of memory is analogical, in those cases where the past 
scene emerges first asynchronously on the soundtrack, sound and image present a 
juxtaposition of past and present, and, though when we enter the flashback the present 
recedes — thus relinquishing the tension in the representation of memory — in the 
moments preceding flashback proper, when past and present are juxtaposed 
simultaneously, the voices or sounds on the soundtrack are representations of mental 
images.   
   
There is a particularly interesting illustration of this in a sequence from Death in 
Venice (Luchino Visconti, 1971).  Recuperating at the Grand Hotel in Venice after an 
illness, composer Gustav von Aschenbach is struck by the beauty of an adolescent 
boy, Tadzio.  A series of flashbacks present Gustav’s debates on aesthetics with 
Alfred, a young composer who has definite modern ideas about aesthetic beauty and 
the creative process.  Though stimulating, these discussions are wearying for Gustav, 
who is less confident and assured in debate than Alfred.  In most cases these 
flashbacks seem to emerge autonomously, but there are one or two interesting 
exceptions.  The first of Gustav’s debates with Alfred initially appears 
asynchronously on the soundtrack, while Gustav observes Tadzio at dinner.  The 
flashback proper follows after some minutes, and given the fact that subsequent 
flashbacks emerge autonomously, we might consider the exact significance of 
audiovisual asynchrony here.  In the present we cut between Gustav and point-of-
view shots of Tadzio, while, on the soundtrack, Gustav and Alfred debate the source 




transformations with the development of the conversation and its specific relation to 
the image track at each point in time.  Instead of understanding the past conversation 
as representing the auditory mental images of Gustav’s memory (recalled voices), to 
begin with it seems that it may simply be audiovisual asynchrony preceding a 
flashback, an autonomous act of narration.  But then the development of the 
conversation becomes bound to the accompanying images in such a way that it seems 
Gustav is recalling the conversation.  When Alfred questions Gustav’s notion of the 
‘labour of the artist’, in the present Gustav’s expression discernibly changes, 
suggesting that he is recalling the conversation.  Alfred asks,  
‘Do you really believe that beauty is the product of labour?’   
Gustav subtly nods his head, seemingly in confirmation.  In the past, after a pause, he 
confirms,  
‘Yes, yes, I ... I do.’   
Gustav looks up at the boy, and it seems that Tadzio’s beauty contradicts his point 
about beauty being the product of labour, and supports Alfred’s argument.  While the 
camera, and Gustav’s gaze, remains fixed on the boy, Alfred says, ‘That’s how beauty 
is born — like that, spontaneously, in utter disregard for your labour and mind.  It pre-
exists our presumption as artists!’  Cut to later on and Gustav walks outside after 
dinner.  There is no sound from the past conversation for some moments.  Then 
Alfred’s voice re-enters as he accuses, ‘Your great error, my friend, is to consider life, 
reality, as a limitation ...’ With this we enter the flashback proper, and Alfred and 
Gustav’s conversation seems to be a continuation of the previous debate.  The specific 
presentation here — the asynchronous sound at dinner, the gap, the subsequent 
emergence of the flashback — leaves room for freedom of interpretation.  One might 




images of Gustav’s memory, and that the flashback which follows is something 
separate.  On the other hand, it seems that the recalled voices at dinner and the 
subsequent flashback are related, that it is the same scene.  The gap might then 
represent an actual gap of equivalent length in Gustav and Alfred’s conversation.  The 
flashback proper is thus anticipated by an audiovisual overlap which lasts several 
minutes.  We have said that the relation between flashback-for-memory and the 
mental images of memory is analogical.  Here, however, we see how the inventive use 
of extended passages of audiovisual overlapping can complicate matters.  Where 
flashback is preceded by extended sequences of audiovisual asynchrony, if the 
relationship between past and present is as significant, deliberate and meaningful as it 




Sometimes sound and image remain asynchronous for the duration of the presentation 
of memory.  The most common form of such audiovisual asynchrony is the 
recollection of voices.  But occasionally sound-images from the past reappear on the 
soundtrack.  In the final story of Soy Cuba (Mikhail Kalatozov, 1964), when the 
peasant Marianna returns to his shack in the mountains after it has been devastated by 
an air raid, the soundtrack presents a reprise of the noise his wife made with a wooden 
grinder on a bowl just a short time before, as she prepared food while Marianna told 
his rebel guest that he did not want to join the revolution.  The extra-diegetic 
recurrence of the sound seems to represent Marianna’s recollection of this 
conversation, marking the transformation of his attitude: he is now willing to join the 




the radicalising potential of personal experience: it can take just this long for a man 
unconcerned with politics to become a militant.   
 
Sometimes one memory will prompt another, and sound and image become split, each 
presenting a separate past.  In Blue Velvet (David Lynch, 1986), on his way to see 
Detective Williams, Jeffrey sees a man — the Yellowman — he recognises from his 
surveillance of Frank’s building.  Jeffrey notes from the sign on the door that his 
name is Detective Gordon, and this prompts him to recall Frank’s conversation with 
Ben.  Frank is framed in close-up as he explains, ‘Gordon went right up to him in 
broad daylight of course, ’cause he’s the man right ...’ This prompts a further 
memory, precipitating a break in synchrony: while Frank’s voice continues on the 
soundtrack (‘... and took those drugs away and it was beautiful!’), the image cuts to 
the Yellowman and the well-dressed man climbing a fire escape to witness the killing 
of the drug dealer.  Through this asynchronous use of sound, Lynch establishes the 
mental processes which enable Jeffrey to identify the Yellowman as Detective 
Gordon.   
 
Nostalgia 
The majority of nostalgic representations of memory share certain basic formal 
properties: the presence of wistful nondiegetic music, the total absence of diegetic 
sound, and frequently the use of slow-motion images.  These moments of nostalgia 
usually appear toward the end of a film and often repeat previous narrative events.
128
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Occasionally, memories are presented as being shared by more than one character.  In 
The Wild Bunch, Pike speaks to Dutch of his plan for the gang to steal arms from the 
U.S. cavalry.  Pike turns to face forward and there is a silence.  A memory image 
emerges, presenting Pike and Thornton — Pike’s old friend who is now working for 
the law to apprehend Pike and the gang — at a bordello.  We then dissolve to 
Thornton sitting alone in a geographically distinct location in the present, suggesting 
that at this moment he, too, is recalling the same memory.  We then re-enter the 
recollection with a dissolve — and in this way we enter and exit the recollection 
several times, each time alternating to a geographically different present.  The 
implication is that Pike and Thornton, in different geographical locations, experience 
the memory approximately simultaneously.   
 
Act of memory with narrative 
In Chapter 1 we noted that in general one who is in the process of narrating a story is 
incapable of performing the concentrated remembering that yields representations of 
the mental images of memory.  Occasionally, however, rather than delivering a free-
flowing unbroken continuous narrative, the recounting subject conveys a hesitant or 
confused narrative.  Where this is the case, the mental images of memory may be 
experienced simultaneously with, or in the interstices of, a narrative.  Since dialogue 
requires the active participation of two or more interlocutors, while remembering is 
generally the subjective experience of an individual, memories experienced during 
dialogue tend necessarily to be short and fragmentary.  Sometimes mental images are 





experienced because of the gravity of the recounted narrative.  In Born on the Fourth 
of July (Oliver Stone, 1989) when Ron visits the family of Billy Wilson, the soldier 
whom he accidentally killed in action, his narrative is hesitant and uncertain.  Images 
emerge of the scenes he describes, and the form adheres closely to what we earlier 
identified as flashback-with-narrative.  Here, however, it seems that these fragmentary 
images, accompanying a confused and hesitant narrative, are attributable to Ron.  
Making this difficult confession, he forms mental images, and his experience of these 
images is consistent with, and to some extent accounts for, the hesitancy and pauses in 
his verbal account.   
 
Impure forms 
Earlier we noted that flashback presents a magically full and rich image of the past.  
While act of memory places more emphasis on the experience of memory, many acts 
of memory, like flashbacks, present the past with all the fullness and richness of the 
present.  However, some acts of memory appear in fragmented, impoverished form — 
the memory image appears in superimposition, or the physical details by which the 
past is temporally and geographically localised are omitted, so that the image of the 
past is noticeably distinct from how it appeared, or would have been experienced, 
when it was present.  As we have seen, such representations of memory are consistent 
with the findings of cognitive research.  The memory image, Richardson writes, is 
typically ‘like a hazy etching, often incomplete and usually unstable, of brief duration 
and indefinitely localised.’
129
 Or again, ‘the memory image, when it exists at all, is 
typically a schematic reconstruction of something seen rather than a full bodied 
                                                 
129







 Rather than the magically full and rich representations of the past 
which flashback presents — and which correspond to the wider concentric circles of 
Bergson’s cone — these atrophied representations of the past seem to correspond to 
the narrower of Bergson’s concentric circles, which ‘enclose the same recollections 
grown smaller, more and more removed from their personal and original form, and 
more and more capable [...] of being applied to the present perception’,
131
 a more 
generalised image of the past, consistent with the utilitarian function of volitional 
memory.  For Richardson, such atrophied memories are evidence of the cognitive 
tendency, with the acquisition of language, towards abstract cognitive modes: 
 
Language is used more and more to compress, to represent and to express our 
experience.  It is typically of more practical use for me to recall that I went to 
the post office yesterday [...] than it is to recall what the sensory-affective 
experience of being in the post office was actually like.  To re-see re-hear and 




In cinema, impure images of the past are fragmentary depictions, superimpositions 
combined with excerpts of sound and dialogue.  In Pursued, Jeb is haunted by vague 
childhood memories of the night his parents were killed.  All he remembers are 
‘flashes and boots with spurs’, memory fragments which the film depicts with 
superimpositions.  Here, the poverty of the memory images is due to several factors: 
the fact that the incident is so remote in the past; the psychological tendency for 
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children to repress memories of traumatic episodes; the fact that the images are 
memories of perceptions which were in themselves perforce impoverished (in the 
final revelatory flashback Jeb peers out from a cellar through a gap beneath a 
trapdoor); and finally, because over time Jeb’s memories of the night have become 
confused with his nightmares, so that they are as much memories of dream images as 
memories of actual perceptions.   
 
Such fragmentary representations usually depict volitional memory, and effectively 
convey the tendency for voluntary memory to yield past experiences only in atrophied 
form.  Representations such as this demonstrate the extent to which memory is 
imagination, consists of nothing more than the images which imagination is able to 
produce.  (Here we anticipate an aspect of mental images that we will discuss further 
in Part II, when we draw on Sartre’s notion of quasi-observation in our efforts to 
better understand the form of some mental images.)  
 
We might consider here some pertinent comments of Bergson.  As we have seen, he 
distinguishes between two forms of recollection: the ‘backward-turning’ memory 
which is peculiar to human beings, and ‘natural’ memory, which it is likely that 
humans share with animals: 
 
To call up the past in the form of an image, we must be able to withdraw 
ourselves from the action of the moment, we must have the power to value the 
useless, we must have the will to dream.  Man alone is capable of such an 
effort.  But even in him the past to which he returns is fugitive, ever on the 




by the other, more natural, memory, of which the forward movement bears 




The poverty of our memory images might be understood, then, as a consequence of 
our tendency toward action.  This leads us to consider the distinction — explicit in 
Proust, at best implicit in Bergson — between voluntary and involuntary memory.  If 
we keep in mind Bergson’s notion of two memories — a backward turning memory 
and a memory which follows on the coat tails of our moment-to-moment experience 
in time — we note that involuntary memory disengages us from the exigencies of the 
present, inserting us in the past, hence the overwhelming quality of the experience, 
and the richness and vivacity of the sensations it revives.  By contrast, voluntary 
memory is always constrained and opposed by the demands of our situation and our 
tendency toward action.  This might account for the tendency for cinematic depictions 
of volitional memory to be vitiated, atrophied representations. 
 
Sometimes, where it revives an incident that occurred previously in the narrative, the 
presentation of memory is significantly different from the original presentation of the 
event, demonstrating the extent to which memory and imagination are bound up with 
one another.  In Subida al cielo (Ascent to Heaven) (Luis Buñuel, 1952), Oliverio’s 
dying mother sends him to Petatlan to fetch a lawyer so that she can make a will.  
Oliverio sets off, leaving behind his wife Albina.  But on the bus is the vamp Raquel, 
who sits across the aisle from Oliverio, tormenting him with her brazen solicitations.  
The driver announces an unscheduled stop and Oliverio finds himself stranded at a 
birthday party.  He steals the bus and, as he leaves, Raquel jumps on board.  Her 
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tormenting now becomes unbearable and Oliverio finally submits to temptation and 
makes love to her.  Upon reaching Petatlan, Oliverio asks Raquel if she needs 
anything.  She bites into her apple and laughs, ‘I got what I wanted!’  When Oliverio 
finally returns home, his mother is dead.  Albina explains, ‘You barely missed her.’   
As he kneels at his mother’s side, a memory image emerges.  Raquel appears before a 
black background, bites into her apple, spits it out impudently and laughs, ‘I got what 
I wanted’, in a reverberant voice, as though spoken in a dream.  Oliverio’s memory of 
Raquel’s dismissal is presented quite differently to how it in fact occurred.  The actual 
exchange took place in daylight.  When Oliverio said goodbye, Raquel spat out a 
piece of apple.  Some dialogue then ensued before she delivered her crushing line.  
Here, by contrast, the key elements of the memory — Raquel insolently spitting out a 
piece of her apple, her cruel dismissal — are condensed into one movement.  Also, 
the surrounding physical context is completely omitted.  It is worth considering the 
extent to which the impure, vitiated representations of memory in Pursued, and here 
in Subida al cielo — in which the original context is absent, details are remembered 
wrongly, which reconstructs an event subjectively — approximate the lived 




In 8 ½ Fellini offers a significant innovation in presenting Guido’s childhood 
memories in an unreal style.  In filmic representations of anteriority — excepting the 
audiovisually asynchronous and the impure forms discussed above — the past is 
generally presented with all the objective vivacity of realism that one expects of the 




scene in which Saraghina dances the rhumba on the beach, the music, around which 
the scene’s action is based (the boys pay Saraghina to dance for their entertainment), 
has no diegetic source.  The overall effect of these recollections is of an event as it is 
remembered many years later, as opposed to how it actually happened, thus 
demonstrating how memory becomes imbricated with imagination. 
 
The same seems to be the case in many of the past scenes in L’année dernière à 
Marienbad (Alain Resnais, 1961).  These representations of anteriority elude the 
distinctions which we have established.  Most of the sequences seem to be flashback-
with-narrative; we see images of the scenes which the man’s commentary from the 
present describes.  But here the scenes presented are so unnaturalistic — often there is 
absolutely no diegetic sound, secondary characters appear frozen like statues, the 
acting is affected, exaggerated — that we can hardly identify them as flashback, since 
flashback conventionally has an objective authenticity.  As we have seen, act of 
memory, by contrast, sometimes presents memory in fragmented, atrophied form.  
Here, despite the unnaturalistic affectedness of these presentations, Resnais captures 
something of the actual experience of memory.  There is no diegetic sound, secondary 
characters are reduced to statues — because these aspects are unimportant (the man 
does not remember them); the man is concerned only with his exchanges with the 
woman.   
 
The author’s mental images 
Processes of memory are central to the very structures of Terence Davies’s Distant 
Voices, Still Lives (1988) and The Long Day Closes (1992).  The films do not follow a 




related episodes, the succession of which follows an apparently aleatory course back 
and forth through time — just as different spheres of time co-exist in memory.  It is 
not causal or chronological logic but, as Wendy Everett notes, the peculiar processes 
of memory which govern the structural composition of these films.  Of Distant 
Voices, Still Lives, Everett writes, 
 
each individual memory once recalled may trigger other deeper, less 
accessible memories.  Autobiographical memory can thus be understood to be 
composed of multiple layers which are elaborately interleaved, or tightly 
nested one within the other, so that remembering is less a matter of retrieving 
a single record than of moving gradually through a highly complex structure in 
which each remembered fragment may lead to others, in a process which is 




In her article ‘Memory Texts and Memory Work’, Annette Kuhn describes Bill 
Douglas’s Trilogy (1972-78) as a ‘memory text’.  Kuhn’s discussion of the memory 
text seems to me to be equally relevant to Davies’s Distant Voices, Still Lives and The 
Long Day Closes: 
 
In memory texts, time rarely comes across as continuous or sequential […] 
events may have a repetitive or cyclical quality […] or may telescope or 
merge into one another in the telling so that a single recounted memory might 
fuse together a series of possibly separate events, or follow no obviously 
logical or temporal sequence.  The memory text is typically a montage of 
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vignettes, anecdotes, fragments, ‘snap-shots’ and flashes that can generate a 
feeling of synchrony: remembered events seem to be outside any linear time 
frame or may refuse to be easily anchored to ‘historical’ time [...] events often 
appear to have been plucked at random from a paradigm of memories and 
assembled in a mode of narration in which causality is not […] a prominent 
feature.  Delivering […] abrupt shifts of scene and/or narrative viewpoint, 
memory texts have more in common with poetry than with classical narrative 
[…] structure and organisation seem to be of greater rhetorical salience than 
content.  The metaphoric quality, the foregrounding of formal devices, the 
tendency to rapid shifts of setting or point of view all feed into the 
characteristically collagist, fragmentary, timeless, even the ‘musical’, quality 
of the memory text, which by and large possesses an imagistic quality that 
aligns it more closely to unconscious productions like dreams and fantasies 




At the outset I stated that I am concerned only with representations of the mental 
images of characters within the diegesis.  But some films, such as Tarkovsky’s Mirror 
(1974), Fanny och Alexander (Ingmar Bergman, 1982) and The Long Day Closes, 
require us to re-evaluate our conceptual framework.  Many of the events depicted in 
The Long Day Closes seem to represent events as they are remembered.  The film is 
autobiographical — Davies is the boy, Bud — and thus problematises our intention to 
focus exclusively on the mental images of characters within the diegesis.  Since the 
director is the protagonist, and since the film is autobiographical, telling Bud’s story 
not as it happened but how it is remembered and how Davies wishes to remember it 
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(and hence present it), throughout the film seems to represent, to actualise, to explore, 
to celebrate, and to fundamentally be concerned with memory — though there are few 
instances of representations of Bud’s mental images which can easily be incorporated 
into our discussion.  At Christmas we see a tableau of the family at the table.  At this 
point the acting is naturalistic, their voices inaudible beneath the rich score.  Then the 
mother looks across the table to the camera and says sincerely, ‘Happy Christmas, 
lad.’  The other five family members turn to look at the camera and say in unison, 
sincerely, ‘Happy Christmas, Bud.’  The style in which this greeting is presented, the 
tableau which is revealed to be a point-of-view shot, lend the scene an artificial 
impression; it is a non-naturalistic moment which seems to capture or represent this 
moment as it is remembered rather than as it actually occurred.   
 
Later, while Bud washes his brother’s back his mother says,  ‘You’ll soon be grown 
up, won’t you lad.’  Bud does not turn upon hearing the voice, and the specific 
acoustic presentation of the voice suggests that it is not an offscreen voice but a 
remembered voice.  Cut to Bud himself leaning before the washing bowl.  He looks 
up offscreen past the camera.  We hear his mother say, ‘Go on, get washed, and I’ll 
bring you your tea and toast.’  But, again, her voice is presented as a remembered 
voice rather than an offscreen voice.  Bud smiles and slowly turns to face forward, as 
though reflecting, and then says, ‘Okay, Mam.’  In addition to the fact that the 
mother’s voice is presented as a recalled voice rather than an offscreen voice, we must 
add that, by reflecting in this way, Bud appears mature beyond his years.  It is as 
though Davies presents the experience and process of memory through Bud; the child 
actor playing Bud visually realises, through the gestures, expressions and reactions of 






Flash-inserts and eidetic imagery 
In her discussion of modernist cinema, Turim considers the relevance of cognitive 
psychological theories of memory to modern filmic language for the representation of 
memory.  The flash-insert implies ‘eidetic’ (visual) memory, in which the past is 
stored as it occurred, and that, under certain circumstances, it is possible to revive a 
visual record of the past.  However, Turim notes that memory is now understood more 
as ‘a process of encoding and decoding information [...] Percepts are encoded as 
memory in another form and must be reconstituted to become a visual display […] an 
information-processing model has supplanted the camera-image model of 
memory’.
136
 She cites Richardson, who nevertheless maintains that in a minority of 
cases ‘of “photographic memory” or “eidetic memory” […] something closer to the 
camera-image model of memory is sustained’.
137
 E.R. Jaensch writes, ‘[f]or the great 
majority of adults there is an unbridgeable gulf between sensations and images.’  
However, it ‘has always been known that for a few individuals this is not true.  Some 




Cognitive research in eidetic imagery has its basis in memory tests, whereby subjects 
are exposed to a test-object or -image for a given duration, and then asked to describe 
it or reproduce it.  But what is the precise relationship or distinction between the 
eidetic-image and the memory-image?  Jaensch writes that eidetic images ‘are 
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phenomena that take up an intermediate position between sensations and images.’
139
 
They encompass a range of images, the experience of which is at one end close to the 
sensational experience of the after-image, in which the imagination plays a limited 
role, and at the other end, ‘when the influence of the imagination is at its maximum’, 
are closer to ‘ideas that, like after-images, are projected outward and literally seen.’
140
 
Whether they more closely resemble the limited sensational experience of after-
imagery or the more fluid ideational experience of memory-imagery, a crucial aspect 
of the quality of the experience of eidetic images is that, like after-images, ‘they are in 
every case literally seen.’
141
 While eidetic images ‘are very distinct, they are not in 
general confused with real objects.  In the majority of cases, they merely have the 
character of pictures, which nevertheless, are seen in the literal, optical sense.’
142
 
Jaensch finds that frequently, ‘an explanation by means of visual memory images is 
excluded by the accuracy with which pictures are described in every detail.’
143
 The 
‘slightly intensified after-images and the projected, literally visible, memory image 
are the limiting cases between which the eidetic images lie.’
144
 One class of eidetic-
imagery, then, would appear to be a profoundly rich and vivid memory-image.  This 
seems consistent with Proust’s account of the intensity of involuntary memory.  
However, the eidetic image is not involuntary but voluntary.  Richardson insists that 
the eidetic-image may ‘be recovered at will by many eidetekers’.
145
 Eidetic imagery 
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is, then, associated with a certain ability.  Because of its perceptual-like intensity 
eidetic imagery is often referred to as ‘photographic memory’.
146
 Eidetic imagery is 
most prevalent among children, but becomes vitiated with the acquisition of the 
symbolic codes of language and is replaced by more abstract cognitive processes 
during adolescence, rarely persisting into adulthood.
 147
 Films which feature flash-
inserts, that is, films which imply that memory is eidetic, Turim suggests, ‘recall and 
reinforce the eidetic recall of childhood that is for most adults lost to some degree.  
Our nostalgia for our childhood perception is perhaps tapped at some unconscious 
level.’
148
 Of the flash-insert Turim writes,  
 
We can see how brevity can be taken as a sign of mental processes meant to 
enhance the mimetic aspect of the representation.  A short image correlates 
with the rapidity of human perceptual and cognitive processes.  The isolation 
of a brief instance of recall serves to augment the coding of an unconscious 
recall breaking through repressive forces.
149
   
 
Noting that, unsurprisingly, the first reports of “photographic memory” coincided 
with the development of photography itself, Turim considers the possibility that 
contemporary technology and modes of representation might influence the way 
people understand their experiences of memory, if not the experience of memory 
itself.  This notion becomes most interesting when Turim cites the research of 
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William Penfield, who ‘found that electric stimulation during brain surgery provoked 
extremely detailed visions’ of incidents in the subjects’ past.  ‘He argued that this 
recall constituted evidence of a “permanent record of the stream of 
consciousness”’.
150
 Though Penfield’s research was widely discounted by his scientist 
peers, his studies ‘were widely enough publicised to have been a factor in 
encouraging a literary and filmic treatment of such direct visual recall.’
151
 Turim 
concludes her discussion of modern cinema’s flash-insert, writing, ‘cognitive 
psychologists argue that it is likely that all forms of sensory input are part of a 
perceptual-cognitive cycle in which no such thing as a whole image simply exists in 
an unreconstructed form.’
152
 The flash-inserts of modern cinema are best understood  
 
as figures, metaphors for memory fragments.  The process of reassembling 
fragments as more complete memories […] is in actuality less of an additive 
montage […] and more of a fictional aspect inherent in memory, residing at 
the core of its process of storage and retrieval.
153
   
 
Modernist films which represent memory in flash-inserts ‘substitute the image-as-
truth for the reconstructed memory and have us believe that while memory is 
subjective, it is not fractured and recombined intra-subjectively.’
154
 Later she asserts 
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that ‘audiences have had their own notions of memory affected by the process of 




Turim identifies an isolated case of the flash-insert in Resnais’s Hiroshima, mon 
amour (1959) as marking a ‘sense that a new tendency in flashbacks emerges in the 
late fifties.’
156
 Hollywood subsequently showcased the flash-insert in The Pawnbroker 
(1965).  The film’s editor Ralph Rosenblum comments on the presentation of memory 
in the film: 
 
The time was right for an overhaul of the flashback.  In the thirties and forties 
the flashback had been very popular and always happened in the same way.  
Joan Crawford or Bette Davis said, “I remember … ” or began reminiscing in 
a dreamy way [...] the camera moved in on her entranced face, an eerie “time” 
music saturated the sound track, a shimmering optical effect crept over the 





Rosenblum’s comments articulate a tired over-familiarity with the conventional 
Hollywood flashback, and a desire to experiment with a new filmic language for 
representing memory.  Of course, the flash-insert is a specifically modern variety of 
act of memory, but, more generally, Rosenblum’s comments express an impulse, 
perhaps kindled in Europe and gaining support from some sections of Hollywood, for 
                                                 
155
 Ibid., p.224 
 
156
 Ibid., p.210 
  
157
 Rosenblum quoted in Rosen, A. (2002) ‘ “Teach Me Gold”: Pedagogy and Memory in The 





an aesthetic shift in filmic representations of memory — away from flashback and 
towards act of memory. 
 
Before proceeding further with our discussion of flash-inserts in cinema, we will 
briefly consider Cathy Caruth’s reading of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of trauma. 
 
Psychoanalytic theory of trauma 
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1921), Freud discussed the peculiar nature of the 
traumatic dreams and hallucinations experienced by those suffering from war 
neuroses.  Anne Whitehead gives a useful summary of his position: 
 
For Freud [...] memory became an effect of the impact of the outside world on 
the unconscious and preconscious; consciousness took on significance in 
providing a first line of defence against external stimuli.  In Freud’s model, 
trauma resulted from a rupture or breach in the protective shield of 
consciousness.  This was less likely to occur when the subject was prepared 
for the onslaught of external stimuli, for example through anxiety or 
narcissism.  The symptoms of the trauma victim, the nightmares of the shell-
shocked soldier which returned him to the terrible event, acted as a means of 




Applying Freud’s theory of trauma to her study of post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), Caruth notes that the dreams and hallucinations of trauma patients are free 
from symbolic meaning, resisting interpretation and cure, by the very fact of their 
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‘literality’.  Indeed, ‘[i]t is this literality and its insistent return which thus constitutes 
trauma and points toward its enigmatic core: occurrence that then remains, in its 
insistent return, absolutely true to the event.’
159
 Caruth makes the important point that 
the pathology of PTSD ‘cannot be defined [...] by the experience itself — which may 
or may not be catastrophic, and may not traumatise everyone equally’.  Nor can it be 
defined in terms of a subjective distortion of the event.  ‘The pathology consists, 
rather, solely in the structure of its experience or reception: the event is not 
assimilated or experienced fully at the time, but only belatedly, in its repeated 
possession of the one who experiences it.’
160
   
 
Dominick LaCapra writes of trauma, 
 
when the past is uncontrollably relived, it is as if there were no difference 
between it and the present […] one experientially feels as if one were back 





For LaCapra the difference and distance between the revival of the trauma and the 
traumatic experience itself is ‘collapsed’.  By contrast, what strikes Caruth most 
forcefully in Freud’s account of trauma is not the collapsing of past and present, nor 
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the period of latency or forgetting, ‘but rather the fact that the victim of the crash was 




The historical power of the trauma is not just that the experience is repeated 
after its forgetting, but that it is only in and through its inherent forgetting that 
it is first experienced at all.  And it is this inherent latency of the event that 
paradoxically explains the peculiar, temporal structure, the belatedness, of 
historical experience: since the traumatic event is not experienced as it occurs, 
it is fully evident only in connection with another place, and in another time.  
If repression, in trauma, is replaced by latency, this is significant in so far as 
its blankness — the space of unconsciousness — is paradoxically what 




In Caruth’s account the traumatic experience is only recognised as such after the 
event, since the subject is not fully conscious, not properly aware of its import at the 
time of the event itself.
164
 This is relevant to our discussion of the flash-insert, which 
is often employed in modern cinema to convey an experience of memory that is 
somehow traumatic.   
 
Flash-inserts and trauma 
Turim notes how the flash-insert has been used to represent the traumatic memory of 
the Holocaust.  ‘If modernist techniques of narration are particularly common in these 
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films’, she writes, ‘it is perhaps because the dislocation of modernist storytelling 
serves as analogy for the psychic damage.’
165
 In The Pawnbroker, as the twenty-fifth 
anniversary of his wife’s death in a concentration camp approaches, memories of the 
camp haunt Nazerman.  Initially, the memories appear in brief, subliminal flashes, but 
as the film progresses, the memories become more frequent, intense and prolonged, 
culminating in the extended recollection of a scene inside a train en-route to a death 
camp.
166
 The Holocaust recollection, writes Turim, ‘signals disruption of everyday 
postwar existence.  Violently inserted flashbacks inscribe in narratives a shattering of 
complacency.’
167
   
 
The use of flash-inserts in modern cinema usually strives to approximate something of 
the violence of memory, its lacerating potential, its capacity to carve through attention 
and impose images upon consciousness, to overwhelm the subject, as it were, in spite 
of him/herself.  Nazerman ‘is portrayed as a man haunted by images that slice into his 
daily existence against his will and outside of his control.’
168
 Alan Rosen writes of 




But the flash-insert is not reserved exclusively for representing traumatic memories of 
the Holocaust.  In Straw Dogs (Sam Peckinpah, 1972), during the scene in the village 
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hall in which the children eat party food and the reverend performs magic tricks, 
Amy, oppressed by the physical proximity of the two men who raped her, and 
suffering from guilt over her complicity in the first of the sexual acts with her ex-
lover Charlie, is overcome by memories of the incident.  Her memories appear in 
intermittent flash-inserts over the continuing diegetic noise of the present.  Having 
initially resolved to demonstrate her courage by confronting and defying her attackers, 
as the scene progresses — and the memory-images become more and more frequent, 
slightly longer, and more disturbing — Amy becomes increasingly uncomfortable.  In 
this way Peckinpah effectively conveys the violence of these memories: Amy is 
overwhelmed; the images appear in spite of her.  It is almost as though she suffers the 
assault all over again.  Images lacerate consciousness like blows from an attack; one 
flinches, parries, tries to collect oneself, but there is no escape.   
 
Where memory is characterised by an essential violence, where the subject is 
overwhelmed by images, we can consider the relation between such experiences of 
memory and states of madness.  In Part II we will consider the extent to which 
representations of mental images are bound up with themes of madness in cinema.  
But what is madness?  Is there such a thing as mental illness?  Before proceeding 





IV. Defining madness 
Throughout history different civilisations have understood and approached madness 
in different ways.  In Medieval times people who manifested symptoms of madness 
were thought to be possessed by demons or to be witches.   In later centuries, though 
it ceased to be understood in religious or supernatural terms, there remained a stigma 
attached to madness.  But by the 1950s, Roy Porter notes, the idea had become 
conventional ‘that mental disorder was not confined to the certifiable.  Ordinary 
people might have ‘complexes’, and neuroses, it was now said, ran like a watermark 
through the population at large’.
170
 From this time mental illness was 
reconceptualised, psychotropic drugs were used more and more to help patients to 
return to or to continue functioning in society, and the asylum system was gradually 
dissolved: ‘Attention shifted to ‘milder’ and ‘borderline’ cases, and mental 
abnormality began to be seen as part of normal variability.  A new social psychiatry 




But the rise of the ‘psychiatric state’ in the latter half of the twentieth century has 
inspired some fierce criticism.  The anti-psychiatry movement, led by Ronald Laing in 
Britain, argues that madness has ‘a truth of its own; and psychosis could be a healing 
process and, hence, should not be pharmacologically suppressed.’
172
 Madness, insists 
Laing, ‘…need not be all breakdown.  It may also be break-through.’
173
 In The Myth 
of Mental Illness, Thomas Szasz argues that towards the end of the nineteenth 
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century, in identifying and classifying hysteria as illness, Charcot and Freud 
effectively redefined illness.  Since that time a vast industry has arisen to diagnose 
and treat mental illness.  A ‘psychiatric game’ has developed, whereby patients — 
because they have found life difficult, because of Christian values inculcated during 
childhood — are willing to seek medical help and to be identified as mentally ill.  
Christian doctrine promises that weakness will be rewarded.  When the hysteric 
manifests symptoms of illness, 
 
[i]t is as if the patient were saying: “You have told me to be disabled — to be 
stupid, weak, and timid.  You have promised that you would then love me and 
take care of me.  Here I am, doing just as you have told me, it is your turn now 
to fulfil your promise!”
174
   
 
Modern-day physicians indulge and foster such a tacit attitude.  But, Szasz insists, this 
is an insidious arrangement.  Szasz understands mental illness in terms of a game-
playing model.  The patient imitates illness, plays the role of the hysteric or 
schizophrenic; but if her performance is effective she risks becoming ‘typecast’: 
 
the actors’ assumed identities may prove convincing not only to their 
audiences but to themselves as well.  They may then begin to act offstage as if 
they were on it…In many chronic cases of mental illness, we witness the 
consequences of playing hysterical, hypochondriacal, schizophrenic, or other 
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If convincing, the patient’s performance often receives professional countenance from 
physicians and psychiatrists, effectively encouraging patients to further embrace their 
roles. 
 
This sort of feedback to the actor means not only that he can no longer rely on 
his audience for a corrective definition of reality and his own identity in it, but 
also that, because of the audience’s response, he must doubt his own 




Though patients are essentially complicit in their role in this system, ‘few persons 
who launch themselves on a career of impersonating the sick role reckon with the 
danger of being authenticated in this role by their families and by the medical 
profession.’
177
 Indeed, Szasz argues, mental patients of the late twentieth century are 





Szasz brings out the respective agendas of both patient and physician in his discussion 
of psychiatry as game-playing.  And, no doubt, mental illness is now an industry 
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which it is in the interests of medical practitioners, psychiatrists, drug companies, and 
many patients to sustain.  But Szasz’s peremptory thesis that mental illness is a myth 
neglects the genuine difficulties from which some people suffer.  In the following 
chapters, as we develop our argument about the relation between representations of 
mental images and themes of madness in cinema, we proceed from the premise that 
mental illness is not a myth, but a reality. 
 
We will pursue the theme of madness further in the next section of this chapter.  
There is one further genus of act of memory — we have anticipated it in our 
discussion of audiovisual overlapping and asynchrony — which is of such 
significance to our overall argument that it requires a separate discussion.  Thus 





V. Recalled voices 
Remembered or imagined sounds and speech are as much mental images as are visual 
images.  We have seen how memory can be represented asynchronously in the form 
of remembered sounds.  Far more common are ‘recalled voices’, the remembering 
subject’s memories of phrases which she or another character said earlier in the film.  
 
Form 
Occasionally recalled voices are supplemented by a simultaneous visual element, the 
faces of the speakers appearing simultaneously with their past utterances.  In such 
cases, the visual image of the speaker is usually a generic image — a disembodied 
head, detached from the physical environment of the original utterance.  But despite 
such formal differences, these sequences function as recalled voices.   
 
Recalled voices and madness 
Inasmuch as recalled voices frequently come to haunt the remembering subject, much 
of what follows in this section directly anticipates the central argument of our 
discussion of imagination in Part II: namely, that there exists a relation between 
imagination and madness, which the points of coincidence between cinema’s 
representations of imagination and themes of madness cogently manifest.  For the 
remainder of this section we consider some of the typical functions of recalled voices.  
We commence with the most ordinary situations, moving progressively towards those 
situations in which the relation between the presence of mental images and themes of 








Recalled voices sometimes perform a straightforward nostalgic function, as, for 
instance, when at the end of Great Expectations (David Lean, 1946) Pip recalls the 
voices of Miss Havisham and the young Estella from many years before.   
 
Pragmatism 
Recalled voices can also perform a pragmatic function.  This is particularly true of the 
recalled voices of Hitchcock’s heroes.  In Spellbound (Alfred Hitchcock, 1945) after 
John Ballantyne is arrested for the murder of Dr Edwardes (whom he masqueraded as 
while suffering from amnesia), Dr Murchison, whom Edwardes was to replace, admits 
to Connie that he knew the real Edwardes.  This admission contradicts his earlier 
behaviour — before, he accepted the Peck character as Edwardes for some days when 
he arrived.  Now alone, Connie recalls Murchison’s words: ‘I knew Edwardes slightly 
... knew Edwardes slightly ... knew’ — the music swells as she recognises the 
significance of this slip and goes to confront him. 
 
In The Naked Kiss (Samuel Fuller, 1964), upon arriving in Grantville, ex-prostitute 
Kelly decides to change her life and becomes a nurse in a hospital for handicapped 
children.  In one extended scene she makes an audio recording of the children singing 
a song which they have rehearsed.  Later she becomes engaged to the successful local 
businessman, J.L. Grant.  One day she arrives back at Grant’s house to find the song 
that she recorded with the handicapped children playing on an audio cassette.  The 
next moment she discovers Grant molesting a little girl.  The girl flees the house and 




her wayward past.  In horror, she kills him with a telephone receiver.  Later, in prison, 
Griff, a policeman and former client of Kelly, will not believe her story.  Kelly cannot 
describe the little girl and he doubts her existence.  Alone in her cell, in despair, Kelly 
watches children playing in the alley through the barred window of her cell.  The 
music of the handicapped children’s song emerges on the soundtrack and Kelly 
recognises the little girl whom Grant had molested.   She calls to Griff in desperation.  
Subsequently she is able to identify the little girl to him and is eventually acquitted.  
Here Kelly’s recollection of the children’s recording performs a pragmatic function.  
Her recollection of the song signifies that the little girl she is watching at play is the 
same little girl whom Grant molested while the song played in the background. 
 
Magnificent Obsession begins with wealthy playboy Bob Merrick crashing his 
speedboat.  The equipment with which he is resuscitated is conveyed from Dr 
Phillips’s house, where it ordinarily stays in case he has a heart attack.  When Dr 
Phillips then suffers a seizure, the resuscitator is not at hand, and he dies.  While Bob 
is recuperating we learn that he quit his medical studies when he received his 
patrimony.  When he learns of the unfortunate circumstances of Dr Phillips’s death, 
Bob feels guilty.  By chance he meets artist Edward Randolph and confides to him 
that he feels ‘haunted’ by Dr Phillips.
179
 Randolph recommends to him a 
philanthropic philosophy of life, which he assures him will bring happiness: one 
offers assistance to those in need, insists that donations remain secret, and absolutely 
refuses any attempt at repayment.  Randolph discloses that it was the late Dr Phillips 
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who first introduced him to this philosophy.  Bob affirms that he would like to 
somehow make amends to Helen, Dr Phillips’s widow. 
‘But if I just help out some poor joker, why does it follow that she’s 
going to listen to me?’ 
‘I think you might be surprised at what follows after trying this way of 
life,’ Randolph assures him. 
But Randolph then proceeds to caution him purposefully:  
‘Don’t try to use this unless you’re ready for it.  You can’t just try this 
out for a week like a new car, you know.  And if you think you can feather 
your own nest with it, just forget it.’   
 
More out of hopeful desperation to make amends to Helen than of genuine solicitude, 
Bob gives some money to an acquaintance who is in personal and financial difficulty, 
on the condition that it remain secret, and that he never try to pay it back.  The next 
moment he sees Helen, and exclaims, ‘I don’t believe it ... It does work!’  Bob tries to 
speak to her of her husband’s theory, intimating that he has just received unequivocal 
proof that it works.   
‘I’m going to go find somebody that needs a couple of thousand bucks, and 
my worries’ll be over,’ he declares. 
‘I think you’ve twisted my husband’s beliefs into something very cheap,’ 
Helen ripostes and withdraws from him into a taxi; Bob follows her in.  She flees out 
of the opposite door, only to be knocked down by an oncoming car, the accident 
leaving her permanently blinded.  Later, now desperate more than ever to somehow 
make amends, Bob slowly ingratiates himself with Helen, under the pretence that he 




himself to Dr Phillips’s model of philanthropy, Randolph counsels him: ‘Once you go 
into it, you’re bound.  You’ll never be able to give it up.  You’ll find it furnishes your 
motive power.  It will obsess you.  Believe me, it will be a magnificent obsession.’  
Bob devotes all his efforts and wealth to doing everything he can to make Helen’s life 
easier, without her knowing anything about it.  He organises a team of the best 
specialists in Europe to try to restore her sight, but the doctors are unable to cure her 
and Helen is despondent.  Then Bob joins her in Europe and they are happy together 
once more.  When Bob is finally ready to reveal his true identity, Helen admits that 
she has known who he is for some time.  He proposes marriage, but Helen flees, 
leaving a note, requesting that he never attempt to find her.  Returning to America 
dejected, Bob arrives at Randolph’s beach house, where he recalls the poignant 
conversation in that same room in which Randolph spoke of philanthropy as a 
‘magnificent obsession’.  With Helen no longer in his life, Bob’s recollection of 
Randolph’s promise now inspires him not only to fulfil his potential by becoming a 
doctor, but also to continue his philanthropic deeds.  Bob subsequently learns from 
Randolph that Helen is seriously ill and they fly to be with her.  Randolph persuades 
Bob to operate on her in an attempt to save her life.  The operation is successful and 
as Helen regains consciousness, Bob at her bedside, she discovers her sight 
miraculously restored.  Having witnessed their reunion, Randolph turns away and 
himself recalls his earlier ‘magnificent obsession’ counsel to Bob.   
 
These two instances of recalled voices are highly significant.  Bob’s initial clumsy 
misapprehension that philanthropy will bring instant personal reward ends 
disastrously with Helen’s accident.  When, after Randolph’s inspiring promise, he 




are still self-interested, to the extent that they are inspired by an anticipated catharsis 
and union with Helen.  It is only after his recollection of Randolph’s assurances, 
accepting that Helen is no longer part of his life, that Bob truly embraces Dr Phillips’s 
philosophy, offering assistance without any hope of self-gain.  When encouraging 
Bob to operate on Helen, Randolph says, ‘Now you’re going to repay that old, old 
debt in a way that you’d never imagined.’  The reason that Bob finally finds himself 
in a position to help Helen — ‘to repay the old debt’ — is because he finally 
abandoned his efforts to help her directly with financial assistance, instead becoming 
a doctor and embracing the true unadulterated spirit of Dr Phillips’s philosophy.  
When, in the final scene — Bob at last reunited with Helen, her sight restored — 
Randolph recalls their conversation, it is clear that, for Randolph, it is Bob’s selfless 
embrace of Dr Phillip’s philosophy which has ultimately yielded him this reward.   
 
Anxiety 
The remembering of past conversations can express simple anxiety.  In Cape Fear (J. 
Lee Thompson, 1962) Sam Bowden and his family are intimidated by Max Cady, an 
ex-convict who bears a grudge against Bowden for testifying against him.  As Cady’s 
intimidation intensifies, Sam and his wife Peggy become genuinely concerned.  
Tossing and turning at night, too anxious to sleep properly, Peggy recalls fragments of 
earlier conversations.  A faint superimposition of the speaker accompanies each 
recalled utterance.  Usually recalled voices reproduce fragments of conversation 
which we have already seen and heard, and their function is thus primarily to convey 
that the remembering subject is in a certain state of mind.  Here, however, the recalled 
voices perform the added function of disclosing hitherto elided conversations between 




police chief Mark Dutton, these recalled conversations reveal that Sam, aware of his 
social responsibilities as husband and father, endeavours to maintain a calm exterior 
to his family.  He repeats to Peggy the pragmatic advice that Dutton previously gave 
him when he openly expressed his distress,  
‘You can’t put a man in jail for what he might do.’ 
‘What are we going to do about that man?’ Peggy asks in despair. 
‘We mustn’t let him frighten us,’ Sam reassures her, ‘that’d be just 
playing his game.’   
Peggy’s recalled voices give expression to the subjectivity of a helpless woman in 
distress.  A dangerous man is intimidating her family and represents a threat to herself 
and her daughter.  She can only hope that her husband is able to protect them. 
 
Paranoia 
When anxiety becomes excessive and irrational we can begin to speak of paranoia.  In 
The Accused (William Dieterle, 1949), university psychologist, Dr Wilma Tuttle, kills 
student, Bill Perry, in self-defence when he attempts to rape her.  Rather than 
explaining what happened to the police, she manipulates the evidence to make it 
appear as though Perry drowned accidentally while diving.  After the murder, internal 
monologue becomes a central element in the film, as she wrestles with her 
conscience, tries to rationalise her actions and escape justice.  She becomes paranoid.  
She thinks she hears something: What’s that?  Nothing.  My imagination!  Oh, watch 
yourself, Wilma, watch yourself.  But she is justified in being paranoid; Lieutenant 
Ted Dorgan believes Perry was murdered and with the help of Perry’s guardian, 




examination paper, this sends Tuttle into a frenzy, as its contents might prove that 
Miss Tuttle is the ‘cyclothalmiac cutie’ whom he was to meet after school: 
 
Idiot, idiot.  I’ll get rid of it...No, no, I’ll rewrite it.  No, it has to be in his 
handwriting.  I can’t get rid of the book because then Dorgan’d be suspicious.  
Oh, wait a minute, wait a minute.  Why do anything?  Supposing they do 
recognise me from the description.  I didn’t meet Bill Perry here that day.  I 
didn’t wait for him, I can prove it.  Wait a minute!  That note I wrote to 
him...that note! 
 
But Tuttle is an intelligent woman.  In fixing the evidence she has done everything 
she can to deflect suspicion from herself.  Whenever she becomes anxious about 
getting caught she reasons and rationalises:  The Dean couldn’t possibly know yet.  No 
one could know.  No one ever will know.  I took care of that.  A man made a seventy-
foot dive and had an accident.  That’s the way I made it look and that’s what they’ll 
think.  She coaches herself on how she ought to conduct herself: 
   
The way I acted with Mrs Conner...I must be more careful.  I know what a 
guilt complex is.  I mustn’t let one destroy me...The law makes allowances for 
self-defence and so must I.  Now remember, remember you must feel that 
nothing has happened to change anything.  You must feel it and I must act it. 
 
Again, here internal monologue enters during a period of personal crisis.  Tuttle has 
killed a man and it is in her response to the consequences of her action that her inner 




investigation starts to close in on her, Tuttle’s guilt and anxiety escalate, culminating 
in an emotionally frenzied near confession, when Ford takes her to a boxing match.  
One of the fighters winks at her between rounds, and she imagines it is Perry.  When, 
in the following round, the same fighter receives a barrage of blows, she imagines 
Perry in his place.  ‘You’re hurting me,’ Tuttle says aloud.  ‘Bill, you’re hurting me.’  
The fighter is knocked out and lurches, unconscious between the ropes, beside Tuttle 
and Ford.  Tuttle covers her eyes and, while the referee counts to ten, in place of the 
prostrate fighter, she recalls how she dragged Bill from the car and rolled him over the 
cliff edge.  ‘I didn’t meant to.  I didn’t mean to!’ she exclaims at ringside, to Ford’s 
bemusement. 
 
In Stranger on the Third Floor (Boris Ingster, 1940) Ward suffers increasingly 
paranoid thoughts, which are fuelled by an intensifying unconscious sense of guilt for 
his part in condemning a man, Briggs, to death, on circumstantial evidence.  After his 
encounter in the hall with the suspicious-looking stranger, and unable to hear his 
neighbour Maine snoring, Ward becomes anxious that the stranger may have 
assaulted Maine (his thoughts are presented via an internal monologue).
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 He is about 
to open Maine’s door to check on him, but then reconsiders as he suddenly recalls an 
utterance of the judge condemning Briggs in court: ‘You forgot that fingerprints will 
always give you away.’  (Ward fears that if Maine has been assaulted and he enters 
his room, he will incriminate himself.)  Here, as in the flash-insert, we see the 
capacity of memory to overwhelm the remembering subject.  The judge’s voice — 
paranoid thought — invades Ward’s consciousness as though an exterior force.  
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Taking heed of this memory, Ward decides not to open the door.  Though he is aware 
that the voice exists only in his imagination, Ward nevertheless reacts almost as if to a 
perceived voice; though its source is internal — memory — his immediate response is 
surprise, as if to something external.  This is quite different from the willed 
pragmatism of memory; here the recalled voice is expressly unwilled, overwhelming. 
 
Obsession 
Recalled voices sometimes reveal a character’s obsession.  Often a character’s 
obsession is related to a prohibited desire or object.  The opening fantasy sequence of 
Belle de Jour establishes that Séverine harbours masochistic fantasies.  During the 
first part of the film, several incidents — Séverine’s interest in Renée’s gossip about 
Henriette working at a brothel, her astonishment upon learning from a taxi driver that 
there are brothels in Paris — establish that she is intrigued by the thought of 
prostitution and the brothel, and that she is bored in her marriage with Pierre, who, it 
seems, does not satisfy her specific sexual desires.  In the country club, Husson 
approaches Séverine and happily confesses to her his own interest in prostitution.  He 
reminisces about a particular brothel, ‘I have fond memories of Anaïs’s, 11 Cité Jean 
de Saumur.’  Séverine draws away in affront when Husson propositions her, but then 
recalls his words, ‘Madame Anaïs’s, 11 Cité Jean de Saumur’, this recollection 
confirming her growing obsession with the idea of prostitution.  (In the scene 
immediately subsequent to this she approaches Madame Anaïs’s for the first time.) 
 
In Videodrome (David Cronenberg, 1982), after watching a recording of Videodrome, 




the show.  Watching Videodrome in his apartment he recalls fragments of earlier 
conversations about the show:  
(Halran: ‘Torture, murder, mutilation’; Masha: ‘Videodrome.  What 
you see on that show, it’s for real!’; Nikki: ‘I’m gonna audition.  I was made 
for that show!’; Masha: ‘It has something that you don’t have Max, it has a 
philosophy and that is what makes it dangerous.’)   
These recollections demonstrate Max’s growing attraction to Videodrome, a 
programme which has been established as sordid, inherently exploitative, dangerous 
and forbidden, but which nevertheless maintains an attraction for Max.  Such an 
attraction to a proscribed taboo object might imply a nascent tendency to madness.  
Shortly after these recollections, Max experiences his first hallucinations as a result of 
his exposure to the Videodrome signal.  But in order to understand just what 
Cronenberg is getting at here, we ought not, perhaps, to interpret the film too literally.  
One can understand Videodrome as a metaphor, a signifier for any prohibited object.  
Most obviously, one might interpret the film as a reactionary caution against the 
degenerative effects of explicit material available on VCR.
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 Max’s attraction to 
Videodrome represents a debasing of cultural and moral values; he is a deviant.  Just 
as Séverine is attracted to a prohibited lifestyle, so Max is attracted to a taboo object, 
which he becomes obsessed by (recalled voices); prolonged exposure to the 
prohibited object affects his mental stability (hallucinations), and finally impels him 
to commit criminal acts (he obeys imagined voices which instruct him to commit acts 
of violence).  
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Because the film adheres to the vraisemblance of the science-fiction genre, 
Videodrome’s caution against the dangerous consequences of attraction to a taboo 
object is pushed to absurd limits.  We may try to understand videodrome as a 
metaphor, a signifier upon which one can project any taboo object one wishes, but as 
the film progresses it becomes increasingly difficult to hold on to such a metaphor 
(few taboo objects can force people to kill against their will).  But attraction to a taboo 
object can prompt normal characters to experience mental images in films which 
adhere to a naturalist aesthetic.  In In a Lonely Place (Nicholas Ray, 1950), when 
Laurel starts seeing Dix, she disregards the warnings of Martha and Captain Lochner 
about Dix’s past and his reputation, and refuses to believe that Dix could have 
murdered Mildred Atkinson.  But Laurel’s attitude changes after she witnesses Dix 
lose his temper in a road rage incident.  Laurel confides to Sylvia that she suspects 
Dix may have murdered Atkinson.  In the scene immediately following this, Laurel 
tosses and turns in bed, anxious and unable to sleep.  She recalls the earlier warnings 
of Martha (‘They still don’t know who killed that checkroom girl’) and Captain 
Lochner (‘It was the act of a sick mind, with an urge to destroy ... an erratic violent 
man’).  Here the recalled voices come at a point of personal crisis: having witnessed 
Dix’s violence at first hand, Laurel now feels that Martha and Captain Lochner’s 
warnings were well founded, and suspects that Dix may have killed Atkinson.  
Naturally, she now regrets the fact of her intimacy with him; and Dix’s haste to get 
married only exacerbates her anxiety.
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 Laurel is certainly not mad, but at the point 
she experiences these remembrances she is extremely anxious, and such anxiety can 
resemble madness — one might even argue that it is a manifestation of madness.  
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Laurel is not insane, but she finds herself in a vulnerable position.  Thus we see how 
ordinary characters become prone to mental images and begin to manifest symptoms, 
faint traces of madness. 
 
While Laurel might be described as a ‘normal’ character, who, because of unfortunate 
circumstances, becomes prey to mental images, we cannot say the same of wounded 
criminal and fugitive from justice, Johnny, in Odd Man Out (Carol Reed, 1947).  In a 
delirious condition, Johnny finds temporary sanctuary at a private table, behind a 
drawn curtain in a pub.  Drifting in and out of consciousness, he knocks over his glass 
and the sight of the spilt beer on the table prompts a hallucination.  He recalls 
utterances of various characters from earlier in the film; the faces of each speaker 
appear consecutively in the bubbles of the spilt beer.  The recalled utterances mark 
key moments of anxiety in Johnny’s ordeal thus far.  Finally, the faces of all the 
speakers appear simultaneously, each face presented in a separate beer bubble on the 
table before Johnny.  They speak simultaneously in a muddled cacophony, 
overwhelming him.  Forgetting that he is in hiding, Johnny cries out in despair.  One 
might say that Johnny’s hallucinations are a symptom of his delirium, but in fact he is 
depicted as being unhinged before he is wounded (the obscure-angled point-of-view 
shots en-route to the bank, his dizzy spell on the steps outside the bank).  Unhinged 
from the outset, Johnny is now unable to control the images that appear to his 
consciousness; here excess of imagination (inability to control the images that appear 
in consciousness) signifies madness. 
 
In Carrie (Brian De Palma, 1976), immediately after her public humiliation (several 




she looks out at the shocked audience, several of whom break into laughter, Carrie 
recalls her mother’s earlier warning:  
‘They’re all gonna laugh at you.’   
Now we see a distorted visual approximation of Carrie’s point of view: couples and 
individuals in the crowd appear in the same shot several times — once in the centre of 
the image, with several reproductions of themselves rotating demonically around this 
central image.  Over these shots we hear Carrie’s recollection of significant lines 
previously spoken by central characters in the crowd: (peers: ‘Plug it up, plug it up!’; 
principal: ‘We’re all very sorry Cassie’; gym teacher: ‘Trust me Carrie, you can trust 
me’.)  Thus, immediately prior to her devastating revenge, sound and image combine 
to create a nightmarish representation of Carrie’s subjective experience of the anxiety 
caused by this cruel humiliation.  As with Laurel in In a Lonely Place, here the 
recalled voices appear at a point of acute personal crisis.   
 
Recalled voices are sometimes experienced by characters who are explicitly marked 
as being deranged or pathological.  In White Heat (Raoul Walsh, 1949), gangster 
Cody Jarrett is obsessively devoted to his mother.  The police assign undercover 
officer Vic Prado to share a prison-cell with him.  In briefing Prado, his senior officer 
explains, 
 
[t]here’s insanity in the Jarretts.  Some of it rubbed off on Cody [...] When he 
was a kid he used to fake headaches in order to get his mother’s attention [...] 
It worked.  As he grew up the fancied headaches became real, until now they 




only person he’s ever cared about or trusted is his mother ... He’s got a fierce, 
psychopathic devotion to her.   
 
The opening scenes establish that Cody’s wife Verna and Big Ed, a rival within his 
own gang, are romantically involved.  In prison one of Big Ed’s pals, Parker, tries to 
kill Cody in a workhouse ‘accident’, but Prado saves him, and Cody escapes with a 
bruise on the head.  His mother (Ma Jarrett) then visits him and confirms that Big Ed 
and Verna are now openly cavorting.  For him and Verna to display their romance so 
brazenly, Big Ed must have been certain that Cody would die in prison.  With this, 
Cody realises that Parker tried to kill him.  Ma announces, ‘I’ll take care of Big Ed.’  
Desperate, Cody tries to reason with her and begs her not to, but she is adamant.  
Returning to the workhouse, Cody seems preoccupied and the dramatic score 
confirms that he is at a point of mental vulnerability.  He warns Parker that he will 
revenge himself on him, and as he walks on with his trolley, he recalls Ma’s words: 
‘I’ll take care of big Ed.  I’ll take care of Big Ed.  I’ll take care of him, Cody.  I’ll take 
care of him, Cody.  I’ll take care of him...’ He stops, looks up, dizzy, and we cut to a 
point-of-view shot of the warehouse.  The image deliquesces, representing his mental 
collapse.  Cut to a series of close shots of drilling machinery in operation.  The score 
reaches a crescendo and he collapses.
183
 Here again, mental images come at a point of 
crisis.  Ma’s resolution to go after Big Ed causes Cody acute anxiety.  His recollection 
of Ma’s declaration causes his panic attack. 
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In the above examples the past appears as a nightmare which haunts the remembering 
subject.  But where there is error, sin, guilt and regret, memory appears as a morbid 
fixation on the impossibility of altering the past; consciousness obsessively returns to 
past sins, recalled voices giving expression to guilty conscience. 
 
Guilty conscience 
In Esta Noite Encarnarei no Teu Cadáver, Coffin Joe remains aloof from the 
townspeople, who in turn avoid him, believing that he worships the devil.  But despite 
all his sinister qualities, Joe is fond of children, since he believes their thoughts are as 
yet uncorrupted by religious superstition.  He longs to make himself immortal through 
union with a carefully selected ‘superior woman’, and abducts six women for this 
purpose, four of whom he kills.  As Jarinda, the last of these women, dies she puts a 
curse on Joe: he will never have a child; she will return to haunt him.  Joe dismisses 
this as religious superstition.  His equilibrium is threatened, however, when in the 
tavern he overhears Jarinda’s husband telling friends that she was pregnant when she 
died.  The widower shows his friends a photograph of Jarinda and Joe grabs it.  The 
thought that he is responsible for the death of an unborn baby causes him great mental 
distress.  As he looks at the photograph, Joe recalls Jarinda’s curse: ‘This night I’ll 
possess your corpse!’   
  
In Jekyll and Hyde (Rouben Mamoulian, 1931), when Dr Jekyll drinks his potion for 
the first time and becomes Mr Hyde, we enter a subjective sequence in which the 
room spirals around him at increasing velocity.  As the spiralling camera movement 
becomes increasingly fast and his beastly panting and accelerated heartbeat become 




characters from earlier in the film: his fiancé, Muriel, urging him to marry her; 
Muriel’s father, the general’s, condemnation of Jekyll’s haste to wed his daughter 
(‘Positively indecent ... It isn’t done!’); Jekyll’s expression of frustration at the 
general’s refusal (‘I could strangle him!’); Champagne Ivy’s invitation to him to 
‘come back soon’, and the image of her coquettishly swinging leg; Lanion’s 
chastisement of his behaviour toward Ivy (‘Your conduct was disgusting!’); Jekyll’s 
expression of his desire to physically possess Muriel (‘Can a man dying of thirst 
forget water?’).  Here the juxtaposition of memory fragments demonstrates an internal 
conflict: the voices of the general and Lanion express the weight of social pressure for 
Jekyll to act with appropriate decorum (repression); his recollection of his own 
utterances and that of Ivy represent an opposing force (libido).  At this crucial 
moment in the film and in Jekyll’s destiny, these remembrances give expression to his 
conflicting emotions.  They are evidence of the state of acute dissatisfaction which 
has led him to this drastic action.  The recalled utterances are an expression of Jekyll’s 
awareness of the potential significance of this action, a manifestation of a subjectivity 
in crisis. 
 
In Fritz Lang’s films, representations of mental images often give expression to a 
guilty conscience.  The criminal may escape legal justice, but he cannot escape his 
conscience.  In Fury (1936), on the eve of his revenge against the lynch mob who 
attempted to burn him alive, Joe is haunted by the faces of the defendants and recalls 
the desperate sarcastic remarks of his fiancée as she pleaded with him not to carry out 
his planned revenge: ‘Do a good job of it.  What does it matter?  Twenty-two, twenty-
three, twenty-five...?’ While it seems these words appear involuntarily, overwhelming 




further.  After killing Kitty and allowing Johnny to take the blame, Chris overhears 
some journalists discussing Johnny’s trial.  One of them believes Johnny is innocent 
and expounds his theory that the real murderer will not get away with it: he will be 
haunted by his conscience.  Chris dismisses this as nonsense, but after the execution 
he is plagued by the ghostly voices of Kitty and Johnny.  Sometimes these voices 
repeat things which Chris actually heard Kitty and Johnny say, and at others he 
imagines the haunting imaginary utterances of their ghosts.  Chris grants such 
credence to these voices that he responds to them aloud: ‘No, no Kitty.  It’s him! You 
were innocent, you were pure...He’s the murderer.’  This torment drives him to 
attempt suicide.  His neighbours sense something is wrong; when they break into his 
flat and Chris regains consciousness, Kitty’s voice immediately returns to haunt him.  
Thus these voices seem to be auditory hallucinations: not only do recalled voices 
invade Chris’s consciousness, but he believes in Kitty and Johnny’s continued 
existence as ghosts.  Chris knows that Kitty and Johnny are dead, and that the voices 
can only be imaginary, yet he is powerless to stop them, and seems to experience the 
voices as if they were actually perceived.  First he pulls back the curtain, as though 
expecting that he might find a physical source for the imagined voices, and then, 
accepting their imaginary reality, he responds to them aloud. 
 
Psychotic trauma 
In The Locket (1947, John Brahm) Nancy Monks is a compulsive liar and thief of 
jewellery.  Her lover, Norman Clyde, confronts her when he discovers that she has 
stolen a diamond bracelet from a party.  Nancy claims that she has never stolen 
anything before, that she doesn’t even like diamonds; she couldn’t help herself.  




explanation.  Nancy recounts a childhood scene.  She and her mother are living in the 
house of a rich family, for whom Nancy’s mother works as a maid.  Nancy befriends 
Karen Willis, the daughter of the family.  During her birthday party, from which 
Nancy is excluded by Mrs Willis, Karen sneaks out and presents Nancy with a locket 
which she had received as a present.  Alone, Nancy says, ‘Thank you God, I won’t 
ever ask you for anything again.’  The next moment, however, Mrs Willis reclaims 
the locket from around Nancy’s neck.  Nancy is distraught, but her mother consoles 
her: ‘If you want things badly enough, someday you’ll have them.’  
 
The following day the locket goes missing, and Mrs Willis interrogates Nancy.  
Meanwhile, Mrs Monks discovers the locket amongst Karen’s clothes and presents it 
to Mrs Willis.  But Mrs Willis rejects her explanation, insisting that she is protecting 
Nancy.  Mrs Willis grabs Nancy by the arms and insistently shakes a desperate 
confession from her.  Jerking herself free, Nancy accidentally knocks to the floor a 
cigarette case; a mechanical lullaby emits from the open case.  Nancy stares down at 
the case as if transfixed.  Clyde reassures Nancy, ‘When you took the bracelet, you 
were just getting even with Mrs Willis.’  But Nancy continues to steal and, after a 
shooting at a party, Clyde comes to suspect her of committing a murder of which a 
valet is accused.  On the eve of the valet’s execution, Clyde recounts his story to 
Nancy’s husband, Dr Blair, pleading with him to intervene to prevent the execution.  
But Nancy convinces Blair that Clyde is bitterly jealous.  Clyde subsequently 
commits suicide and when Blair later discovers that Clyde had been right, that Nancy 
is a thief, and perhaps a murderer, he suffers a nervous breakdown.  Nancy’s next 
fiancé is John Willis, son of her girlhood tormentor, Mrs Willis.  Blair reappears on 




hadn’t believed Clyde, so Willis doesn’t believe Blair.  Immediately before the 
ceremony, Mrs Willis presents Nancy with the locket which she took from her and 
then accused her of stealing as a child.  Turim notes, ‘[t]his climatic scene of psychic 
dissolution is the reversal of the elements of Nancy’s childhood flashback, with 
Nancy replacing the sister, marrying the brother, with the locket being given instead 
of taken away.’
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 Mrs Willis exits and Nancy recalls her exclamation of gratitude, 
when Karen had originally presented her with the locket: ‘Thank you God.  I won’t 
ever ask you for anything again.’  She acquiesces in a perplexed swoon, her 
unconscious quest for the locket of her childhood finally satisfied.  ‘Nancy,’ a 
bridesmaid calls from offscreen.  Startled from her rêverie, Nancy — once more — 
accidentally knocks the cigarette case off the dresser and the mechanical lullaby 
sounds.  She stands, as if petrified, over the open box.  The bridesmaid rushes in and 
closes the box, replacing it on the dresser, but the music continues.   
‘Did you close it tight?’ asks Nancy.  ‘The tune ...’  
‘What tune?’   
The bridesmaid leads Nancy into the hall where the guests are awaiting her and the 
wedding march is playing, but, intermingled with the music of the march, is the 
subjective sound of the mechanical lullaby.  Visibly disquieted, Nancy descends the 
stairs, approaching the groom.  Portentous nondiegetic music enters, the mechanical 
lullaby becomes increasingly intense, and Nancy is beset by recalled voices, her 
expression becoming increasingly distraught with each recalled utterance, until she 
finally relives the original traumatic scene with Mrs Willis:  
‘I’ll get it out of you.  I’ll make you say it for the good of your soul.’ 
‘No!’ 
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‘Say it!  Say it!  Say it!’   
Nancy screams and collapses.  This appears to be a genuine portrayal of madness, in 
that throughout the film there are no lingering close-ups of Nancy which indicate that 
she is calculating.  Rather, she seems to be genuinely ill, to actually believe in her lies, 
to believe that she is innocent of wrongdoing.  Turim notes that in the final scene, 
Nancy ‘collapses into madness’,
185
 but it seems this collapse is rather the apogee of 
Nancy’s madness, the point from which she might at last begin to recover. 
   
In this section we have considered the functions of recalled voices — which we felt it 
necessary to distinguish from other representations of memory simply on the basis of 
their formal characteristics.  We now return to our general discussion of act of 
memory (visual-images as well as sound-images) to consider the various functions 
which these recollections perform (thus some of the basic functions of memory 
identified above are further elaborated in the next section).  And here we will pursue 
further the hypothesis that there exists a relation between representations of mental 
images and themes of madness in cinema. 
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VI. (Act of Memory) Function 
In distinguishing act of memory from flashback, we posit a distinction which many 
filmmakers and critics have not hitherto recognised.  The formal criteria which we 
have outlined for the distinction have a general utility, but since in practice many 
factors problematise unequivocal distinctions, we find that many sequences fall into 
one category or the other quite arbitrarily, that in many cases there is little difference 
between the function of flashback-for-memory and act of memory.  This section is 
organised such that the extent to which memory is a manifestation of madness is 
greater with each subsequent function identified.  Thus, we commence with a 
consideration of the pragmatic functions of memory, which appear quite unrelated to 
any such themes. 
 
Pragmatism and detection 
The remembrance of a past incident often acts as a moment of revelation which will 
in some way affect or determine the future conduct of the remembering subject.  
Annette Kuhn writes,  
 
The past is like the scene of a crime: if the deed itself is unrecoverable, its 
traces may still remain.  From these traces, markers that point towards a past 
presence, to something that has happened in this place, a (re)construction, if 
not a simulacrum, of the event can be pieced together.  Memory work has a 
great deal in common with forms of inquiry which — like detective work and 




deciphering signs and traces, making deductions, patching together 




The pragmatic use of memory is closely related to the practice of detection.  Thus we 
find the pragmatic use of memory in subjects who are professional detectives, such as 
Bucky in The Black Dahlia (Brian De Palma, 2006).  But it is not only professional 
detectives who use memory for pragmatic purposes.  In many of Hitchcock’s films the 
hero is an innocent man, a victim of circumstances, wrongly implicated in a crime, 
who must assume the role of detective.  In The Saboteur, Kane is wrongly accused of 
an act of sabotage and flees, becoming a fugitive.  The only connection between him 
and the guilty man, Fry, is an envelope that Kane picked up and returned to him when 
Fry dropped it at the military base.  When the lorry driver asks Kane where he would 
like dropping, Kane recalls picking up the letters that Fry had dropped, visualising the 
address on the envelope: ‘That’s it, Deep Springs Ranch.’  At the ranch he finds an 
elderly gentleman, Mr Tobin.  While Tobin is inside the house, his infant grandson 
takes some letters out of his pocket and drops them.  Superimposed over the 
envelopes on the ground are images of those dropped by Fry at the military base.  The 
association between the memory image and the situation in the present establishes that 
Kane realises that he may find some clue to assist him in his pursuit of Fry amongst 
the letters on the floor.   
 
In Vertigo Scotty’s detective work is quite different.  Scotty does not aim to prove his 
innocence (though his reputation is tarnished by the incident at the bell tower in which 
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he failed to prevent Madeleine from committing suicide, he was not found guilty of 
any crime); rather, he is in search of the truth: why does Judy bear such an uncanny 
resemblance to Madeleine?  When Scotty finally completes the process of making 
over Judy to look like Madeleine we have one of Hitchcock’s supreme expressionist 
moments.  As they kiss, the camera spirals round them.  The lights give way to 
darkness; the mise-en-scène undergoes a metamorphosis so that it appears that they 
are kissing in the stable at the bell-tower, symbolically expressing Scotty’s 
remembrance of his kiss there with Madeleine.  As Scotty realises this he breaks off 
for a moment, and then resumes kissing her.  Gradually the stable background 
recedes; as the camera continues to rotate, the mise-en-scène becomes that of the hotel 
room at the Empire once more.  One can interpret this elaborate sequence — the 360-
degree camera movement, the shifting colour sequence, shifting mise-en-scène — as a 
visual actualisation of Scotty’s realisation that Judy is Madeleine.
187
 It is not enough 
simply to say that these are mental images; the shifting scenes are an objectification of 
the experience of memory, of the process by which uncanny suspicion and incredulity 
(Judy resembles Madeleine, but Madeleine is dead) become belief (Judy is Madeleine 
— Madeleine is not dead).  Immediately subsequent to this sequence, Scotty’s 
suspicions are confirmed when he helps Judy to put on her necklace and realises that 
it is the same locket which belonged to Carlotta Valdez.  For a moment the locket 
around Judy’s neck becomes that in the portrait, establishing that Scotty has made this 
connection. 
 
In Spellbound, detection takes the form of a psychoanalytic investigation.   In order to 
prove John Ballantyne, the Peck character’s, innocence, Connie must first help him to 
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identify, and then to confront, the repressed traumatic episode of his past.  Only this 
will explain his unaccountable sense of guilt, which is such that, though he has no 
memory of it, he is willing to accept responsibility for a murder (of which Connie is 
convinced he is innocent).  Throughout the film, various motifs in the present prompt, 
for Ballantyne, a string of remembrances, each of which is followed by a dizzy spell.  
But the film withholds the content of these vague remembrances which so affect him.  
Through an examination of the prompts, Connie helps him to piece together the clues, 
and finally her investigation leads them to a ski slope, the site of the climactic scene 
in his psychoanalytic therapy.  Descending the slope, Ballantyne recalls descending 
the slope of a balustrade and accidentally killing his brother by pushing him onto a 
spike on an iron railing.  This is the original trauma which has been the source of his 
perpetual unconscious sense of guilt.  The only mental images in the film (other than 
the dream sequence) present the revelation of the repressed scene; the painful 
confrontation of a repressed trauma, this moment in fact constitutes a fundamental 
experience in the overcoming of his neurosis, a moment of supreme clarity.  Here 
Ballantyne’s illness is amnesia, an absence of memory; when memory images finally 
arrive they have a rejuvenating effect.   
 
In contrast to Hitchcock’s innocent men who inadvertently become caught up in 
espionage and murder plots, in Blue Velvet, Jeffrey aspires to be a detective.  On his 
way to see Detective Williams, he is startled to see a man he recognises from his 
surveillance of Frank’s building, the Yellowman.  He notices the name — Detective 
Gordon — on the door and this prompts him to recall Frank’s conversation with Ben 
about Gordon.  As we have seen, this memory prompts a further memory which 




Dorothy’s apartment, in which he has discovered two corpses, Jeffrey sees the well-
dressed man entering the building.  He sits down on the stair and recalls an image of 
the well-dressed man meeting Gordon.  We return to Jeffrey on the stairs and he 
recalls a previous image of the well-dressed man and the Yellowman/Gordon exiting 
the car.  This association of images acts as a revelation: there was no third man: the 
well-dressed man is Frank, and he is on his way upstairs.   
 
In Pursued, as in Spellbound, the investigation is biographical.  Jeb assumes the role 
of detective, investigating his own past.  We have seen that he is haunted by a violent 
incident in his past which resulted in the death of both of his parents.  And since that 
night, for some unknown reason, a one-armed stranger, Grant Callum, has wanted him 
dead.  At the start of the film at the dilapidated ranch Jeb looks out through a doorway 
and the limpid apparition of a man appears, and says,  
‘Come out, or we’ll come in after you.’   
‘You’re imagining it’, Thelma reassures him.  
‘I’m not imagining.  I’m remembering.  I’m putting together what 
happened, or what I guess must have happened.’   
Jeb’s paltry memories of the fateful night have become commingled with dream 
images.  All he remembers are fragments — flashes, boots with spurs.  As a child, Jeb 
is haunted by involuntary memories of the episode; while the memory-images are 
impoverished, it is plain that they conceal a dark secret.  With time these memory 
fragments become clues, images which Jeb clings to in the hope that through them he 
might uncover the mystery of his past.  When he is wounded in battle and wakes from 




‘seemed to come from way back somewhere when you were a 
kid...Something about boots, flashes of light, somebody hurt, killed.’   
‘You’ve got to tell me what I said, Doc.,’ Jeb insists, ‘every word, I 
wanna know.’   
Thus Jeb, too, is a detective; he must unearth the buried taboo of his past if he is to 
come to terms with his identity.  At the end of the film, Callum and his posse hunt Jeb 
down at the old derelict ranch.  Hitherto, Jeb’s excavations of memory have yielded 
nothing but the same half-remembered fragments, but here, aware that Callum is on 
his way, Jeb anticipates a re-enactment of the bloody events of his forgotten past.  He 
senses that re-living the violent threat will engender memories which will illuminate 
the obscure secret which has haunted him; he fatalistically desires this and, by 
returning to the ranch, has engineered it thus.  As they surround the ranch, Jeb shoots 
out at Callum and his posse.  They return fire and as the shots reign in, Jeb is 
overwhelmed by memories (‘I remember now, those dreams I’ve been having ever 
since I was a kid ...’) Realising these memories enables Jeb to piece together the clues 
of memory fragments which have so obsessed him (‘The flashes were gunfire.  And 
the man shooting was my father ... The boots with spurs — they were my father’s.’) 
 
We see, then, that the pragmatic use of memory can be of fundamental personal 
significance for the remembering subject.  Such is the case with Laura Palmer’s 
volitional memory in Fire Walk With Me.  In a moment of intense solitary reflection, 
Laura realises that the ring the One Armed Man was wearing on the finger with which 
he pointed so furiously at her father in their confrontation at the junction, belonged to 
her deceased friend Teresa Banks.  Here she recalls and draws a connection between 




earlier past — the meeting organised by Teresa in which Laura and Ronette were to 
service Teresa’s client, who (unknown to all three women) was in fact Laura’s father, 
Leland.  Inserted in between these two pasts is an image of the Man From Another 
Place, wearing the ring in Laura’s dream.
188
 Thus, through this willed use of memory, 
Laura takes important, though painful steps toward the horrific revelation that her 
father is sexually abusing her and that it was he who murdered her friend Teresa.  
This is a courageous use of memory, which contributes to the gradual rending of a 
veil of denial which Laura has sustained since childhood. 
 
Revelation 
The narrative of some films prepares in advance for a crucial revelatory recollection.  
Near the beginning of New Jack City (Mario Van Peebles, 1991), undercover police 
officer, Scotty, apprehends crack cocaine addict, Pookie.  When onlookers start to 
grab the money which is scattered around them on the floor, Scotty produces his gun 
and points it at the crowd, cautioning, ‘Get back, I’m a police officer.’  The shots of 
the reacting onlookers focus particularly on a well-dressed man, who, like everyone 
else, watches with interest.  Subsequently we learn that this well-dressed onlooker is 
Karim, a respected businessman, who is a close associate of drug lord Nino Brown.  
Later, masquerading as a drug supplier, Scotty becomes acquainted with one of 
Nino’s associates.  When he appears at the court where Nino and his friends are 
playing basketball, Nino orders him to leave, since he does not know him personally.  
As Scotty leaves, Karim remarks, ‘I’ve seen that boy somewhere before.’  
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Eager to conclude their operation, the police engineer a drug deal.  Meeting with Nino 
and his cortège in a warehouse, Scotty lays his suitcase on the ground and as he 
carefully opens it, Karim recalls the scene from the start of the film in which Scotty 
apprehended Pookie.  (It seems the visual resemblance in Scotty’s physical attitude is 
the immediate prompt for the memory — in the remembered scene he kneels over 
Pookie, surrounded by scattered money; in the present again he kneels as he opens the 
suitcase.)  This memory, the only mental image in the entire film, is of great 
significance (because the drug deal is thwarted, the police cannot secure the lengthy 
conviction they had hoped for), and though it occurs towards the end of the film, it 
has, as we have seen, been prepared for in advance from the beginning.   
 
A note on form and function 
In considering the various functions of act of memory we must here return to 
Bordwell’s distinction between story and plot.  The story represents the gamut of 
narrative events in chronological sequence.  The plot is the order in which the story is 
told.  In his discussion of flashback, Bordwell distinguishes between internal 
flashbacks, which present story events which are subsequent to the first plot event, 
and external flashbacks, which present story events which precede the first plot event.  
The cases discussed above, in which memory performs a pragmatic function, are 
typically internal recollections.  But internal recollections do not necessarily repeat 
material already presented.  Hitchcock effectively employs internal recollections 
which return to crucial narrative events, the original presentation of which was 
obscured.  In Frenzy (Alfred Hitchcock, 1972), when the killer, Rusk, recalls the 
moment his victim tore the brooch from his tie, the memory presents fragmentary 




moment of the woman’s murder, the camera withdrew out onto the street).  In 
Vertigo, the crucial episode on the bell tower (an incident which was previously 
presented from Scotty’s — limited — perspective) is revealed through Judy’s 
recollection.   
 
Subjective insight 
Recollections which offer subjective insight are typically, though not always external.  
Unlike pragmatic recollections — by which the subject engenders a knowledge 
hitherto lacking, and which often have a more or less immediate pragmatic value — 
memories which offer subjective insight often reveal a significant episode in the 
subject’s past which sheds light on his or her motivation, habitual behaviour and 
actions.  Such recollections are of little immediate value for the remembering subject; 
rather, these memories are a convenient narrational device by which we are granted 
access to characters’ motivations and obsessions.   
 
We have established that a minority of recollections which offer subjective insight are 
internal.  In Vertigo, the internal recollection performs an integral narrative function 
in revealing to the spectator Judy’s deception.  In other films recollections return to 
earlier story events which were not previously elided or obscured.  In Passage to 
India (David Lean, 1984) Adela goes exploring on her bicycle and comes across 
statues of figures in erotic poses.   The mysterious intrigue which the statues represent 
for her is a microcosm of the mythology of the dark, sensual mysteries of the Orient 
to which she is attracted.  Her rêverie is abruptly curtailed when the wild monkeys 
inhabiting the overgrown area violently chase her away.  The symbolic significance is 




too close; let this be a warning to you!’  Nevertheless, when lying in bed Adela 
subsequently recalls the sculptures, it is clear that she is seeking some kind of 
awakening, knowledge of the Other, and that she is tempted by the thought of a 
romance with an Indian, which for her represents an attractive contrast to the dreary 
prospect of a future with her fiancé.  This subjective insight presages the film’s 
central action.  Adela’s recollection of the erotic statues is not unlike Max’s recalled 
voices in Videodrome; it marks the progression from curiosity to obsession.  Just as, 
in Videodrome, a television programme which features real-life torture and mutilation 
represents a taboo object, so for the colonial English of Passage to India, lower-caste 
native Indians represent a taboo love object.  
 
Adela’s recollection in Passage to India is internal, but, as suggested above, the 
majority of recollections which offer subjective insight are external.  In The Thin Red 
Line (Terrence Malick, 1998), Private Bell has very little dialogue in the film; his 
character is constructed predominantly through memory images of his wife.  Two-
thirds of the way through the film, when his wife writes him declaring she wants a 
divorce, we are party to his distress, which he confides to no one.  Thus an entire 
ongoing plot line is developed with barely a line of dialogue uttered.   
 
A recollection may reveal the motive for a mode of conduct that is atypical in terms of 
generic expectations or in the context of the director’s oeuvre or the actor’s star 
persona.  In The Quiet Man, Squire, the brother of his fiancée, challenges Thornton to 
a fight in public.   Despite all Squire’s provocations, Thornton refuses to fight.  Given 
that Thornton is played by John Wayne, this refusal to fight seems inexplicable.  But 




seems he would relish the opportunity to fight Squire, but some unspecified motive 
prevents him.  Later, when Squire knocks him unconscious, a recollection emerges 
which reveals that Thornton was formerly a professional boxer and killed an opponent 
in the ring.  In this brief sequence Thornton’s behaviour — unmanly in Ford’s world 
— is instantly elucidated. 
 
In other cases the memory may imply a psychological or psychoanalytic explanation 
for a personality disorder or perversion. In Belle de Jour, on her way up the stairs to 
the brothel for the first time, Séverine recalls when, as a girl, she rejected the wafer 
when the priest offered it in Communion.  Prior narrative events established that 
Séverine harbours masochistic sexual fantasies and is intrigued by the notion of 
prostitution and the brothel.  This recollection establishes an association between 
Séverine’s imminent entrance into a life as a prostitute and a childhood incident, 
which now appears as a portent of her present action.  
 
Spider (David Cronenberg, 2002) offers a portrayal of a man who has been 
institutionalised in prison after a serious crime in his youth.  The adult Spider relives 
scenes from the past, some of which he remembers, others at which he was not 
present, but imagines.  In this way Cronenberg establishes sympathy for Spider, since 
through these memories and imaginings we learn how he attempted to kill his father 
and his father’s mistress in revenge for the murder of his mother.  The mental images 
thus initially appear to perform a therapeutic function: through them Spider relives/re-
creates the events surrounding his mother’s death, in order that he might achieve 
catharsis.  But this understanding is undermined when, at the end of the film, we learn 




revise our understanding of the mental images which have throughout the film 
established sympathy for Spider: in the light of this new knowledge, these episodes 
appear as the imaginings of a very disturbed mind.  By presenting Spider — through 
his subjective remembrances and imaginings — as an unfortunate victim, only to 
finally discredit his version of events — revealing it to be the elaborate fantasy of a 
deranged mind — the film betrays a reactionary agenda, whereby Spider is 
condemned more vehemently because of this insight into his warped imagination. 
 
Moment of death 
In cinema the moment of death sometimes provides the occasion for a representation 
of imagination.  The climactic sequence of Don’t Look Now (Nicolas Roeg, 1973) 
offers a compelling example of this — though the images that John experiences do 
not cover the whole period of his life, but only significant images and impressions 
from earlier in the film.  The sequence unfolds in fast-pace montage.  The 
juxtaposition of images from various points in the recent (and more distant) past, the 
desultory character of their succession (the memories do not unfold in chronological 
sequence, but rather jump back and forth between different pasts), effectively conveys 
the faculty of memory in its externality to time and chronology.  This sequence seems 
to owe something to the representations of memory found in French Impressionist 
films of the twenties which, Turim notes, ‘intersperse multiple temporalities as co-




In Hunger (Steve McQueen, 2008), the moment of the leader of the IRA prisoners’ 
1980 hunger strike, Bobby Sands’s, death takes a quite different form — an elegiac, 
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lyrical sequence.  Close to death, Sands wakes and with some difficulty identifies the 
woman at his bedside as his mother.  With this there is an extremely slow dissolve to 
a subjective sequence.  A group of schoolboys cross-country run in a cornfield.  Now 
the young Sands gazes out of the window of a moving coach.  The singing — ‘We’re 
from Belfast’ — of the other boys is gradually replaced by ambient sound design and 
we cut to the young Sands running through the woods alone.  As he comes to a 
standstill we return to the present, the camera looking directly down upon the 
emaciated Sands.  The sound of his accelerated breathing is prominent here, and it is 
apparent that he is dying.  Catching his breath, the young Sands turns to look behind 
him, but there are no other runners in sight; he is way out ahead.  At the dying Sands’s 
bedside, his mother raises her hand to his head.  Still without sign of the other boys, 
the young Sands, having caught his breath, faces forward and resumes running.  Shots 
of a flock of birds flying away and a blue sky as evening falls are a figure for Sands’ 
passing away.  Here McQueen uses this subjective sequence to present an elegy to 
Sands’s role in the hunger strikes.  Rather than depicting an actual memory, the 
primary significance of the sequence is poetic.  True, the sequence emerges as a 
recollection.  But this motivation is a means to a greater end, an effective metaphor, 
establishing an associative continuity between character traits of the young Sands — a 
cross-country runner, way out in front ahead of the field — and of the adult Sands — 
a political activist, inspiring men by his example.  In the woods the young Sands, so 
far ahead no one will see him, stops to catch his breath, and, certain that the other 
boys are close behind him, faces forward and resumes running.  The adult Sands is 
also way out ahead, leading men who he knows are following behind him.  At the 
threshold of his mortal life, he pauses, looks back, and with courage confronts death.  




urges us to understand the cross-country race as a figure for the Irish prisoners’ 
struggle; Sands’s death is a victory for the struggle of the Republican prisoners. 
 
Guilty conscience 
We will see in Part II that representations of imagination frequently give expression to 
a guilty conscience; acts of memory occasionally perform this function also.  In Blue 
Velvet, the morning after being beaten up by Frank, Jeffrey reflects on recent events.  
We cut between Jeffrey sitting on his bed in the present, the camera zooming in closer 
as he breaks down in tears, and a series of mental images, which juxtapose images of 
Dorothy begging Jeffrey to hit her (which he does, and she smiles with pleasure), with 
the maternal image of Dorothy as she is granted momentary access to her son at Ben’s 
house.  As he experiences these images, Jeffrey breaks down in tears, thus 
establishing his sense of guilt at his complicity in Dorothy’s sexual masochism. 
 
We noted earlier how in Esta Noite Encarnarei no Teu Cadáver, when Joe learns that 
Jarinda, one of the women he has killed, was pregnant, he is haunted by the curse she 
uttered as she died (‘This Night I’ll Possess Your Corpse’).  Simultaneous with his 
recollection of her curse, the photograph of Jarinda becomes an imaginary/memory 
image of Jarinda as she died, a snake wrapped around her body.  Thus here 
recollection expresses a sense of terror.  Joe’s struggle with guilt escalates when he 
subsequently loses his own child and images of Jarinda return to haunt him.  Thus Joe 
finds his imperious assuredness threatened when circumstances force him to question 
his philosophy and consider the veracity of the religious superstition for which he has 
had such contempt.   In representing Joe’s lacerating sense of doubt, mental images 






As is clear from the above discussion of guilty conscience, act of memory is often 
related to crime and sin.  A character has committed some crime or other for which 
she feels guilt; she is plagued by her conscience, a repentant sinner.  Others are less or 
even un-repentant.  For these characters, memory of sin is more often a consequence 
of contingent accidents than pangs of guilt. 
 
The ‘Merry Widow’ waltz acts as a sinister refrain which runs throughout Shadow of 
a Doubt (Alfred Hitchcock, 1943).  The song first plays over the opening credit 
sequence of images of ballroom waltz dancing.  When Uncle Charlie later gives a 
present of a ring to his niece (also called Charlie) and she notices that it has an 
engraving which has nothing to do with her, it is clear that the ring is stolen; with this 
the ‘Merry Widow’ emerges on the soundtrack and extradiegetic images of ballroom 
dancing are superimposed upon images of Uncle Charlie in the present.  This is an 
interesting enunciation which is not clearly designated as act of memory, and could 
equally be interpreted as an autonomous act of narration.  This moment reveals the 
specific nature of Uncle Charlie’s criminality for the first time: until this point it is 
clear that he is on the run and that he is almost certainly a criminal; the engraving on 
the ring suggests that it was stolen; now the significance of the ballroom waltz of the 
opening credit sequence is apparent: Uncle Charlie charms and then steals from rich, 
elderly women.  It seems that Uncle Charlie’s imagining of, or his remembrance of 
the ‘Merry Widow’ waltz signifies his remembrance of his crimes.  But if this is so, it 





In Jekyll and Hyde, Dr Jekyll goes to the aid of a young working-class woman, 
Champagne-Ivy, who is being attacked.  As he puts her to bed and attends to her 
wounds she flirts with him and finally grabs and kisses him.  Jekyll’s colleague, 
Lanion, enters and is horrified at what he witnesses.  Jekyll laughs the incident off and 
leaves.  On his way out Ivy encourages him to return and swings her leg seductively.  
As he and Lanion leave the building Jekyll recalls Ivy’s words: ‘Come back soon, 
won’t you ... Oh yes you can.  Soon...’ For some moments, the image of Ivy’s 
exposed leg, swinging over the side of the bed, is superimposed over the scene outside 
as Lanion chastises Jekyll for his unprofessional conduct.  The superimposition seems 
to be a figurative expression of the processes of Jekyll’s unconscious mind, his 
repressed libido.  This is supported by the ensuing dialogue as Jekyll says to his 
colleague, ‘Well, why aren’t you frank enough to admit that other self, that indecent 
self?  No, you prefer to hide it and pretend it isn’t there.’  Here, then, quite the 
opposite of imagination appearing in the form of guilty conscience, the film presents 
images which signify temptation.  It finally seems that Champagne Ivy’s invitation, 
and the lingering image of her coquettishly swinging leg, unconsciously propel Jekyll 
to test his potion.  After the transformation, Hyde immediately seeks out Ivy.   
 
Dr Jekyll represents the model for a character type, the pathological male who 
struggles with the beast within.  Twin Peaks’s Leland Palmer is an embodiment of the 
same basic character type: a respectable member of the community who leads a 
clandestine existence in which he becomes a lecherous beast, giving free reign to 
repressed impulses.  In Fire Walk With Me, as we have seen, when Leland arrives 
home and sees Laura sitting with her best friend, Donna, he recalls a memory of her in 




Polanski, Teresa’s friends.  During the recollection the placid music momentarily 
gives way to a dark underscore cue, and then returns as the memory passes.  The 
memory, thus punctuated by the score, is marked as the sinister content of Leland’s 
mind.  Later, after a harrowing encounter on the road with the One Armed Man, 
Leland has two recollections in close succession.  First he recalls the moment when, 
in bed with Teresa, he frightened her by covering her eyes with his hands.  The 
ensuing conversation runs as follows:  
‘What are you doing?’ 
‘Who am I?’ 
‘I don’t know.’ 
‘That’s right.’   
When Laura calls him in the present, and Leland (impossibly) seems to react to her 
voice in the past, the eerie, dream-like unsettling effect is compounded by the fact that 
the specific wording of Leland and Teresa’s conversation has a deeper significance 
with regard to Laura and her denial of Leland’s abuse: the words encapsulate the 
unarticulated dialogue between Laura and Leland, abused and abuser: ‘What are you 
doing? — Who am I? — I don’t know.’  In the present, Laura asks Leland who the 
man was, but Leland ignores her, preoccupied.  Now a second recollection emerges: 
in a memory which expands on a previous memory-image, Leland recalls arriving at 
the trailer park to meet Teresa’s friends and catching a glimpse through the window of 
Laura and Ronette, before hurriedly leaving.  Here Leland’s recollection imparts 
crucial narrative information: when we return to the present we know exactly why 
Leland killed Teresa Banks.  The coincidence between recollection duration and time 
elapsed in the present, the sense of memory experienced in time is intense and 




betrays himself: after each recollection Laura seems to know a little more, has become 
more suspicious.  (After the first recollection, referring to the One Armed Man and his 
tirade at the junction, Laura asks: ‘Who was that?  He looked familiar.  Have I met 
him?’; after the second, she asks whether Leland came home during the day last week 
— when she discovered Bob in her bedroom.  Leland lies; he says no, and then 
quickly changes his mind.  Laura is now markedly troubled and suspicious; we sense 
the vast veil of denial being rent asunder.)  Later, as Leland paces up and down alone 
in the living room he recalls murdering Teresa.  The memory reprises the murder 
scene from the film’s opening: before, chillingly, we heard the murder; now we see it 
also.  The emergence of Leland’s memories, the manner in which they are prompted, 
is essentially ordinary; what is abnormal is the content of the memories.  There is no 
suggestion of remorse or feelings of guilt — he simply remembers murdering Teresa.  




Conclusion to Part I 
Our discussion of flashback established that current terminology is inadequate.  
Flashback-for-narrative seemed to us to be quite distinct from the mental images of 
memory.  On the other hand, flashback-for-memory appeared to imply mental images, 
since it is motivated by an act of recollection.  Nevertheless, a closer examination 
revealed that this emphasis on memory is superficial.  Flashback-for-memory 
conceals a shift of emphasis from subjective memory to autonomous narration.  Thus 
we distinguished act of memory from flashback-for-memory, asserting that act of 
memory consists of representations of mental images.  While, like flashback, act of 
memory may retain a certain objectivity in presenting events remembered from an 
objective perspective (the remembering subject is often physically present in the 
memory image), unlike flashback-for-memory, the typical presentation of act of 
memory (intercutting) places emphasis on the experience of memory in time.   
 
In its present usage the term ‘flashback’ is too ductile to mean anything other than ‘a 
filmic depiction of anteriority’.  However, film narrative theory has established some 
qualifying adjectives which provide greater specificity.  Bordwell’s distinction 
between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ flashbacks is important.  (My own distinction 
between flashback and act of memory means that we can speak also of internal and 
external acts of memory.)  Branigan’s distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ 
flashbacks is less significant.  Subjective flashbacks are logically motivated, either 
through a character narrating a story, or through memory; objective flashbacks emerge 
autonomously.  There are very few objective flashbacks in classical cinema.  Such 
flashbacks are far more frequent in modern cinema, though still relatively rare (in 




flashbacks are subjective.  But to identify a sequence as a ‘subjective flashback’ tells us 
very little.  Was it motivated by an act of narration?  If so, was this narrative actually 
recounted by one character to another, or was it recounted only in the imagination of the 
recounting subject, addressed to herself/the spectator?  Or was it motivated by an act of 
recollection?  If so, was it presented as an actual memory, experienced in time, or a mere 
analogue of memory? 
 
My concept of act of memory is a move towards great specificity in speaking of 
cinema’s representations of anteriority.  Current terminology is deeply inadequate.  Is 
it practical or desirable that the term ‘flashback’ should apply equally to the lacerating 
flash-inserts of The Pawnbroker, as it does to the long recounted narratives of Out of 
the Past or Citizen Kane?  In its current use the term is conveniently ductile.  We need 
qualifying adjectives to distinguish between different varieties of filmic depictions of 
anteriority.  This terminology does not currently exist and so it must be developed.  
My ‘act of memory’ is a move in this direction.  A phenomenological approach to 
film form, it introduces the question of ontological specificity into our efforts to 
distinguish between different varieties of filmic representations of anteriority. 
 
So far we have examined representations of the past.  In Part II we consider 



















Introduction to Part II 
In Chapter 3 we look at cognitive and phenomenological theories of the image, before 
proceeding to consider questions of form and function in filmic representations of 
imagination and the situations which engender imaginings.  Here we develop our 
hypothesis about the relation between representations of mental images and themes of 
madness, and this theme will be further developed throughout Part II.  In positing a 
connection between mental images and madness, we anticipate the objection that 
imagination is an essential function of ordinary human mental activity.  The capacity 
to remember, and to create and test imaginary hypotheses, are mental capacities that 
human beings have developed over time and which distinguish humans from animals.  
We accept this.  The essential point is that madness manifests itself through material 
(the brain), mental processes (various forms of reasoning and speculating, etc.) and 
behavioural and psychological tendencies (anxiety, fantasy, conscience) which are 
common to all humans.  Mental images and themes of madness are so closely bound 
up in cinema that it seems the history of cinema’s representations of mental images is 
best understood in the context of its representations of madness.  Our efforts to 
demonstrate this will require us to consider just what constitutes madness; we may 
begin to understand certain mental images experienced by characters, who would not 
normally be designated mad, as traces of madness; we will consider the possibility 
and extent of continuity between the behaviour of ordinary characters who, in difficult 
circumstances, summon, or are prey to mental images, and the insane character who 
has lost control over the images that occur to her. 
 
Before proceeding further we will first briefly consider Richardson’s cognitive theory 




Chapter 3. Imagination 
I. Richardson’s cognitive theory of mental imagery 
Richardson organises mental imagery in a typology consisting of four elements: 1. 
after-imagery; 2. eidetic imagery; 3. memory imagery; 4. imagination imagery.  At the 
outset he writes, ‘[i]t may well prove to be the case that a quasi-perceptual experience, 
in the form of a visual image, involves the reactivation of those neuro-physiological 
processes of the central nervous system that were activated during the original 
perceptual experience.’
190
 Later he writes ‘[a]n image by definition is a quasi-sensory 
or quasi-perceptual experience.’ But in the following sentence he qualifies this, 
adding, ‘[i]ts meaning and significance derive from its differentiation from a 
percept.’
191
 In most cases the cortex plays an important role in the generation of 
images.   
 
Imagination imagery is the broadest class of mental imagery, encompassing 
hypnagogic imagery, perceptual isolation imagery, hallucinogenic drug imagery, and 
photic stimulation imagery.  From his analysis of the work of a number of researchers 
Richardson notes that ‘[t]he main difference between these forms of imagery is in the 
antecedent conditions that arouse them and not in the phenomenal attributes that 
appear in the subject’s report.’
192
 All cases of imagination imagery, Richardson 
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This brief discussion has provided us with an initial idea of the different forms of 
mental imagery, but we must forbear from granting the findings of cognitive research 
too much weight because the specific test conditions under which its results are 
obtained are evidently quite different from the environments and conditions in which 
mental images are otherwise spontaneously experienced.  We will reserve 
Richardson’s discussion of hallucination for Chapter 7.  In a brief excursus we will 
now discuss the image as a phenomenon of consciousness.  In his earliest theoretical 
writings, Jean-Paul Sartre elaborated a phenomenological theory of the image which 
will inform our discussion throughout Part II. 
 
II. Sartre’s phenomenology of the image 
In L’Imaginaire (1940) Sartre identifies the common error of all preceding theories of 
imagination as ‘the illusion of imminence’, the confounding of images with things.  
Sartre maintains that the imaginary world, like the real world, is a world that exists, 
only it exists in the imaginary mode.  The image, he writes, ‘is an undoubted psychic 
reality.  An image can in no way be reduced to a sensory content, or be constituted on 
the ground of a sensory content.’
194
 Indeed, the purely mental image can be 
constituted only by the annihilation of perceptual consciousness: ‘[a]s long as I look at 
this table, I cannot form an image of Pierre; but if all at once the irreal Pierre surges 
up before me, the table that is under my eyes vanishes’.
195
 The relevance of this last to 
cinema’s representations of mental images may be grasped if we consider the function 
of the dissolve, which often heralds (the emergence of and/or from) a sequence of 
mental images: as the present recedes, mental images emerge, and vice versa.   
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The positional quality designates whether the object which the image represents exists 
or not.  A condition of the image is negation: the positional act which constitutes the 
image ‘can posit the object as nonexistent, or as absent, or as existing elsewhere, it 
can also “neutralise” itself, which is to say not posit its object as existent.’
196
 The 
imaginary world is not in fact characterised by freedom: the image is constituted by 
the nihilation of the world ‘as totality’, ‘and this nihilation is revealed to us as being 
the inverse of the very freedom of consciousness’
197
; the world is denied from the 
point of view which posits the object imagined as absent or nonexistent, or — to 
confirm the precise significance of this point for us — the world is denied from the 
perspective of the ‘present’.  Thus the emergence of the imaginary world coincides 
with the retreat of the present. 
 
if consciousness is free, the noematic correlate of its freedom should be the 
world that carries in itself its possibility of negation, at each moment and from 
each point of view, by means of an image, even while the image must as yet 




A consciousness which is free is able at each moment to deny or negate the world 
from a specific point of view by the creation of an image; the specific point of view 
from which the world is denied is that from which the image of an absent or non-
existent object is present to consciousness.  This definition of the freedom of 
consciousness seems to correspond with a normal use of imagination.  In 
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L’Imaginaire Sartre applies his phenomenological method in a discussion of the 
different states of consciousness corresponding to various states of imagination, 
ultimately developing a ‘pathology of imagination’, a phenomenological analysis of 
various states of neuroses.  We often find representations of mental images that 
correspond to Sartre’s theory of the image, thus in our discussion we will return to 
Sartre’s theories wherever they are relevant to our understanding of cinema’s 
representations of mental images. 
 
III. Form 
In the following chapters we discuss the largest classes of imagination — imagined 
voices, fantasy, dream, and hallucination — separately.  In this chapter, we will 
consider imagination in a more general sense.   
 
The imagination circuit 
Just as in cinema there is a memory-circuit, so there is an imagination circuit, in 
which mental images are framed by opening and closing parenthetic shots of the 
imagining subject in the present.  This resolved circuit of classical cinema is often 
dismantled in modern cinema, in which one or other, or both, of the opening and 
closing parenthetic shots are omitted.   
 
Entering imagination 
The omission of the opening parenthetic shot often deceives the spectator into 
(temporarily) mistaking an imaginary scenario for reality.  In Ai No Corrida (Nagisa 
Oshima, 1976), a servant, Sada, enters into a sexual relationship with her master, 




his wife is shaving him and the wife sends her to fetch a bowl of water.  Upon 
returning, Sada drops the water when she finds Kichizo and his wife making love.  
Frozen in a bewildered attitude of fury and jealousy, she notices the cut-throat razor 
lying redundant on the floor nearby.  From a close-up of Sada we cut to her picking 
up the razor.  Cut to the wife rising into the shot with blood pouring from her face, her 
ear severed from her head.  It is only as we return to a medium shot of Sada, still 
frozen at the threshold, and then to her view of Kichizo, still making love to his wife, 
that we recognise that the previous few shots — her murder of Kichizo’s wife — were 
mental images of Sada’s imagination.  Sequences such as this draw attention to a 
breakdown in the signifying chain.  In this connection Frederic Jameson discusses 
Lacan’s account of schizophrenia: 
 
Lacan describes schizophrenia as a breakdown in the signifying chain, that is, 
the interlocking syntagmatic series of signifiers which constitutes an utterance 
or a meaning [...] His conception of the signifying chain essentially 
presupposes one of the basic principles (and one of the great discoveries) of 
Saussurian structuralism, namely, the proposition that meaning is not a one-to-
one relationship between signifier and signified, between the materiality of 
language, between a word or a name, and its referent or concept.  Meaning on 
the new view is generated by the movement from signifier to signifier.  What 
we generally call the signified — the meaning-effect, as that objective mirage 
of signification generated and projected by the relationship of signifiers among 









The recollection circuit and the imagination circuit are signifying chains.  The 
meaning of a sequence is not imminent to its images but arises from the relationship 
of the images to each other.  Where the signifying chain breaks down or is dismantled 
— as in the above example from Ai No Corrida, where the opening parenthetic shot 
of the circuit is omitted — the text, in a sense, assumes a schizophrenic quality: do the 
images represent the reality of the present or imagination?  The closing shots of the 




The omission of the closing parenthetic shot means that the imagined scene acts as a 
transition between presents.  In 8 ½ Guido is eating breakfast with his wife when his 
mistress appears.  Guido escapes this impossible situation, in which it seems a 
confrontation between the two women is inevitable, by conjuring a fantasy.  Upon 
exiting the fantasy, rather than returning to the original present, we shift to the new 
present of the theatre where Guido is casting his film.
200
 In The Shining (Stanley 
Kubrick, 1980) the telepathic hotel cook, Mr Halloran, has an ominous vision of the 
troubling happenings at the hotel.  We see an image of the open door of room 237 (the 
room Halloran explicitly forbade Danny from entering), then a shot of Danny in a 
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catatonic state.  But when Jack comes to investigate and encounters the beautiful 
woman in the bathtub, this is no longer Halloran’s vision but narration proper; the 
resolving shot is omitted.  Since, upon emerging from imagination, we can shift — as 
in 8 ½ — to a new present, here one might argue that we do not emerge from 
imagination at all, since the images of Halloran’s imagination are presented as 
actually occurring; Halloran is telepathic — thus his mental images already represent 
a new present.  
 
Alternatives to the imagination circuit 
In Part I we noted that one alternative to the usual cross-cutting of act of memory was 
Hitchcock’s superimpositions, as in the Saboteur and The 39 Steps, to depict the 
remembering subject and the memory-image simultaneously.  Suspicion (Alfred 
Hitchcock, 1941) employs the same device to represent Lina’s imagining of Johnny 
pushing Beaky from a cliff while simultaneously showing her expression as she 
realises this dreadful vision.  In Blow Out (Brian De Palma, 1981), De Palma presents 
different temporal and existential planes simultaneously, using a layering effect.  
Having inadvertently recorded the senator’s accident, Jack listens to the audio 
recording in order to discover precisely what happened.  While he listens to the 
crucial moment of the recording his face remains in close-up (in the present), while in 
the background is a close-up of the tyre being shot in slow-motion.  Jack did not see 
this: this is not memory but an act of imagination based on the evidence of his audio 








Modern cinema often presents mental images asynchronously, thus capturing the 
phenomenological subjective experience of the co-existence of two temporal or 
existential planes: remembering/imagining while remaining in the present — not only 
physically, but (on some level) consciously, or sensorially.  In such cases mental 
images are usually presented on the sound track, the image remaining in the present.  
There is thus a rupture which corresponds to an apparent ontological hierarchy of the 
senses, whereby hearing represents the subjective, vision the objective.
201
 We find 
such asynchrony in The Pianist (Roman Polanski, 2002), as the pianist, sitting before 
a piano which he dare not play lest he reveal himself to the Nazis from whom he is in 
hiding, imagines the music which would issue from the piano were he to play it.   
 
In A Streetcar Named Desire (Elia Kazan, 1951) the madness and vulnerability of 
Blanche Dubois is emphasised by the use of subjective sound effects.  In his first 
meeting with Blanche, Stanley explains that Stella has talked about her a great deal.  
‘She said you were married once, weren’t you?’ he asks.  Blanche stares off into 
space with a troubled expression, and Stanley’s words are repeated on the soundtrack 
in a subjective receding reverberant echo, demonstrating that the memory of her 
marriage is somehow traumatic for Blanche.  ‘The boy died,’ she explains. 
 
Later, almost in a trance of remembrance, Blanche tells Mitch how her young 
husband shot himself through the mouth with a revolver.  At the climactic point in her 
story we hear the subjective sound of a gun-shot, dramatising her narrative.  
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Subsequently, when, having learned about her past, Mitch comes to confront her, 
Blanche approaches the window, distracted.  Music appears on the soundtrack.   
‘There’s that music again...’ 
‘What music?’ asks Mitch, confirming that the music on the 
soundtrack is an image of Blanche’s imagination.   
‘The polka tune they were playing when...’  
Shutting her eyes, she lifts her hand to her temple.   
‘Wait!...’  
A subjective gun-shot resounds.   
‘Shot!’   
The music continues.   
‘It always stops after that.’  
The music recedes.   
Finally, when the doctor comes to take her away, there is once more subjective sound, 
as the voices of the doctor and Stanley alternately echo through Blanche’s mind.  In 
terms of our developing central argument about the relation between representations 
of mental images and themes of madness, it is interesting to note the bias in 
contemporary medicine and psychiatry — which is perhaps reflected in cinema — 
whereby purely auditory images and hallucinations — imagined voices — are 
generally thought to be more indicative of madness than hallucinations in which there 
is a visual element.     
 
Genericism and ‘quasi-observation’ 
Mental images which are somehow qualitatively impoverished raise the question of 




character of the irreal object.’
202
 Our attitude in relation to the image is quasi-
observation.  In an important passage Sartre distinguishes this from perception: 
  
I can keep an image in view as long as I want: I will never find anything there 
but what I put there […] In the world of perception, no ‘thing’ can appear 
without maintaining an infinity of relations to other things […] in the image, 




This analysis is relevant to the specific form of many of cinema’s representations of 
mental images — their generic, vague quality.  In Part I we discussed the specific 
form of nostalgia images (wistful nondiegetic score; absence of diegetic sound), but 
where nostalgia images do not reprise previous scenes, in many cases we can question 
the status of such images as ‘memories’: to what extent are they memories, to what 
extent imagination?  In A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume argues that 
memory and imagination are to be distinguished only by the intensity of their images: 
 
the ideas of the memory are much more lively and strong than those of the 
imagination [...] When we remember any past event, the idea of it flows in 
upon the mind in a forcible manner; whereas in the imagination the perception 
is faint and languid, and cannot without difficulty be preserv’d by the mind 
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It is the indefinite nature of the sole term of distinction — intensity — which accounts 
for the frequent confusion between the two faculties: 
 
as an idea of the memory, by losing its force and vivacity, may degenerate to 
such a degree, as to be taken for an idea of the imagination; so on the other 
hand an idea of the imagination may acquire such a force and vivacity, as to 
pass for an idea of the memory, and counterfeit its effects on the belief and 
judgement.
205
   
 
Indeed, Hume writes, ‘We are frequently in doubt concerning the ideas of the 
memory, as they become very weak and feeble; and are at a loss to determine whether 
any image proceeds from the fancy or the memory.’
206
 In many nostalgia images there 
is an element of genericism, a ‘foggy character’, a lack of specificity, no surrounding 
detail by which one might temporally or geographically situate the memory.  It seems 
to us that this is because nostalgia images are invariably the product of voluntary 
memory.  In Private Bell’s images of his wife in The Thin Red Line, memory is 
suffused with imagination to create an idealised image of this woman.  There are 
never any other people present in these images; where the location for the images is 
the bedroom, the shots are framed so closely that the bedroom remains generic — it 
could be any bedroom.   
 
In Fear X (Nicolas Winding Refn, 2003), in the hotel room Harry’s mental images of 
his wife are so vague that they seem to represent imagination more than memory.  The 
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camera zooms in on Harry as he sits on the bed.  When we then cut to a different 
angle, there is no suggestion that we have left the present; indeed, Harry is wearing 
the same hooded raincoat in both shots.  It is only when a hand appears and gently 
caresses his face that we understand that this is a mental image.  Two factors suggest 
that these images are better understood as imagination rather than memory images.  
Firstly, the coat: while it is possible that Harry’s wife once caressed him in this way, 
and that he was wearing this same coat, it seems more likely that it is the Harry of the 
present who is caressed by his (imaginary) wife rather than a Harry of the past 
(memory).  The sequence of mental images does not commence when we cut from 
Harry on the bed to a closer shot of Harry from a different angle, but rather, when the 
hand enters this latter shot and strokes his face.  Secondly, we must consider Harry’s 
response when the hand appears and gently strokes his face.  His cold unmoved 
response to this tender gesture is the response of the Harry of the present; his resigned 
expression suggests that he knows the hand is an illusion.  (If these are memory 
images it is not clear why Harry looks so troubled while his wife caresses his face — 
like a man devastated by the tragic premature death of his young wife.) 
 
But nostalgia images are not the only mental images which have this impoverished 
quality.  There are the impure fragmentary pragmatic memory images we discussed in 
Part I, such as those of Kane in The Saboteur.  In the three recollections in Dressed to 
Kill, the remembered objects — the gloved hand, the knickers, the wedding ring — all 
share a generic quality; they are isolated, situated in an extremely limited physical 
space, as is Oliverio’s recollection of Raquel’s callous dismissal in Subida al cielo.  
The reader may recall that in the introduction we requested that she accept the broad 




thesis.  So why now, in a discussion of imagination, speak of memory?  Here we must 
acknowledge that in practice, and in time, memory tends to become infused with 
imagination.  The generic quality of the recollections discussed above demonstrates 
that here memory is imagination; the subject recalls only what is necessary, what she 
‘puts there’
207
; the rest is omitted.  More interesting still are the substantial flashbacks 
in 8 ½ — the ‘asa nisi masa’ flashback, the Saraghina episode — which also have a 
vague, generic, dream-like quality.  These sequences seem to represent events the 
subject knows to have occurred but is unable to remember properly, memories 
embellished by imagination.  Resnais’s L’année dernière à Marienbad and Terence 
Davies’s Distant Voices, Still Lives and The Long Day Closes are, in quite different 
ways, composed of unnaturalistic, affected representations of the past which seem to 
express the irreducible subjectivity of events as they are remembered rather than an 
objective account of what actually happened.  While, on principle, we have insisted 
that we are not concerned with the mental images of the director but with those of 
characters within the diegesis, in The Long Day Closes, as we have seen, the fact that 
Davies is Bud obliges us to revise our conceptual framework.  The entire film can be 
understood as representing Davies’s own mental images, his memories of his 
childhood, and it is this aspect that accounts for the fact that these autobiographical 
films appear quite unnaturalistic: this is life as it is remembered, rather than as it 
happened.  Classical cinema’s best representations of memory as generic, vague, a 
product of imagination, Fellini’s distorted childhood memory sequences — these 
psychic qualities which in other films appear as moments or excerpts, are realised by 
Davies as a principle of aesthetic composition for the duration of entire films. 
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The presence of the imagining subject within the imagined scene 
We find an interesting innovation in representations of imagination in films which 
situate the imagining subject within the imaginary scene itself.  In Wild Strawberries 
Isak imagines scenes from his youth at which he was not present.  The elderly Isak 
appears within these scenes as a witness, though of course the people in the past do 
not acknowledge his presence.  In Ryan’s Daughter (David Lean, 1970), the 
schoolteacher, Charles, notices footsteps in the sand which he suspects belong to his 
wife, Rosy, and follows them along the beach to a rock with a pool of water.  
Following the footsteps which he has tracked, Charles imagines Rosy walking along 
the beach with her lover to the pool.  As they approach, Charles hides behind the rock, 
but soon realises they cannot see him.   
 
We find this mode of presenting imagination in two films which present the visions of 
a psychic.  In The Fury (Brian De Palma, 1978), Gillian has visions involving Robin, 
a boy who shares her psychic powers and with whom she feels a connection.  The 
imagined scene, though actually occurring at that moment in another place, is a 
representation of Gillian’s imagination; at the same time, she appears within the 
vision, in, but separate from the imagined scene; we see the scene she imagines at the 
same time as we see her imagining it.  While there is no question of her intervening in 
it, the fact that she is visually situated within the imagined scene effectively conveys 
the overwhelming, all-consuming experience of these visions.  In The Deadzone 
(David Cronenberg, 1983), whenever he makes physical contact with another person, 
Johnny experiences psychic visions related to that person.  In his first vision of the 
nurse’s daughter, Amy, in her burning bedroom, Johnny appears within the imagined 




is no longer in the hospital bed of the present, but in Amy’s burning bed within the 
vision.  Later, when assisting the sheriff with his investigation, Johnny kneels in a 
snow-covered gazebo and takes the hand of a murdered woman, Elma.  In the vision 
the murderer encourages her to come and join him; Elma approaches, and as she steps 
onto the gazebo the camera draws back, eerily revealing Johnny’s presence on the 
gazebo, in exactly the same attitude as in the present.  Johnny is greatly disturbed by 
this vision in which he witnesses a murder.  ‘I saw it,’ he tells the Sheriff.  ‘I was 
there, I saw it.  I stood there.  I saw his face ... I stood there and watched him kill that 
girl!’   
   
Cronenberg employs the technique more systematically in Spider.  Jonathan Sklar and 
Andrea Sabbadini write,  
 
A sense of unconscious timelessness is conveyed by the film…The past of 
Spider’s childhood (the 1950s) and the present of his life in a half-way house 
for former psychiatric patients (the year 1988) seem to coincide uncannily 
whenever, by telescoping generations, ‘boy Spider’ and ‘grown-up Spider’ are 




Again, though the adult Spider is present within the remembered and imagined past 
scenes, there is no question of him intervening in them.  However, in the scene of the 
sexual encounter between Spider’s father, Bill, and his mistress, Evelyn, Spider 
momentarily takes Bill’s place.  After the sexual act in the tunnel, Bill faces the wall, 
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his back to the camera as he does up his fly.  But as he turns we see not Bill (Gabriel 
Byrne), but the adult Spider (Ralph Fiennes), who delivers his father’s line,  
‘I’m stopping here for a bit’.   
(Evelyn sees and hears Bill, not Spider.)   
 
In each of the examples discussed here, dispensing with the vraisemblance of a rigidly 
defined notion of realism facilitates the simultaneous presentation of the mental image 
itself and the subject in the act of imagining. 
 
The merging of imagination and reality 
The real and the imaginary worlds are metaphysically distinct: an imagined utterance 
has no claim to existence in the empirical world.  However, occasionally we find 
irrational transgressions of this divide.  In La voie lactée (The Milky Way) (Luis 
Buñuel, 1969) the pilgrims, Pierre and Jean, arrive at a gathering in a field where 
schoolgirls are giving their annual presentation.  The teacher, Madame Garnier, 
introduces the performances: ‘As you all know, this year has been a difficult one.  
Violence is everywhere, these days, but thanks be to God, our classes have been 
undisturbed ...’  As she speaks the camera frames the young pilgrim, Pierre, and we 
cut to a brief insert of armed men and women marching through the street.  The sound 
continues momentarily as we return to the present and, for a moment, Pierre seems 
disoriented.  Madame Garnier introduces a religious recital, inviting the girls onto the 
stage, and as Pierre looks up there appears a further insert of armed men and women 
marching through the street, shells exploding in the distance.  While the girls, in 
consecutive sequence, denounce various forms of heresy, inserts continue to obtrude 




cut back to Pierre in the present, his eyes lowered.  The man sitting next to him looks 
offscreen with some alarm, and asks,  
‘Is there a shooting-range near here?’   
‘No, it’s me,’ Pierre reassures him, ‘I was imagining they were 
shooting a Pope.’   
The implication is that, impossibly, the man hears the gunfire of Pierre’s imagination.  
We understand this mischievous emphasis on and shattering of the metaphysical 
division of the real and the imaginary in the context of the surrealist influence on 
Buñuel. 
 
Deleuze notes the tendency in modern cinema for the real and the imaginary to 
increasingly merge toward a point of indiscernibility.
209
 This phenomenon is in 
evidence in Audition (Takashi Mikee, 1999).  Aoyama collapses after drinking the 
whisky which was drugged by Asamai, the young woman whom he has selected to 
replace his wife.  Henceforth it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish fantasy 
from reality.  As Aoyama collapses we return to a previous scene of him and Asami 
dining in the restaurant, but now their conversation is completely different: instead of 
telling Aoyama that her family is quite normal, Asami explains how as a child she 
was abused by her step-father.  But which version of this scene represents the truth?  
Is this Aoyama’s memory of what Asami really told him at dinner?  Or is this, rather, 
his imagining of the dark reality which Asami has concealed from him?  As she 
recounts this story of her step-father’s abuse we cut to Asami’s apartment, where she 
lies on her back spread-eagled on the floor.  It might be that this shot is purely 
autonomous, but it may also represent an act of imagination (which we could attribute 
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to either Asami or Aoyama).  Let’s assume for a moment that the sequence is not 
simply an autonomous act of narration, but represents an act of imagination — 
depending on whether or not this is the real version of the conversation in the 
restaurant, the status of this second act of imagination, in relation to the present, 
becomes quite remote.  If the conversation in which Asami recounts the abuse she 
suffered really took place, then what we see is Aoyama’s memory of it.  The shot of 
Asami in her apartment could then be interpreted as either: Aoyama’s memory of 
mental images he formed while listening to Asami’s story; or, mental images formed 
at the present moment in response to the remembered conversation.  On the other 
hand, if at dinner Asami really was guarded in her response to Aoyama’s inquiry 
about her family, then the scene in which she recounts the horrors of her childhood 
must occur in Aoyama’s imagination.  In which case, the shot of Asami in her 
apartment becomes an act of imagination within an act of imagination.  As Asami 
continues to recount her story in the restaurant we cut back to the apartment and then 
to an extreme close-up of a burn on Asami’s inner right thigh.  While Asami’s voice 
from the restaurant continues to recount the story, the image remains in the apartment, 
the camera slowly tracking up her body to reveal that the recounting voice is that of 
the Asami in the apartment; the voice is no longer ‘off’ but ‘on’.  This sequence 
appears to follow a dream-like logic.  The precise status of the sequence remains 
fundamentally ambivalent.  It is possible, as we have seen, to construct various 
scenarios to account for certain of the images presented and for the illogical 
developments in the sequence, but the film endorses none of these specifically; it is 





Without focusing exclusively on any one class of imagination (fantasy, dream, etc.), 
we have here discussed aspects of the formal presentation of filmic representations of 
imagination in a general sense.  We will now consider aspects of the functions of 
imagination in cinema. 
 
IV. Function 
The mental images of imagination perform many of the same functions as those of 
memory, thus we find here some situations and character types with which we are 
already familiar. 
   
Pragmatism/Reasoning/Speculating/Re-enactment 
Detectives employ imagination for pragmatic purposes, creating imaginary 
hypotheses.  In Natural Born Killers (Oliver Stone, 1994, U.S.), investigating the 
crime scene in which serial killer, Mallory Knox, seduced a petrol pump attendant, 
elicited oral sex from him on top of a sports car and then murdered him in cold blood, 
Detective Scagneti inspects the imprints left by her buttocks on the car bonnet.  As he 
gazes at the bonnet he forms mental images of Mallory — pouting sensually and then 
blowing him a kiss — which appear on the bonnet, distorted by the contours of the 
bodywork like reflections in a false mirror at a fairground.  But such a pragmatic use 
of imagination is not limited to the professional detective.  There are others who, by 
force of necessity, become detectives.   
 
In Missing (Costa-Gavras, 1982) a father, Ed, undertakes an investigation into the 
mysterious disappearance of his son, Charlie, in a Latin American country, following 




describes the scene (Charlie’s girlfriend translates), Ed looks over and from a point-
of-view shot from Ed’s perspective, without a cut, the scene the neighbour describes 
emerges, presenting Ed’s visualisation of the scene she describes.  When, in Ryan’s 
Daughter, Charles follows his wife’s footsteps in the sand and imagines her tryst with 
her lover — this is an act of detection, an effort to reconstruct the past based upon 
present evidence. 
 
In Shadow of a Doubt, when Charlie discovers that the initials engraved on the ring 
Uncle Charlie gave her are the same as those of the murdered widow, extradiegetic 
images of ballroom dancing appear in a superimposition, and the ‘Merry Widow’ 
plays on the nondiegetic score.  The superimposed images are symbolic of Uncle 
Charlie murdering the rich widows.  In their first appearance, when Charlie insisted 
on keeping the ring despite its engraving, these images were superimposed upon 
images of Uncle Charlie in the present, apparently signifying an act of recollection.  
Now the same images are superimposed over images of Charlie, and represent her 
realisation that Uncle Charlie is a murderer.  Given the presence of the music, we 
might also surmise that here Charlie makes a connection between this discovery and 
Uncle Charlie’s fixation with the ‘Merry Widow’ waltz.  (Later, when her mother 
hums the waltz, Charlie implores her to stop.)  In Hitchcock’s extra-diegetic use of 
‘The Merry Widow’ it seems that the waltz represents an act of imagination which 
contributes to our understanding that the character — first Uncle Charlie and then 
Charlie — is remembering; imagination signifies memory.  Charlie, too, is a 
detective.  Uncle Charlie’s strange behaviour presents her with a series of clues — his 
limp upon alighting the train, the ring, the newspaper house, the ‘Blue 




chains of association: the initials of the dead widow — the ring — the ‘Merry 
Widow’. 
 
Stage Fright opens with a sequence which is ultimately revealed as a false flashback, 
as Johnny explains to Eve that he is on the run: Charlotte arrives at his house 
distressed with a blood-stained dress, explaining that she has killed her husband; but 
she has to perform that night and needs a dress for her performance.  Johnny goes to 
her house, and while he retrieves the dress, the maid discovers the body and screams.  
As Johnny flees, the maid catches a glimpse of him.  Having returned with the dress 
and sent Charlotte off for her performance, Johnny, now alone, reflects, and we see 
images of his imagination.  Over his face in the present appear a series of 
superimpositions, after each of which his expression becomes increasingly agitated: 
Johnny leaves Charlotte’s house and the maid rushes to the banister to see him flee; 
the maid tells the police what she saw; the police open the phonebook (to search for 
Johnny).  The series of imaginings ends as the police arrive to apprehend him.  Here 
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Excluding Stage Fright, which represents something of an anomaly in Hitchcock’s 
oeuvre, Hitchcock’s hero is an innocent man, implicated in a crime he did not 
commit; in order to prove his innocence and unravel the sinister plot in which he finds 
himself bound, he must think like a detective.  But there are still other detectives 
whose search is entirely internal.  In Wild Strawberries, Isak reconstructs an imagined 
past in order to come to terms with the path his life has taken.  While there is certainly 
an element of nostalgia in his imaginings, there is also a palpable sense of lost time.  
(At the end of the first imagined past his voiceover explains, ‘A feeling of emptiness 
overwhelmed me.  A feeling of sadness’).  Isak knows that his cousin Sara — his 
life’s lost love — found him excessively pious and instead preferred his ‘awfully 
naughty and thrilling’ brother Sigfrid.  He appreciates that around this time there must 
have been a flirtation — Sigfrid advanced, Sara acquiesced.  Returning to the house of 
his childhood summers engenders the re-enactment of these scenes.  Most striking 
here is the august endurance of the past.  Isak is obsessed with the past; he cannot 
relinquish the thought of the happiness he might have shared with Sara.  With all the 
years that have passed, he still recalls, re-imagines, laments the events of fifty years 
before.   In contrast to the pragmatic imagination of the professional detective, Isak’s 
imaginings have no immediate use value; rather, they offer catharsis. 
 
In Spider, the hero relives past scenes in an attempt to come to terms with his 
involvement in his mother’s murder.  As noted above, the adult Spider physically 
appears within these scenes, often watching closely (and remembering) the utterances 
and actions of his younger self.  But he also appears in several scenes at which the 
young Spider is — hence was — absent.  These latter scenes are imaginings, 




scenes Spider obsessively documents what is said.  He, too, is a detective, excavating, 
re-imagining the past; ultimately his obsessive detective work is revealed to be the 
confused investigation of a deeply disturbed man. 
 
Guilty conscience 
But at what point does the pragmatic imagining of the detective become an obsession?  
In The Conversation Harry prides himself on his professionalism in recording 
conversations for corporate contracts.  Harry claims to be interested only in the 
quality of the recording, but in fact he becomes obsessed by a desire to discover what 
the conversation is about and whether any harm will come to the two interlocutors as 
a result of his work.  In the past, Harry’s work has resulted in the deaths of three 
people in a political scandal.  He is haunted by guilt and fears that this might happen 
again.  The more of the conversation he manages to render, the more certainly Harry 
will know whether violence will result from his work.  While he would like to 
envisage himself as a professional wire-tapper who respects a religious ethical code, 
he is aware of (and tormented by) the fact that such a notion is inherently 
contradictory.  When Harry forms visual images of the young couple while on a 
subway train, this is evidence of his growing obsession with the recording.  Though, 
professionally, Harry is a detective of sorts, his real motivation is personal.  The 
driving force behind his detective work is his burden of religious guilt.   
 
Often, in Hitchcock, mental images convey a guilty conscience.  In Blackmail (1929), 
on her way home after stabbing the artist to death, Alice seizes on objects of her 
perception which remind her of the murder: a flashing neon image of a cocktail being 




continues her walk home, flash-inserts present her memory of the dead man’s arm; 
she passes a beggar and the position of his body reminds her of the dead man.   
 
In each case here — for the professional detectives, for Hitchcock’s innocent men 
who become detectives, for the introspective subjects, as well as for those like Harry 
Caul with a guilty conscience — it is the past to which we return, which is re-
imagined, reconstructed or reconstituted.  Far less common are representations of an 
imagined future.  
 
Anticipation 
La guerre est finie constitutes a tour de force in representations of imagination.  The 
film presents a few stress-filled days in the life of Diego, a Spanish revolutionary 
working for the overthrow of Franco.  Diego remembers, imagines, speculates, 
hypothesises, and, what is most unique to this film, he anticipates the future.  Such 
representations of an imagined or anticipated future seem to correspond to what Philip 
di Franco calls ‘future imperfect time, wherein events are rendered as visual 
fulfilments of imagined ideas in the mind of a character.’
211
 The status of many of the 
inserts in the film is equivocal.  Do they represent Diego’s remembrance of recent 
events which were previously elided, events prior to the first plotted event, his 
anticipation of events to come, events we will not see, events we will subsequently 
see but which occur differently to how he imagines they might?  Are the numerous 
inserts which seem to represent Diego’s anticipation of his crucial meeting with his 
revolutionary comrades to be understood as the mental images of his imagination or 
as autonomous flash-forwards?  Might we understand these inserts to signify that 
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Diego anticipates the meeting, while presenting actual images from the meeting which 
are not and necessarily cannot be identical with the images of his imagination?   
 
Several times Diego forms mental images during conversation.  Near the beginning, 
he tells the bookshop owner’s wife Marie about how, when he was questioned by the 
police, he had to speak on the phone to Nadine Sallanches, the daughter of the man he 
was impersonating.   
‘Do you know her?’ asks Marie.    
‘No,’ Diego explains.  ‘I don’t know any of them.  I know all about 
them, but I don’t know any of them.’  
In quick succession, appear images of three different women walking in the street, 
and while Marie resumes conversation, the three women, in successive shots, each 
make the same entrance into a café.  It seems these inserts represent Diego’s 
imagining of what Nadine Sallanches might look like.  (Later, when he is on the train, 
again an insert presents shots of a series of young women, in rapid succession — 
turning a corner, descending a staircase, walking along a street; the third woman turns 
into the Sallanches’ address at 7 Rue de L’estrapade.  Over these silent inserts, the 
unrelated conversation of the couple opposite Diego in the dining car of the present 
continues, this audiovisual asynchrony effectively conveying the simultaneity of his 
experience of — visual — imagination and — acoustic — sensory impressions of the 
present.  Later still, when Diego leaves Ramon’s house, a brief inserted sequence 
presents a zoom in on Marie, and then of the Sallanches’ address, immediately after 





As they descend the stairs to open up the bookshop, Jude says to Diego, ‘Antoine 
must be at the station.’  With this appear three rapid inserts of Antoine at the station.  
In each successive shot he turns as the camera approaches him, as though these are 
imaginary point-of-view shots from Diego’s perspective.  When Diego meets Antoine 
at the station and finds that there is no news of Juan’s arrival and that Juan would 
have gone through Perpignan in any case, he has a presentiment that Juan may have 
been arrested: an insert presents Juan turning as two men approach him from behind.  
Diego asks Antoine if he knows who handles the crossings at Perpignan, and an insert 
presents Diego rushing and boarding a train as it departs.  In the present Diego 
enquires at the desk about a ticket to Perpignan.  He rushes past commuters through 
the subway and boards the train just as it is departing.  The earlier insert, then, was a 
flash-forward.  The insert is autonomous inasmuch as it presents the future events that 
it anticipates exactly as they will occur.  On the other hand, the fact that the insert 
appears when it does seems to signify an act of imagination.  While speaking with 
Antoine, Diego anticipates that he will shortly catch the train.  In place of the mental 
images of his imagination, the film breaks chronological sequence by presenting him 
actually catching the train; soon after this Diego does catch the train, and the images 
of the insert reappear in their proper place in the chronological succession. 
 
After seeking out a contact at an apartment block only to discover he has the wrong 
address, Diego waits for the elevator and we cut back and forth between the elevator 
lights and images of his imagination.  His internal monologue explains and 




is assaulted (Perhaps Juan did go, and he’ll walk into the trap);
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 a man smiles as he 
approaches (Diego) (Roberto.  You must find Roberto now); a swift track in on a 
middle-aged woman with an anxious expression (She’ll wonder what’s wrong.  She’ll 
realise something’s happened to her husband.)  Diego alights from a street car.  The 
internal monologue establishes that he is going to visit the wife of Andres, a 
revolutionary who has gone missing; he would rather not see her now, but only she 
can lead him to Roberto.  As he ascends in the elevator again an insert presents the 
middle-aged woman, bearing an expression of acute anxiety.  When he arrives at the 
apartment, we see that the occupier, Carmen, is the woman whose dread Diego has 
anticipated since alighting the streetcar.  As he had imagined, upon learning that 
something is wrong, she is distraught. 
 
Diego’s mental images evidence parallel and separate patterns of thought, which 
juxtapose the various women in his life and his work in the liberation movement.  
Alone in his apartment, he recalls his earlier conversation with Marie.  Explaining to 
her that Nadine Sallanches had not blown his cover when the police telephoned her 
and he impersonated her father, Diego remarked that he had a ‘lucky star’.  Speaking 
aloud in the present — ‘A tiny little star for personal use ... A starfish for every 
purpose’ — he recalls an image of Marie.  A few moments later he forms an image of 
his wife, Marianne, which does not seem to revive any specific previous perception.  
Soon after this, Diego retrieves a secret message from a tube of cream.  Unravelling 
the message, he anticipates an important meeting with his comrades.  He then speaks 
aloud, recalling his earlier tryst with Nadine — ‘My name is “Nana.  And mine is 
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“Sunday”’ — reclines on his bed with a book, and again imagines Marianne, lying in 
bed, apparently in thought, a tear in her eye.  A few moments later Marianne returns 
and they make love.  In the post-coital scene, Diego again anticipates his forthcoming 
meeting with his comrades.   
 
Any generalisation which would identify all of the inserts in the film which anticipate 
the future as either representations of the mental images of Diego’s imagination or as 
autonomous flash-forwards would be an oversimplification.  In many cases, the 
phenomenological status of the images is impossible to determine.  Towards the end 
of the film, however, there is an interesting case which can unequivocally be 
identified as a representation of the mental images of Diego’s imagination.  After 
informing Diego that he is to go to Barcelona to meet Juan after all, Marianne 
suggests they go to the cinema.  An insert appears of a man putting a suitcase in a 
locker.  Like many of the previous inserts, upon first viewing it is impossible to tell 
whether this is a representation of the mental images of Diego’s imagination or an 
autonomous flash-forward (the presence of which nevertheless indicates that Diego 
simultaneously forms mental images in which he anticipates putting the suitcase in a 
locker, but that these images are not identical with the flash-forward insert presented).  
As they prepare to leave, Diego announces that on their way he will leave his suitcase 
in a locker at the station.  When at the station we see Marianne — and not Diego — 
put the suitcase in a locker, we understand that the earlier insert, which presented a 
man (presumably Diego) putting the suitcase in the locker, was not an objective flash-





The difference between the representation of the imaginative experience of Diego and 
that of countless other characters in cinema, whose mental processes are essentially 
no different, is that Resnais presents Diego’s thoughts.  The result is a film which is 
stylistically unconventional, which is sometimes disorienting, in which it is not 
always clear precisely what the phenomenological status of a given insert is, but 
which constitutes a significant advance in filmic representations of imagination.  
While La guerre est finie proffers a sustained effort to represent the imagined futures 
of mental subjectivity, we find rare isolated instances of depictions of an imagined 
future in classical cinema in two of Hitchcock’s films. 
 
In Sabotage (1936) two men discuss sabotage operations in an aquarium.  Having 
been ordered to plant a bomb at Piccadilly Circus, Verloc stands before an enormous 
fish-tank, and, as he gazes at it, the tank dissolves into an image of Piccadilly Circus, 
which then deliquesces.  Verloc’s imagining of the devastation for which he will be 
responsible, should he fulfil his orders, complicates his character.  This is, then, an 
expression of guilty conscience which precedes the criminal act itself.  In Suspicion 
Lina’s mental images take the form of a premonition.  Whilst playing scrabble she 
begins to suspect — prompted by Beaky’s suggestion that if he had an ‘ER’ he could 
turn ‘MURDER’ into ‘MURDERER’ — that her husband Johnny may at that very 
moment be arranging with his friend a meeting at which he will murder him.  She 
focuses on the photograph of the proposed location for Johnny’s property 
development plan; with Lina’s face superimposed, the photograph then becomes the 
actual cliff-top and Lina imagines Johnny pushing Beaky from the cliff.  In 
conversation with Johnny (present) Beaky laughs, and this diegetic laugh morphs into 




not murder him the next morning, but Beaky does subsequently die on a trip to France 
with Johnny.  In fact the film never decisively reveals whether or not Lina’s 
suspicions are well-founded.  Either her mental images are a dreadful premonition of 
a fatal act of violence (which is subsequently realised when Beaky does eventually 
die), or this is a hysterical episode (Lina has good reason to be suspicious of Johnny 
— she has proof of his dishonesty, he has gambled her money — but it does not 
follow from this that he is a murderer).   
  
Several of the examples discussed here — Alice’s momentary hallucination in 
Blackmail, Harry Caul’s growing obsession with the couple whose conversation he 
has recorded in The Conversation, Mr Clegg’s obsessive documenting of utterances in 
an imaginary past in Spider — indicate a deeper tendency which we believe to be 
highly significant, and which, as we have already indicated, will inform much of our 
discussion henceforth: namely, that many representations of imagination are related to 
themes of madness.  Present to some extent in many of the states or conditions in 
which representations of imagination are experienced, often by quite sane characters, 
are traces of madness: imagined voices (often a manifestation of paranoia), waking 
fantasies, dreams, drug-induced hallucinations, genuine hallucinations, psychic 
visions, belief in the supernatural — each of these mental states can, it may be argued, 
in some sense be considered a manifestation of madness.  We will subsequently 
pursue further our hypothesis about the relation between representations of mental 
images and themes of madness in cinema in a taxonomy of the major forms of 






Chapter 4. Imagined voices 
Imagined voices are as much mental images as are visual images, though they 
represent semantic rather than visual thought.  I remind the reader that excerpts of 
internal monologue and imagined voices are presented in italic font to distinguish 
these passages from actual utterances spoken aloud (dialogue) or remembrances of 
such utterances (recalled voices).   
 
Internal monologue 
As a narrational device, voiceover is similar to the narrational ‘voice’ passages in a 
novel.  But in this form the device is invariably limited to the use of the past tense, 
and is thus distinct from the experience of mental images in the present.  Thus I 
distinguish this traditional ‘voiceover’ from ‘internal monologue’ — often referred to 
as ‘stream-of-consciousness voiceover’ — which presents thought as it is experienced 
in the present moment, and which seems to derive less from the narrational voice of 
the novel than from the theatrical soliloquy. 
 
Formal aspects - Second-person narration and temporal disjunction 
In La Guerre est finie, Diego’s internal monologue is presented in the second person 
‘you’ form, and seems to be spoken not in the voice of Diego, but comes from an 
anonymous voice which addresses him directly, but which at the same time represents 
his consciousness.  Here the grammatical distancing of Diego’s inner thoughts 
functions as a permanent expression of his internalisation of the emotional 
detachment and military organisation which certain of his comrades in the liberation 
movement exhibit more profoundly.  This is particularly evident when he visits 




yet you need her.  She’s the one who can take you to Roberto.  Upon learning that her 
husband is missing, Carmen is devastated; Diego thinks, But you must wrest her from 
her grief, her solitude.  She knows where to find Roberto. 
 
Diego’s benevolence and compassion have alienated him from some of his comrades, 
particularly Roberto.  Inwardly, Diego describes his comrades as, desiccated, tireless, 
worn-out men, fastidious about detail but less clear about the larger picture, ready to 
die.  This last complaint satirises and is in sharp contradistinction to Roberto’s 
previous insistence that news of arrests in Madrid may have been exaggerated: ‘[in 
Spain] They’re too close to things to see the situation clearly ... We [in Paris] have a 
broader perspective.’  This theme of the details and the big picture is satirised again 
when, at the conclusion of his meeting with his comrades, the chief addresses Diego 
privately, and the soundtrack substitutes his thoughts for his words (his thoughts, as 
we shall see, apparently identical with the words he utters aloud): Perhaps the details 
of a partial reality have blinded you.  The dozens of tiny, true little details have 
clouded your vision.  You’ll take a break.  
 
The crucial meeting with his revolutionary colleagues provides an exhibition of 
internal monologue.  As Diego opens the meeting with an exposition of the situation 
with the arrests in Madrid, the sound of his voice recedes and internal monologue 
reveals his thoughts: he is tired and disillusioned with the liberationist movement and 
with the cold pragmatism of his comrades.  The fact that Diego’s thoughts are here 
presented simultaneous with his verbal address distinguishes this case from the others 
we shall come to look at.  We said that internal monologue constitutes a 




conversation — while our interlocutor speaks, or during the pauses and interstices of 
our own discourse — we form semantic mental images, rehearsing how we might 
respond to our interlocutor’s point, or repeating what our interlocutor has said.  But to 
address a group of people in this way while following an entirely separate current of 
thought seems quite impossible.  Thus, here, Diego’s internal monologue reveals itself 
as temporally detached from the unfolding scene. 
 
After Diego’s opening exposition, the chief of the underground network says, ‘Carlos 
[Diego] has given us a completely subjective view of the situation.’  Diegetic sound 
then recedes and the soundtrack presents the internal thoughts of the chief, which 
echo the words he has just spoken, Carlos has given us a completely subjective view 
of the situation.  Unlike Diego’s thoughts, which reveal a subjective state of 
disillusion which runs counter to the verbal address we imagine he delivers, the 
chief’s thoughts apparently correspond approximately with what we imagine, and 
what it seems, he says.  His thoughts conclude with a characterisation of Diego’s 
position: Carlos advises that they should consider the ‘realities of the situation’.  But 
what does “realities of the situation” really mean?  That we should allow the political 
situation to come to a head on its own?  That’s mere opportunism, pure and simple! 
Diego’s rejoinder — ‘I never said we should just let things develop spontaneously’ — 
confirms this identity between the chief’s verbal discourse and his inner thoughts.   
 
While in the previous exchange the thoughts of the speaker were presented 
simultaneously with his verbal address, now, as Diego speaks, the soundtrack presents 
the chief’s thoughts: You never said we should just let things develop spontaneously.  




that these thoughts are apparently experienced while Diego is speaking suggests that 
the chief is not properly listening to him.  And, as the following passage of 
conversation demonstrates, the chief’s thoughts — apparently quite unrelated to 
whatever it is (we do not know because we do not hear) Diego is saying — anticipate 
what he himself will say next.  This passage of the chief’s thoughts concludes, Lenin 
voiced criticisms of a general strike insofar as it tends to preclude other forms of 
struggle; and as Diego concludes whatever he was saying, the chief proceeds to 
reference Lenin.  Now, while the chief speaks, we hear Diego’s thoughts: If you wish 
to discuss Lenin, then we’ll discuss Lenin.  And, as did those of the chief, Diego’s 
thoughts anticipate his next comments.  His thoughts conclude with: Your criticism is 
purely negative.  What are you really proposing?; then, translating his criticism of the 
chief into a neutral grammatical form, he says aloud, ‘Criticism is always negative at 
first.’   
 
In his dialogue with the chief there are moments when Diego’s inner thoughts seem to 
be temporally detached from the unfolding scenes, as though the scenes had already 
happened, the internal voice offering a retrospective subjective commentary.  
Moments later, when such a relationship will enhance the dramatic effect of an 
exchange, internal monologue once more seems to represent thought as experienced 
in the present.  Deviations between what a character seems to be saying and what we 
hear him thinking expose subtle psychological contrasts between the interlocutors: the 
chief seems to say almost exactly what he thinks, while there is a subtle process of 






Multiple internal monologues 
Ordinarily internal monologue is exclusively limited to the central protagonist, but 
occasionally a film presents the thoughts of several characters, just as in a novel the 
narrational voice may provide access to the thoughts of several different characters.  
Annie Hall features an interesting case of internal monologue which marks the 
beginning of Alvy and Annie’s relationship.  Alvy and Annie speak on the roof of her 
building, and each interlocutor’s inner thoughts are presented in subtitles as a 
counterpoint to their actual conversation.  As Annie says that she would like to enrol 
on a photography course, Alvy thinks, I wonder what she looks like naked.  Alvy then 
talks about how photography is a relatively new art form and so a ‘set of aesthetic 
criteria have not yet emerged’.  While Annie continues the conversation, her inner 
thoughts — I’m not smart enough for him.  Hang in there — reveal that she is slightly 
intimidated by the intellectual current of his conversation.  There are not here two 
conversations, one actual, the other virtual, but one conversation, and two separate 
internal monologues.   
 
In Der Himmel Über Berlin (Wings of Desire) (Wim Wenders, 1987) we hear the 
inner thoughts of many different characters.  Usually internal monologue has two 
functions: on the one hand, it enables the imagining subject to articulate thoughts to 
herself; at the same time, it grants the spectator access to these thoughts.  The internal 
monologues in Der Himmel Über Berlin have a third aspect in that they are justified 
as imaginary utterances by the presence of the angels, who, as it were, overhear the 
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Comedy and fatalism in Tirez sur le pianiste 
A French New Wave film, Tirez sur le pianiste, combines tropes of various genres 
and is characterised by sharp contrasts between the tribulations of its protagonists and 
light-hearted self-reflexive authorial flourishes.  Charlie’s internal monologue is 
sometimes a source of humour, but also conveys his philosophical fatalism.  As in the 
above scene from Annie Hall, the early examples of internal monologue in Tirez sur 
le pianist manifest the limitations of individual subjectivity in a romantic situation, 
the void of doubt and uncertainty that pervades a courtship (What is a woman 
thinking?  What relation is there between what she is thinking and her external 
conduct?   How must I appear to her?) When walking home Léna, a waitress at the bar 
at which he is pianist, Charlie twice goes to take her hand, but she evades him.  Then 
he goes to put his arm around her waist but changes his mind.  His inner thoughts 
confirm his tentative indecision: She’ll wonder why you don’t speak.  Say 
something...anything.  Hiding from the men who were following them, Charlie and 
Léna finally make physical contact.  Having lost them, as they resume their walk, 
Charlie thinks, She felt me near.  She didn’t mind, or she’d have moved away.  So 
she’s willing...for what? As they walk, the camera moves in on him so that she is out 
of shot.  Charlie continues to procrastinate, rehearsing what he might say, Invite her 
for a drink.  Gain time.  Make it sound casual.  “Come for a drink?”  No, that won’t 
do, be nicer.  “Léna, I bet you’re thirsty.  So am I” He turns and asks, ‘Like a drink?’, 
but she has gone.  His attention dominated by Léna while she is in his presence, 
Charlie now instantly dismisses her from his thoughts and considers the relative 
merits of various jazz pianists: Think of something else.  Is Art Tatum talented?  Or 
Erroll Garner?  Yes, Garner’s talented.  Junie Manse?  You don’t know anything 




Charlie’s arm.  She took your arm, just like that.  She’s taking you to her place.  
Following Léna upstairs to her apartment, Charlie thinks, Don’t look at her legs.  But 
I must look down, or I’ll stumble.   
 
Upon entering Léna’s apartment Charlie sees the poster of Edouard Saroyan and a 
flashback ensues, which, as we have seen, is initiated by Léna’s narration, but which 
unfolds from Charlie’s perspective, and which presents an exposition of his former 
life as a concert pianist.  Edouard’s internal monologue intervenes at the crucial 
moment in the flashback.  Theresa confesses that she slept with Schemeel, who in 
return advanced Edouard’s career.  She imagined she could forget it, but can’t: ‘What 
you did yesterday is part of you today ... I don’t want you to touch me.  Don’t touch 
this dirt!’  Edouard thinks, Yes, look at her, go to her, kneel while there’s time.  If you 
go now she’ll be alone.  You mustn’t, but he walks away nonetheless.  Moments later 
Theresa kills herself, and we understand the extent of Charlie’s guilt.  
 
In the present, Charlie and Léna go to the bar and Léna confronts their boss, Plyne, 
angry that he gave the gangsters their addresses.  While they argue, Charlie turns 
away and thinks: 
 
Plyne’s a bastard, but she’s tough on him.  He wants her, but there’s nothing 
doing.  Even now he can’t take his eyes off her.  She’s piling it on, but what 
can I say?  That Plyne’s not so bad, he just wanted to be somebody?  That’s it; 
you don’t want to tell her.  It’s not your business.  Just take your place at the 





Though he knows Plyne betrayed him and Léna, Charlie sympathises with him.  Still, 
this sympathy is overridden by a fatalistic sense of apathy.  But when Plyne is about 
to assault her, Charlie intervenes and a fight ensues.  Charlie’s philosophical 
sympathy for Plyne makes the fact that he now kills him in a fight sadly ironic.  Apart 
from being the source of some humour in his courting of Léna, Charlie’s internal 
monologue gives expression to his resignation, his fatalism, his emotional 
detachment.  In a general way this might be interpreted as a symptom of the popular 
influence of the contemporary existential thought of Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert 
Camus. 
 
Transgression of codes 
Unscrupulousness 
In Quicksand (Irving Pichel, 1950), Dan steals $20 from the till of the garage where 
he works in order to take Vera on a date.  At this significant moment, internal 
monologue presents his thoughts: Nobody checks my cash except this once-a-week 
bookkeeper, and he doesn’t come around till Thursday.  I could put it back before 
Thursday; I could put it back tomorrow, as soon as I get that twenty bucks from Buzz.  
Thus, Dan is not a career criminal, but is unscrupulous enough to take the first steps 
on what the film ultimately presents as being an extremely steep and slippery slope.  
When he notices the book-keeper returning unexpectedly, Dan is distressed: What’s 
he doing here two days at a time? ’He finds out I’m short, he’ll tell the old man.  The 
old man’s mean enough to send a guy to jail just for laughs.  I gotta get twenty bucks 
in a hurry.  After mugging a man in a car park, Dan spots his ex-girlfriend Helen and 
seizes the opportunity to join her in order to appear less conspicuous.  This 




longer interested in her romantically.  As they walk along the pier Dan’s effort to 
appear calm is juxtaposed against the exhilarated relief his inner thoughts express: My 
knees were really shaking back there.  I thought the cops’d bust outta that alley any 
minute.  But then Dan’s relief gives way to selfish thoughts.  Recalling Vera, he 
immediately forgets Helen:  Yeah but...now I’m in the clear, with heavy dough in my 
pocket.  I can pay off that jewellery store and have enough left over to show Vera the 
biggest time she ever had.  Vera!...I’ve got a date with her tonight!   
 
Here the presentation of Dan’s thoughts enables us to judge him.  He was foolish and 
unscrupulous, but despite his crimes, his selfishness and his callous treatment of 
Helen, he is not ultimately a malevolent character.  He is an ordinary man who makes 
a series of stupid mistakes, and his problems escalate beyond his control.  He is 
attracted to the glamorous Vera (who turns out to be more materialistic, self-centred 
and callous than he is, and who ultimately betrays him), whom he prefers to Helen 
(who, despite Dan’s rejection, remains loyal to him throughout); he tries to take short-
cuts, therefore he must be punished, and his ordeal — being pursued by the police, 
going on the run — is this punishment.  But, as his inner thoughts establish, he is not 
fundamentally malevolent and thus when he meets the lawyer at the end and repents 
his crimes, when he finally appreciates the qualities of the loyal and devoted Helen, 
he is granted reprieve.   
 
Religion, race, violence, and fire in Mean Streets 
In Quicksand, though Dan eventually reforms himself, the presentation of his internal 
thoughts is limited to the expression of his fall from righteousness.  By contrast, in 




culturally specific milieu of crime which has its own ethical code.  Charlie knows the 
limitations of this code, but, because of a vague sense of religious obligation — his 
efforts to help Johnny — and because of the natural direction of his desire — his 
attraction to Diane — he feels the repressive constraints of this code, which he 
ultimately transgresses.  While in Quicksand, Dan’s internal monologue marks his 
temptation to deviate from a moral code which the audience recognise and accept as 
their own, here Charlie’s thoughts reveal the tension produced by the conflict of his 
will with the limitations of the codes — religious, cultural, racial, familial — which 
constrain him, codes which are specific to the Italian-American criminal underworld 
depicted, but which much of the audience does not share.   
 
At the start of the film, as he stands alone in church, Charlie’s inner thoughts establish 
his complicated relationship with his Roman Catholic heritage.  He cannot identify 
with the popular ritualistic understanding of faith.  Standing before a statue of Jesus, 
Charlie asks, What do you say, eh?  That it’s all bullshit except the pain, right?  The 
pain of hell, the burn from a lighted match increased a million times.  With this, he 
touches the flame of a candle, as if to sample the infinite power of God.  Later, in 
Tony’s club, Charlie tries to hold his fingers in the flame of a lighted match.   
‘You’re crazy!’ his friend says, 
‘Priest taught me that,’ Charlie replies.   
The opening scene established that Charlie’s fascination with fire signifies his vague 
sense of religious awe, but this is not all.  Immediately after this exchange in the club, 





You know something?  She is really good looking.  I gotta say that again: She 
is really good looking.  But she’s black.  Now you can see that real plain, 
right?  Well, there’s not much of a difference anyway, is there?  Well, is there? 
 
In the Italian-American milieu that the film presents, such an interracial attraction is 
fiercely prohibited.  Charlie’s fascination with fire thus becomes symbolic also of his 
prohibited attraction to Diane.   He subsequently arranges a date with her on the 
pretext that he wants her to work as a hostess in a restaurant.  When the time to meet 
her arrives, Charlie instructs the driver not to stop, but to ‘drive by real slow’, and he 
thinks, Are you crazy?  That’s all I need now is to get caught in the village with a 
melanzana.
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Charlie’s inner thoughts also concern his relationship with Johnny.   Near the 
beginning of the film, Michael expresses his concern about Johnny’s debt and about 
Charlie’s association with him.  Charlie assures him that Johnny will pay.  When 
Johnny subsequently arrives and checks his trousers in at the cloakroom, Charlie is 
alarmed by his exhibitionism: All right, ok, thanks a lot, Lord, thanks a lot for 
opening my eyes. Charlie rationalises his efforts to help Johnny through recourse to 
his idiosyncratic understanding of religious ethics.  ‘Who’s gonna help him if I 
don’t?’ he asks Teresa.  ‘That’s what’s the matter.  Nobody, nobody ... nobody tries 
anymore ... Tries to ... to help people, that’s all ... Saint Francis of Assisi had it all 
down.’ Later, in the restaurant, Charlie’s uncle warns him about Johnny, advising, 
‘Honourable men go with honourable men.’  Shortly after this, in the restaurant 
kitchen, Charlie is immediately drawn to the flame of the fire.  He grimaces as he 
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holds his hand in the flame and his thought — Fire — encapsulates his sense of the 
august forces of religion.  Charlie’s obsession with fire is now also metonymically 
associated with his relationship with Johnny (which is literally dangerous — he could 
get physically hurt).  Charlie’s inner thoughts thus establish Scorsese’s principal 
obsessions: religion, race, violence. 
 
Amour fou 
Laura’s internal monologue in Brief Encounter is provocative even today.  Sitting 
silently with her sewing while her husband Fred contentedly completes his crossword, 
she addresses her internal thoughts to him, recounting the story of her romantic affair 
with her lover, Alec, and the film unfolds in a series of flashbacks.  The scandal is in 
the juxtaposition.  On the surface, we have a cosy domestic scene, but Laura’s internal 
monologue desecrates this image.  The presentation of her internal thoughts profanes 
her husband and her marriage, and renders the scene excruciating.  Laura’s calm 
demeanour in the present, Fred’s apparent ignorance of her affair and inner thoughts, 
Laura’s apparent lack of any genuine shame or repentance — the combination of 
these elements render some moments in the film unbearably cruel, but the key to it all 
is Laura’s internal monologue, by which the entire narrative becomes her imaginary 
confession to Fred. 
 
When he invites her back to his friend’s flat and Laura declines, Alec says, ‘I’m going 
back to the flat,’ and Laura returns to the train station.  But while she is waiting, the 
soundtrack presents an interesting subjective sequence in which Laura’s internal 
monologue alternates with her memory (recalled voices) of Alec’s words: I really 




going back to the flat — I’m going home.  This sequence effectively conveys a 
juxtaposition of conflicting desires: desire and amour fou oppose duty, decency, 
honour and propriety; in Freud’s terms, libido battles with repression.  Like Max in 
Videodrome, Laurel in In a Lonely Place, and Adela in Passage to India, Laura is 
attracted to a proscribed object of desire.  Her affair with Alec is prohibited, since she 
is married.  Here again, internal monologue presents the thoughts of an unscrupulous 
character, but like Dan in Quicksand, Laura is not an entirely malevolent character.  
She has fallen madly in love, and broken one of society’s fundamental prohibitions.  
To identify with Laura is to be implicated in her transgression.  (Perhaps the vicarious 
thrill of adultery by proxy accounts for the enduring popularity and effectiveness of 
this film.)   
 
In each of these three films, internal monologue is associated with transgression, the 
breaking of prohibitions, and in each case the code of rules and expectations is 
different.  In the following discussion we will consider films in which there is a 
manifest link between internal monologue and themes of madness. 
 
Internal monologue and madness 
Past trauma 
In Hiroshima mon amour, after sharing with the Japanese the story of her tragic affair 
with a German officer and subsequent ignominy and confinement, the woman returns 
to her hotel room and, looking in the mirror, she talks to herself and her utterances are 





One thinks one knows, but one never does — Her first love, in Nevers, was 
German.  We shall go to Bavaria, my love, and we will wed.  She never went 
to Bavaria.  Let those who never went to Bavaria dare talk to her of love — 
You were not quite dead.  I told our story.  I betrayed you tonight with that 
stranger.  I told our story.  It could be told, you see — Not for fourteen years 
had I experienced an impossible love.  Not since Nevers — See how I forget 
you, see how I have forgotten you.  Look at me.  
 
She is obsessed by the past, which she must confront and come to terms with if she is 
to become well.  Her memories of Nevers are complicated.  On the one hand, she 
explains, ‘I grew up in Nevers.  I learned to read in Nevers.  And it was there that I 
was twenty years old.’  She fondly describes the Loire to the Japanese, and it is clear 
that she cherishes memories of the landscape of Nevers.  On the other hand, it was in 
Nevers that she was socially ostracised and confined in a cellar after the death of her 
lover.   
 
The man senses that her experience in Nevers has scarred her, and encourages her to 
share this experience with him, in order that she might overcome it; in short, he 
assumes the role of therapist, and she that of patient.  When she confirms that she 
hasn’t told the story to anyone else, not even her husband, they embrace, and the 
cathartic value of the process is explicit.  Subsequently, in her hotel room, slightly 
drunk, she inevitably regrets being so loquacious with a stranger.   In her inner 
thoughts she addresses her dead lover directly, I betrayed you ... see how I’ve 
forgotten you!  Scarred by her past experience, the woman’s conversation with the 




psychological obstacle.  But, given the strength of feeling, it is only natural that later 
she should regret it.  Thus afterwards, alone, internal monologue intervenes to chasten 
her; it is a residual symptom of her bondage to the past, which she will now surely 
begin to overcome. 
 
Paranoia 
In Stranger on the Third Floor, Ward’s inner thoughts reveal his escalating paranoia, 
which is fuelled by his increasing sense of guilt that Briggs, the man whom he helped 
to convict, may have been innocent.  On his way home from the trial he returns to the 
empty courtroom and recalls Briggs’s earnest protestations of innocence as he was 
condemned: ‘I didn’t do it, I didn’t!’ But Ward immediately banishes these doubts: 
What’s the matter with me?  He did, ’course he did.  But then he recalls his fiancée 
Jane’s caution: ‘Suppose, for just one minute, that he’s telling the truth.’ Ward 
reflects: 
 
I wonder if she’s right.  After all, I didn’t see Briggs actually kill Nick.  And 
the rest of the evidence was circumstantial, too.  So what?  That doesn’t make 
it less reliable.  If the courts had to have an eye witness for everything, nobody 
would ever be convicted.  Sometimes they do get the wrong man.  Why did he 
have to have a criminal record?  Now they’ll have to give him the chair.  He’ll 
die and...I’ll never know for sure. 
 
Soon afterwards, after chasing a strange man from his building, Ward notices that his 





He must be awake.  Maybe he heard that man in the hall.  Why’s he so quiet?  
I can’t hear a sound.  Is there...is there something wrong with him?  That man 
— maybe he did something to him...Maybe he killed him.  What’s the matter 
with me?  I’m acting like an old woman.   
 
Ward anxiously reasons that if Maine is dead, he might be implicated, and he recalls 
several past incidents which would support such an allegation.  He becomes 
convinced of this, but then reasons that he is getting carried away: Poor Jane.  They’ll 
drag her into it.  But Maine isn’t dead!  What’s the matter with me?  I’m just tired.  I 
can’t think straight anymore.  If I could only drive it out of my mind. 
 
Ward’s paranoia is precipitated by his growing sense of guilt for his part in the 
conviction of Briggs, who turns out to be innocent.  His inner thoughts reflect this 
paranoia, but the growing sense of guilt which drives his paranoia is entirely 
justifiable and rational.   
 
Megalomania 
In Shock Corridor (Samuel Fuller, 1963), journalist Johnny Barrett gets admitted to a 
mental hospital in order to investigate a murder, but during the course of his 
investigation, he himself becomes insane.  The presentation of his internal thoughts 
charts his passage into insanity.  But signs of Johnny’s imperiousness and ambition 
are present from the outset in his internal monologue.  In the opening scene he 
rehearses a mock interview with Dr Fong in preparation for his actual psychiatric 
assessment.  Dr Fong breaks off when Johnny asks, ‘Do you think I’m a fetishist?’, 




Doc Fong.  Professionally he knows he’s playing with dynamite, but ... It appears here 
from Dr Fong’s reaction — ‘Hell no, Johnny’ — that they have rehearsed the 
conversation before, and that Johnny has been instructed not to introduce psychiatric 
terminology.  But Johnny has grown impatient.  Thus from the outset his excessive 
ambition and arrogance are in evidence.  In the opening scene his girlfriend, Cathy, 
cautions him, ‘You’re on a hopped-up show-off stage.  Get off it!’  When, having 
been admitted to the psychiatric hospital, Johnny is interviewed by Dr Cristo, his 
inner thoughts reveal his derision of the process: Who am I? — Dr Cristo, Clinical 
Director, Head of the medical staff for seven years.  Married, two children.  Hobby: 
golf — Don’t you know? — Now it’s time to ask me about voices. 
 
Walking the hospital corridors, Johnny’s inner thoughts again confirm his 
megalomaniacal motivation: Ever since my voice changed I’ve wanted to be in the 
company of the newspaper greats.  And this long corridor is the magic highway to the 
Pulitzer Prize.  When he asks the inmate Pagliacci about Sloane’s death, Pagliacci 
initially seems to completely disregard Johnny’s question — ‘I took my time killing 
my wife’ — but then continues, ‘Did you know that a man named Sloane, a patient 
here, was killed with a knife in the kitchen?’  Johnny’s internal response to this — He 
remembered Sloane’s murderer.  They do have flashes of sanity! — demonstrates that 
he is concerned with the patients only to the extent that they can assist him in his 
investigation.  Johnny’s callous selfishness is in evidence again when, after his 
frustrated efforts to obtain information from Stuart, he inwardly laments how close he 
came, only to be frustrated at last by his interlocutor’s insanity: If only Stuart had held 





From the outset there are signs that Johnny has a latent personality disorder.  But if 
there is a turning point, after which he manifests signs of insanity, it is when he first 
receives electric convulsive therapy.  Subsequent to this, when Dr Cristo questions 
him, Johnny evidences symptoms of sensory-motor deficiency, manifested in 
temporary intermittent aphasia: What’s the matter with me?  Why can’t I talk?  This 
aphasia subsequently becomes a source of humour when he questions Boden, an 
insane, Noble Prize-winning, American physicist, who draws Johnny’s portrait as 
they speak.  Boden’s quite rational conversation about his disillusionment with Cold 
War nuclear physics is juxtaposed with Johnny’s inner thoughts, in which he 
desperately repeats the question which now obsesses him: 
 
I got fed up with man taking a daily hammer and sickle coated pill of venom... 
— If I keep saying it over and over and over in my mind, the words will have 
to jump out of my mouth! “Who killed Sloane in the kitchen?” — ... I’m a pure 
scientist ... — Who killed Sloane in the kitchen? — ... Let the Russians claim 
bigger satellites.   
 
Beyond its comic value, this juxtaposition marks the change Johnny has undergone.  
On the basis of this exchange alone, it is not Boden, but Johnny who appears insane.  
His entire purpose in life is now distilled to this question — ‘Who killed Sloane in the 
kitchen?’ — which, powerless to articulate it, he obsessively repeats in his 
imagination, regardless of what his interlocutor says; Johnny’s excessive ambition 
now manifests itself in an irrational obsession.  When he finally manages to articulate 
the question, Boden quite matter-of-factly answers, ‘Wilks.’  His mission finally 




the pad.  When the attendants restrain him, Johnny rants about the attendant Wilks 
killing Sloane.  After a further period of sedation and isolation, Dr Cristo asks him, 
‘Who killed Sloane?’   
But Johnny can no longer remember the killer’s name.  Allowed to walk the 
hospital corridors once more, Johnny’s inner thoughts express his turmoil, He handed 
the story to me right on a platter, right on a platter.  He gave me the name … Why 
can’t I think of the name?  Name!  I can’t remember the name of the killer! Here there 
is a manifest link between Johnny’s inner thoughts and themes of madness.  During 
his tenure in the asylum Johnny becomes insane.  But even before his internment, 
internal monologue reveals his nascent arrogance and over-ambition, a pre-disposition 
to madness which Cathy had apprehended from the beginning. 
 
Schizophrenia 
In Snake Pit (Anatole Litvak, 1948), the madness of Virginia Cunningham is 
established in the opening scene.  Sitting on a bench in the grounds of an asylum, she 
conducts an imaginary conversation with a doctor who is not there.  The conversation 
is punctuated by the insertion of her internal thoughts.  The voice of the imaginary 
doctor is male and comes from offscreen:  
‘Do you know where you are, Mrs Cunningham?’ 
Where is he? she thinks.  As if he were crouching behind me...Why am I afraid 
to look at him? 
‘You know, don’t you, Mrs Cunningham?’ 
‘In New York, of course.  I used to live in Evanston, Illinois, that’s where I 
was born.  It’s right near Chicago.’ 




‘Very well, thank you.’ 
Who is he?  And why all these questions, as if he were testing me? 
‘Do you hear voices?’ 
‘You think I’m deaf?  Of course, I hear yours.’ 
It’s hard to keep on being civil when they ask you such naive questions.   
Next to her, instead of a doctor she sees another female patient.  He’s clever, she 
thinks, but he can’t fool me with his magic. It’s an old trick, changing into a girl.  
When her husband, Robert, visits her and she doubts whether it is him, her internal 
voice becomes split and there is a dialogue.   
‘Robert!’ she exclaims upon seeing him.   
It looks like him, she thinks, but I must be careful.   
Then another voice cautions, Watch your step, honey.  Everything counts 
against you.  This voice appears to be the imagined voice of an elder patient 
she has met in the asylum.   
Virginia thinks, Of course it’s not him.   
Robert says, ‘Hello.’   
It even sounds like him, she thinks. 
They can do a good job when they want to, the additional voice intervenes.   
In Snake Pit internal monologue establishes that Virginia is insane from the outset.   
Her internal monologue then appears regularly throughout the film, giving expression 
to her inner experience of various events: when, unfamiliar with her surroundings, she 
enters the asylum and likens it to a prison; when she is about to receive electro-
convulsive therapy; when she is interviewed by a panel of doctors to determine 






In Psycho (Alfred Hitchcock, 1960), having murdered his mother and her lover, 
Norman Bates sustains the illusion that mother is still alive by incorporating her 
personality into his own.  In the final scene, Norman has finally become mother.  
When a policeman brings him a blanket, from offscreen, we hear mother say ‘Thank 
you.’  Cut to Norman alone in his cell and, as the camera slowly moves in, the 
soundtrack chillingly parades Norman’s madness, presenting an internal monologue 
spoken in the voice of mother.  Formally, then, amongst all of the examples of 
internal monologue that we have examined, this one is unique.  Internal monologue is 
the inner voice of the imagining subject, spoken in the first-person form — due to 
these factors it is perhaps the most penetrating insight cinema can grant into the 
subjectivity of a character.  This is as true of the final scene of Psycho as of any other 
instance of internal monologue, only here, the juxtaposition between body (Norman) 





From this brief survey, it is clear that internal monologue often gives expression to the 
thoughts of characters who are in a state of distress or at a point of crisis.  Thus, again, 
it seems we find here traces of madness in otherwise sane characters.  But of the 
voices which may be present in imagination, one’s own voice (internal monologue) is 
but one.   
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The imagining of imaginary utterances in voices other than one’s own must, in a 
phenomenological sense, be distinguished from recalled voices, which are 
recollections of actual past utterances.   
 
Pragmatism/Reasoning/Speculating 
Imagined voices sometimes perform a pragmatic function, enabling the imagining 
subject to reach a decision.  In the famous sequence of Marion driving the car in 
Psycho, the imagined conversations serve pragmatic ends, enabling Marion to think 
through the consequences of her action; but finally, there is a hint of malicious fantasy 
as she almost smiles, imagining Mr Cassidy’s reaction upon learning that she has 
stolen his money. 
 
Anxiety 
The three flashbacks in A Letter to Three Wives are prompted by the imaginings of the 
three women, each of whom becomes anxious that it may be her husband who has 
eloped with Adi Ross, and it is the imagined voice of Adi which expresses these 
doubts and initiates the flashbacks: (Is it Brad?  Is it Brad?  Is it Brad?; Why didn’t 
George go fishing?; Maybe you haven’t got everything that you wanted after all ...).  
A voice without a body, Adi ultimately functions as an enigmatic signifier of the three 
women’s jealous anxiety at the thought of their partners’ infidelity.  
 
Guilty conscience 
As with various other forms of mental images which we have thus far discussed, 




than one internal voice frequently gives expression to an internal conflict of desires 
and motives.  In Kipps (Carol Reed, 1941) the hero, engaged to another, has a tryst 
with his boyhood sweetheart, following which he conducts an internal dialogue with a 
voice of conscience.  The internal dialogue presents an internal subjective conflict: the 
whispered voice of conscience speaks in a refined accent, and represents Kipps’s 
newly acquired pretention and sense of duty (he has inherited a large sum of money 
and has been advised by various friends and relatives to conduct himself accordingly), 
his ambition to improve himself culturally, to become a gentleman; while the voice 
which protests innocence and attempts to justify his conduct is Kipps’s genuine voice, 
the working-class cockney accent of the draper’s shop-man. 
 
Madness and imagined voices 
Telepathy 
As with the visions of the psychic, the imagined voices of the telepath are 
distinguished from those we have considered thus far in that they have a privileged 
relation to reality; they represent the actual thoughts of characters.
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 In Scanners 
(David Cronenberg, 1980), Cameron involuntarily ‘scans’ the thoughts of the people 
in his immediate physical environment.  Dr Ruth teaches him to utilise his ability so 
that he does not merely passively receive unwanted information, but is able to 
manipulate the thoughts and actions of others.  However, Cameron initially 
experiences his ability as an unwelcome menace.  In one scene Ruth conducts an 
experiment, in which Cameron is strapped to a bed while people file into the room 
and sit down.  As the first few people enter, the soundtrack presents their thoughts, 
                                                 
216
 Like psychic visions, one might question whether or not the imagined voices of the telepath can be 
classed ‘imagination’, since the imagining subject is actually able to read other people’s thoughts (not 
merely what he imagines these thoughts might be).  But it seems to us that this does not alter their 





but as more and more people enter, while no one actually speaks, the voices 
cumulatively mesh to become a blather of continuous multiple indistinguishable 
speech-acts, eventually causing Cameron to convulse in an episode of fitting. 
 
Though an image such as this, of a man fitting uncontrollably because of imagined 
voices, seems to represent madness, the imagined voices of telepaths such as Cameron 
are rationalised within the verisimilitudinal context of science-fiction.  By contrast, in 
genres with a more naturalistic aesthetic, we find imagined voices which are 
genuinely imaginary, spontaneous auditory hallucinations, which are unquestionable 
manifestations of madness. 
 
Auditory hallucination 
In Shock Corridor, when Johnny is having his portrait sketched by Boden, the insane 
Noble Prize-winning American physicist, an announcement comes over the hospital 
public address system, calling ‘Dr Hawthorn’.  The announcement is repeated several 
times, and each time, Boden is distracted, but after listening curiously for a moment, 
resumes his sketch.  But then he imagines several successive voices summoning him 
over the P.A. system: Dr Boden wanted at the Pentagon — Dr Boden wanted at 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration — Dr Boden wanted at 
Newfoundland.   
 
From the above discussion it is apparent that the experience of imagining voices is 
common to all sorts of characters, and this is, we believe, evidence of continuity 
rather than a radical distinction between states of relative sanity and insanity.  




imagine voices.  A manifestation of madness?  Perhaps not, though had she not found 
herself in such a situation, she would probably not have experienced such images.  
But then other more banal images will take their place, one might object.  No doubt.  
But cinema tends not to represent such banal thoughts.  More often we are party to the 
thoughts of characters who are in some kind of trouble.  Distress, danger and anxiety 
engender mental images in sane characters.  Extreme situations give rise to mental 
images, and these images can thus be understood as traces of madness.  The extent to 
which one is able to control the articulations of imagination is a measure of sanity.  
But a stagnant imagination, completely lacking in freedom, is redundant.  One must 
allow imagination to wander, allow one’s thoughts to be carried by it to some extent if 
it is to operate effectively, enabling the imagining subject to anticipate the 
consequences of her actions, make decisions, and adjust her behaviour accordingly.  
But, accepting the tendency of imagination to assume such licence, we must also 
recognise that the imagining subject nevertheless remains ‘in control’, in that she may 
abruptly terminate her imagining at any point should the exigencies of her physical 
environment require her to act.  But the extent to which imagination remains within 
the control of the imagining subject is surely determined to some extent by the 
vicissitudes of her specific situation.  In a given set of circumstances, anxiety, 
paranoia even, may be a rational response.  Thus the specific demands of a situation 
may impose an abnormal rate of imaginative activity upon — and hence reveal traces 
of madness in — a subject who would otherwise be considered sane.  Thus the mad 
subject suffers from abnormal or excessive functions of an instrument which the sane 
person shares with her: namely, imagination.  Over the next three chapters we explore 




Chapter 5. Fantasy 
The phenomenology of daydreaming 
In his critique of Alain’s theory of the image in Imagination: A Psychological 
Critique, Sartre makes some important points about the status of the image and the 
subject’s awareness of it.  According to Sartre, the basis of Alain’s theory is 
judgement.  Alain ‘viewed imagination as belief in a false object’, thus as judgement 
Alain’s image ‘involves in its very nature an assertion of existence’.
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 The imaginary 
world is therefore a world of deception: ‘Imagination appears as a succession of 
momentary little dreams followed by rude awakenings [...] Either one is in the 
imaginative act, and we perceive falsely.  Or else we wake up’.
218
 This is fine, Sartre 
says, for conscious perceptions and dreams, but what about fantasy? 
 
A man who goes off into a dream tells himself stories which he does not 
believe, yet which are something other than mere abstract judgements.  Here is 
a kind of assertion, a type of existence midway between the false assertions of 
dreams and the certitudes of waking life, a type of existence which is evidently 
that of imaginary creations.  To make judgemental acts of these is to attribute 




Having thus identified the fundamental weakness of Alain’s theory, Sartre goes on to 
state his own position: 
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When I evoke the image of my friend Peter [...] Peter appears to me […] in 
image.  Doubtless I must shift to reflection to formulate the judgement, ‘I have 
an image of Peter,’ directing my attention not to the object of the image but to 
the image itself as a psychic reality.  But this shift to reflection in no way 
alters the positional quality of the image.  I do not wake up, I do not right 
myself, I do not suddenly discover that I formed an image.  Quite the contrary, 
the moment I make the assertion, ‘I have an image of Peter’, I realise that I 
knew all along it was an image.  Only I knew it in a different fashion, for this 




Unlike the dreamer, the imagining subject is able to make a reflective judgement, so 
that he knows he is imagining.  As Roland Barthes explains in declaring his 





Fantasy in L’Education sentimentale 
Cinema’s fantasy sequences have antecedents in literature.  In L’Education 
sentimentale, Gustav Flaubert’s chiselled style lends many of his descriptions of 
imagination a realism of psychic temporality — that is, he manages to convey 
something of the reality of the temporal experience of imagination.  If we consider 
that, amongst the earliest film theorists, Hugo Münsterberg championed cinema, 
arguing its superiority over existing art forms — particularly theatre — on the basis of 
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film’s capacity to depict mental subjectivity,
222
 if we consider, that is, that from the 
beginning, cinema, by force of its specific technological form, represented something 
of a zenith-point in the effort to convey mental subjectivity (of which imagination is a 
significant element), then we can understand Flaubert’s depictions of imagination as 
anticipating the matter-of-fact movement into fantasy in the cinema of, for instance, 
Fellini or Oshima. 
 
There are two significant grammatical aspects by which Frédéric’s acts of imagination 
are distinguished from cinematic depictions of imagination.  Firstly, written in the 
past tense, the novel describes Frédéric’s imaginings as past events.  Narrative 
cinema, by contrast, seems to unfold in a historical-present — it presents putative past 
events as though they were occurring in the present.  Thus, filmic representations of 
imagination have an immediacy which is lacking in Flaubert’s descriptions.  
Secondly, written in the third-person form, Frédéric’s acts of imagination are 
therefore also presented at this remove.  By contrast, depictions of imagination are 
one aspect in which cinema often momentarily assumes a first-person mode of 
narration.  Nevertheless, the brevity, the terseness of Flaubert’s articulation of some 
of Frédéric’s acts of imagination, cannot but remind one of cinematic depictions of 
imagination in certain modern auteurs.  For instance, when he chats on the terrace 
with M. Dambreuse about his career: 
 
Was he thinking of asking him to be an associate in any of his own 
undertakings? 
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The young man saw, as by a lightning flash, an enormous fortune 
coming into his hands. 




Or, when alone, Frédéric prepares himself psychologically for a duel with Cissy, his 
thoughts become increasingly sombre, and he is resolved to die: 
 
‘ ... Yes, I shall be killed.’ 
And, suddenly, he saw his mother, in a black dress; incoherent images 




In this last, we have a morbid thought presented in the present tense, as in internal 
monologue.  There follows a visual mental image which realises this morbid thought; 
and finally, a description of Frédéric’s reflection on his cowardice.  Depictions as 
terse as this resemble unheralded flashes of imagination in modern cinema, as, for 
instance, when Guido fantasises about executing his script-advisor in 8 ½, or when 
Wakizaka hallucinates twice in quick succession, imagining he sees Shoko, in 




In classical cinema, transition into fantasy is often preceded by a zoom in on the 
imagining subject, a nondiegetic music cue and a formal flourish such as a dissolve.   
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Fantasy circuit and modern cinema 
Modern cinema frequently shuns such a legible signalling, entering fantasy via a 
simple cut, so that often one only registers the transition after the fact.  In Mulholland 
Drive (David Lynch, 2001), soon after waking from her long sleep, Diane experiences 
a brief waking fantasy.  She turns to her left, and an expression of glorious relief 
comes over her as she sees Camilla (who in the dream was Rita), wearing a red dress, 
smiling at her: ‘You’ve come back!’ Diane says joyfully.  But a look of horror then 
descends over her features.  When we then cut to Diane looking more calm and 
pensive, it is clear that this is the present and that the exchange with Camilla was 
imaginary.
225
 Not only is the transition into imagination here completely unheralded, 
but Lynch compounds confusion by making the Diane of the fantasy virtually 
indistinguishable from the Diane of the present (dishevelled, wearing her dressing 
gown).   
 
While disruptions of the signifying chain through the omission of the opening 
parenthetic shot can create confusion (we momentarily mistake imagination for 
reality), the implications of the partial or complete omission of the closing parenthesis 
are less significant.  Where the resolving shot is partially omitted, upon returning to 
the present we find that there has been a temporal ellipse, the duration of which is 
indeterminable, but remains within logical parameters.  Where the closing parenthesis 
is completely omitted, we pass directly from the fantasy to a new present which is 
different from that which was the point of departure, the fantasy sequence thus acting 
as a transition, as in 8 ½.  In both cases, the imaginative act is deprived of the 
intensity of a tangible relation to the temporality of the present.   
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In Belle de jour, after her humiliating meeting with Husson in the brothel, clearly 
distraught that she has been discovered, the camera moves in toward Séverine from 
behind.  A fantasy sequence emerges, in which Pierre defeats Husson in a duel in the 
woods.  When we return to the present, Séverine exits her room and Madame Anaïs 
asks, ‘Has he gone already?’  Here, though the point of the fantasy’s return is roughly 
consistent with its point of departure, since neither the opening nor the closing 
parentheses of the circuit show Séverine’s face, the fantasy appears at a remove from 
her consciousness; the fact of Séverine’s experience of the fantasy is notably de-
emphasised.  The looser the circuit bracketing, the more removed are the mental 
images from the imagining subject, the more autonomous the sequence becomes. 
 
In some cases, despite the omission of the opening parenthetic shot, the sequence is 
immediately recognisable as fantasy.  In the first scene of The King of Comedy 
(Martin Scorsese, 1982), Rupert Pupkin shields talk show host, Jerry Langford, from a 
mob of enthusiasts, and in the confusion manages to gain entrance to his limousine.  
Rupert is bleeding, and so Jerry offers him his handkerchief.  As they drive, Rupert 
pitches some of his awful stand-up act to Jerry, who is unimpressed, and politely 
advises him to contact his assistant.  When they arrive at the hotel and Jerry finally 
escapes him, Rupert looks at the blood-stained handkerchief with Jerry’s initials on it.  
Cut to a new scene in which, over lunch, Jerry begs Rupert to take over his show for 
six weeks.  Though there is no explicit formal coding to mark the passage into 
fantasy, the sequence is nevertheless immediately recognisable as such purely from 
the extent to which it contradicts the narrative situation hitherto established.  (At this 




the fantasy, its point of departure, as Rupert standing outside the hotel staring at 
Jerry’s handkerchief.)  As Jerry persists in his request, Rupert becomes increasingly 
melodramatic in his refusal.  When we then cut to the reality of the situation, in which 
Rupert, now quite animated, is alone in his bedroom, rehearsing an imaginary 
conversation with Jerry, we understand that this new present is the ground from which 
the fantasy is elaborated.  Between Rupert looking at Jerry’s handkerchief and this 
new present, there is a temporal ellipse.  Here then, it is the omission of the opening 
parenthesis rather than the closing parenthesis of the circuit which enables the fantasy 
to constitute a bridge between separate presents.  As the fantasy continues, we pass 
back and forth between Rupert alone in the present and the fantasy scene in the 
restaurant.  Scorsese’s presentation of this scene differs from typical representations 
of fantasy, since here Rupert does not merely imagine the scene, but actually 
rehearses it.  Having omitted the opening parenthesis of the circuit, in order to 
establish that the scene is not simply imagined but rehearsed, Scorsese reveals the 
situation in the present.  Once this has been established, the effect of the continued 
intercutting between the fantasy and reality is comic, emphasising the disparity 
between Rupert’s real life and the utopia of his fantasy. 
   
Asynchrony 
It is uncommon for a fantasy to consist purely of sound, but occasionally the 
imaginative element is solely image.  For instance, in A Clockwork Orange (Stanley 
Kubrick, 1971) Alex listens to his favourite music, Beethoven’s ‘Ninth Symphony’.  
While his voiceover describes the rapture the music induces in him, we see images of 
his imagination: a girl being hung, natural disasters.  Thus Alex’s mental images are 




present.  But this sequence seems to differ from the examples of ‘asynchrony’ we 
examined in Part I, in that here the present does not only present the sensory 
impressions experienced simultaneous with imagination, but here (music) engenders 
and at each moment perpetuates the simultaneous (visual) mental images. 
 
Simultaneous co-existent orders 
In Kipps, present and fantasy world are presented simultaneously within the same 
shot.  At his woodwork class Kipps gazes longingly at his teacher Miss Walshingham.  
The fantasy commences with an objective shot: while Kipps remains static, another 
version of himself, a hologram-like limpid figure, emerges from his body.  We then 
cut to a subjective imaginary point-of-view shot, as Kipps watches his irreal self 
approach the teacher.  As the irreal Kipps speaks to Miss Walshingham we cut back 
and forth between the fantasy and shots of the imagining Kipps of the present.  The 
irreal Kipps declares his love for Miss Walshingham, but she remains oblivious to his 
presence — because they each exist in distinct orders.  The irreal Kipps is about to 
leave, when the fantasy reaches a turning-point: a reciprocal irreal hologram-like Miss 
Walshingham emerges from the real Miss Walshingham and calls (the irreal) Kipps 
back.  Particularly interesting here is the fact that the fantasy world does not entirely 
overwhelm the present.  Throughout the fantasy we regularly return to the present in 
the shots of (the real) Kipps watching (imagining) the progress of his fantasy.  But 
apart from this intercutting, in the first half of the fantasy, when the irreal Kipps 
declares his love for the real Miss Walshingham of the present and she remains 
oblivious to his presence, we have a co-existence of the real (Miss Walshingham) and 
the irreal (imaginary Kipps) within the same shot.  Kipps’s perception of the oblivious 




point-of-view shots which combine perception and imagination.  In representations 





Contingencies of the present 
We will see in Chapters 6 and 7 that the exigencies of the imagining subject’s 
situation and physical environment can find means of expression in hallucinations 
and, in distorted form, in dreams.  This is also true of some fantasies.  Some aspect of 
the physical environment of the present becomes incorporated into the fantasy.   
 
While the majority of fantasies are triggered by a spark in the present, as they 
develop, most fantasies — though they may be peopled by those in the imagining 
subject’s life, and give expression to her obsessions — constitute, and are defined as 
such by, a definite severance from the present situation.  By contrast, there are others 
which emerge from and are developed through present perception, but which are 
distinguished from misperceptions and hallucinations inasmuch as they are 
deliberately willed psychological deceptions.  In Natural Born Killers, Mallory’s 
fantasy of Mickey at the petrol station is parasitic upon the petrol pump attendant, 
whom she imagines is Mickey.  She knows that the man filling up her car is a 
stranger, yet she knowingly and deliberately imagines that he is Mickey in order to 
become aroused. 
 
We have already seen that, in Subida al cielo, Oliverio is tormented by the 
solicitations of loose woman, Raquel, on the bus en route to Patalan, where he plans 
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to hire a lawyer so that his dying mother can make a will.  From the outset Oliverio 
nobly rejects her advances, but Raquel persists and his resistance weakens.  She 
dangles before him a stringy children’s toy and then offers him a bite of her apple.  
Oliverio takes a bite and regards her sensually.  As he faces forward, chewing the 
apple, an erotic fantasy sequence emerges.  Of all the fantasies we discuss in this 
chapter, this one, with its various surreal elements, most resembles a dream.  Several 
aspects of the situation in the present find expression in the fantasy.  When he ends 
his embrace with Raquel, the string which Oliverio finds dangling from his mouth is 
that which Raquel had just a few moments earlier dangled before him in the present.  
He follows this string and it leads him to his mother, who is seated on a plinth.  This 
symbolism establishes associations between sex and death, and anticipates the fact 
that Oliverio’s desire for Raquel will become associated with his mother’s death, 
when he learns that he ‘just missed’ his mother, after submitting to Raquel’s 
temptation.  Also, the presence of the animals in the fantasy — the herd of goats that 
interrupt Oliverio and Raquel’s embrace, the man carrying a sheep over his shoulders 
— is explained when we return to the present where Oliverio fondles a sheep which is 
sitting on his lap. 
 
Having discussed some formal aspects, we will now consider the functions of filmic 




Of course the prime function of fantasy is wish-fulfilment, but some waking fantasies 




from a present situation.  In La guerre est finie, Diego arrives home carrying the 
suitcase he is looking after for the young revolutionary, Nadine, to find his wife 
Marianne and her friends working.  Upon entering, particularly nervous and furtive 
because uncertain of the contents of the suitcase and because he fears Nadine may 
have inadvertently led the police to him, he encounters a woman he does not 
recognise.  The previous evening Diego became impatient with the inquisitive probing 
questions of Marianne’s colleague, Agnès.  Now, as he enters the room, Agnès is 
retrieving some papers from a bookcase.  Immediately she remarks that his suitcase 
looks heavy, and jokingly asks what is in it.  Diego asks who the woman he passed in 
the hall was.  ‘Lola,’ Marianne explains.  As Diego enters his room, the photographer 
Bill accosts him, saying, ‘I wanted to say, about last night – Well, if I can ever be of 
help.  A photographer gets around, you know.  That’s all.  I’m sure Agnès must be 
mad with curiosity.’  The allusion to the scene of the previous evening, the 
mentioning of Agnès’s curiosity, though no doubt quite innocent, are nevertheless 
equivocal, and the insert of mental images, which soon follows, reveals how Bill’s 
words, the presence of a stranger — Lola — in his home, and his lingering unease 
with Agnès, prompt Diego to compose momentary paranoid scenarios.  Now alone, he 
carefully opens Nadine’s suitcase and finds that it contains explosives.  Her 
colleagues now departed, Marianne forwards a message to Diego: he is to meet Juan 
in Barcelona after all.  A rapid succession of inserts follows: Agnès appears from 
beneath the bed and carefully opens the suitcase.  In the present, Diego asks, ‘He 
didn’t say why I’m going?’ while the mental images continue with a shot of Lola 
getting the suitcase from a top shelf.  Here then, Diego’s existing suspicion of Agnès 
combines with his nervous attitude (caused by the suitcase, the police and Nadine) 




unwelcome questions, Bill’s equivocal comment).  Though it is extravagant, this 
nightmarish imaginary scenario involving Agnès is a reasonable product of the 
circumspection necessary for a man in Diego’s position: in their first meeting Agnès 
asked awkward questions; when he enters the room trembling with nerves, she 
immediately draws attention to the contents of his suitcase; Bill then mentions 
Agnès’s ‘curiosity’.  On the other hand, the image of Lola demonstrates how, from a 
mesh of impressions of the recent and immediate past, Diego composes a confused 
imaginary scenario, a symptom of paranoia.  He does not mistake what he sees, but 
extrapolates from these recent memories an alternative, exaggerated nightmarish 
scenario, in which the protagonists exchange roles.  In the present, Diego sees Agnès 
reach for the top shelf to retrieve a file, but he imagines Lola in an identical attitude, 
retrieving not a file, but his suitcase.  Diego has no grounds to suspect Lola of 
anything; his suspicion of Agnès is here displaced to Lola, simply because he was 
alarmed to encounter her, a stranger, upon returning to his house in this anxious state.  
 
Wish-fulfilment 
As we have said, the majority of fantasies are wish-fulfilling, but of course the content 
of a wish-fulfilling fantasy depends on the specific personality traits, obsessions and 
desires of the individual imagining subject.  By far the most common form of wish-




We saw in our discussion of asynchronous representations of imagination (Chapter 3) 




soundtrack presents his mental images of the music which would issue were he to 
actually play it.  The Jewish pianist spends much time on the run, in hiding from the 
Nazis, reliant on the benevolence of others for sanctuary.  When he finds himself 
before a piano it is clear that there is no question of him playing it, since this may 
draw unwanted attention.  The function of fantasy here is to indulge an impossible 
pleasure.  The pianist manages, by the power of imagination alone, to temporarily or 
partially placate, to momentarily escape, the anxiety and nausea of his situation.  
Here, mental images function as a temporary antidote to and an escape from the 
exigencies of an impossible reality.   
 
Redemption 
In Merry Christmas Mr. Lawrence, we learn through a flashback that Jack is plagued 
by guilt over an incident from his adolescence, when he allowed his brother to be 
publicly humiliated by his school peers in an initiation rite.  The brother was a 
talented singer; the other boys stripped him to his waist and ordered him to sing.  
After this he never sang again.  Subsequent to this flashback anecdote, the new 
General at the prisoner-of-war camp buries Jack up to his neck as punishment for 
creating disorder.  At night, the camera moves in towards Jack’s head and we enter a 
fantasy sequence in which Jack is reconciled with his younger brother, whom he 
encounters in the garden of their childhood.  Most interesting here is that Jack appears 
in his military uniform, a grown man, while his brother remains a child, the same age 
he was in the flashback.  It is as though, as a consequence of the burden of his guilt, 






 Jack apologises, but his brother seems unconcerned; then, significantly, he 
sings.  Thus this imaginary exchange appears to offer Jack — now dying, helpless to 
effect any such actual reconciliation — the only form of catharsis, the only reprieve 
from guilt he will realise: an imaginary one. 
 
Serenity 
We saw in Chapter 2 how at the point of death characters sometimes replay 
significant episodes from their past.  The moment of death can also engender wish-
fulfilling fantasy scenes.  In Carlito’s Way (Brian De Palma, 1993), Carlito’s 
objective throughout is to earn the money he needs to start up a business in the 
Bahamas and escape his life as a gangster.  At the end of the film, just as he is about 
to catch the train to the airport, he is shot in a revenge attack.  As he is stretchered 
across the train platform, the soundtrack presents his thoughts in a calm and 
philosophical internal monologue.  He is sure that Gale will make a good mother.  He 
accepts that he is dying and will not realise his dream.  Then the ‘Escape to Paradise’ 
travel advertisement placard, which clearly symbolises his dream of escaping the 
criminal world, comes alive: the woman whose silhouette appears against the 
reflection of the setting sun on the tropical sea is Gale, dancing on the beach to the 
(unheard) music of three musicians.  Over these images Carlito thinks, Can’t come 
with me on this trip though.  Gettin’ the shakes now, last call for drinks, bar’s closin’ 
down.  Sun’s up.  Where we go for breakfast?  Thus these mental images seem to 
offer Carlito catharsis.  They represent a utopian vision of the dream which he can no 
longer realise; at the same time they seem to represent a vision of the afterlife.  
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Imagination here condenses Carlito’s lament for a lost dream and his calm acceptance 
of death in a utopian image which tempers the tragic dénouement. 
 
Avarice 
We find an early fantasy sequence in Greed (Erich von Stroheim, 1925).  The dentist, 
McTeague, marries Trina, but soon finds that she is obsessed with accumulating and 
hoarding money.  In one scene Trina informs McTeague that his mother has written 
requesting $50.  She remarks, ‘I wonder if Mommer thinks we’re millionaires ... Fifty 
dollars is fifty dollars.’  McTeague reminds Trina that she has five thousand dollars.  
As he goes to sleep, Trina sneaks over to his bedside, takes money from his coat 
pocket, and puts it away in her drawer.  An intertitle, which seems to represent Trina’s 
thoughts rather than words spoken aloud, explains: ‘If Mommer really needs the 
money so badly ... she’ll write again.’  Cut back to Trina stroking her hands 
avariciously.  An iris-close fixes momentarily on her hands, before a fantasy image 
emerges, of a pair of emaciated arms, hands fetishistically handling piles of gold.  The 
fact that the arms are so unhealthily thin suggests that Trina will happily allow her 
physical health to degenerate for the sake of hoarding more money.  Later, when 
McTeague loses his job, Trina empties his pockets of his last wages and impatiently 
sends him out to seek work.  McTeague requests money for the streetcar because he 
has far to go and it is going to rain, but Trina refuses.  He sets off into the rain, while 
Trina remains indoors and a fantasy emerges, presenting two pairs of hands retrieving 
gold treasure.  A subsequent intertitle explains of Trina: ‘Gold was her master ... a 
passion with her, a mania, a veritable mental disease.’  While Trina is miserly and 






In The King of Comedy, convinced that he is a gifted comedian, Rupert Pupkin 
desperately craves the fame which he feels his talent merits.  He resolves to enter 
show business at the top, certain that Jerry Langford will offer him a big break.  After 
delivering a demo recording to Jerry’s assistant, Miss Long, Rupert fantasises, 
concocting an idealised anticipation of his meeting with Jerry.  Jerry has listened to 
the tape and he praises Rupert effusively.  He invites Rupert to his house for the 
weekend to work on some material, and assures him that he can bring his girlfriend 
along.  On the basis of this imaginary conversation, Rupert invites his friend Rita to 
Jerry’s for the weekend.  Upon arriving, Rupert behaves as though he really were 
Jerry’s friend, as if his imaginary conversation with Jerry had actually taken place.   
 
Subsequently, while he awaits Miss Long in the reception area, Rupert imagines that 
he is a guest on Jerry’s show.  His old high school principal, George Kapp, appears as 
a mystery guest, and announces that he will marry Rupert and Rita live on television.  
But he first embarks on a monologue, which evidences the idiosyncrasies of Rupert’s 
imaginative life.  Not content with his televised wedding to Rita, Rupert’s fantasy 
demands that Kapp first deliver a formal apology on behalf of his high school for their 
failure to recognise his talent.  Kapp then assures viewers that Rupert and Rita will be 
married after the advertisement, and we return to the present as Miss Long arrives and 
politely advises Rupert to work on his act in New York’s comedy clubs. 
 
The content of Rupert’s fantasies, and their juxtaposition with the events of the 
present, functions to ironically emphasise the gulf between the facts of his reality and 




we cannot extrapolate hypotheses about the role of fantasy in criminal psychology.  
Nevertheless, in the film fantasy is hugely significant.  Rupert’s imaginary life is so 
powerful that it comes to determine his behaviour in the real world.  The film does not 
concern itself with the question of Rupert’s mental health status.  In fact, the 
denouement, in which, having been released from prison after three years, the 
irrepressible Rupert promotes his best-selling autobiography, suggests that his drastic 
action was not necessarily entirely irrational.  Desperate for fame, he kidnaps a talk-
show host in order to secure a ten minute television slot for his stand-up routine; his 
act is broadcast.  Though his routine is terrible, Rupert nevertheless attains fame, 




In 8 ½, Guido finds himself in an awkward situation when his mistress Carla appears 
while he is at breakfast with his wife, Luisa.  Guido escapes this impossible scene by 
conjuring a fantasy.  Carla suddenly bursts into song; Luisa introduces herself to her 
husband’s mistress and, without the slightest hint of malice, compliments her on her 
voice.  (The governing logic of the fantasy is: ‘if only my wife and mistress could get 
along like this …’)  This sequence engenders Guido’s large-scale misogynist fantasy 
of a harem peopled by all the women of his life, past and present.  Luisa appears, 
attired as his mother was in his childhood.
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 Guido’s position in the fantasy (centre-
of-attention in a society of women), in referencing the previous flashback in which the 
young Guido and his siblings were bathed, expresses a regressive desire to return to 
the blissful plenitude of childhood, a time during which the women in his life seemed 
                                                 
228






to exist purely in order to service and comfort him.  Clearly such a scenario lies 
outrageously outside the realm of the possible.  In her article, ‘Fantasy, Imagination, 
and Film’, Kathleen Stock writes: 
 
Fantasising is aimed, not at actual truth, nor at possible truth, but at being a 
substitute for states of affairs that would gratify.  To that end, there is no 
penalty, in terms of the fantasy’s guiding aim, if it represents states of affairs 




But the fact that Guido’s fantasy is misogynist does not make him a misogynist.  Later 
Stock writes, 
 
the content of a fantasy about S is at least negatively responsive to what the 
fantasist would find pleasurable with respect to S’s occurrence, so that his 
fantasy is isolated from inferential transactions with those beliefs which would 
entail or imply something about S which would inhibit a pleasurable response, 
were it the case…an agent’s fantasies about S tend to be isolated from 




Thus Guido’s harem fantasy is divorced from, or excludes, the knowledge that in 
reality such a situation would be morally objectionable.  Subsequently, Stock 
introduces the hypothetical fantasist John, who has a fantasy about having sexual 
intercourse with a woman by force.  Her description of John’s treatment of the 
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morally objectionable aspect of his fantasy is instructive in our understanding of 
Guido’s fantasy: 
 
John seeks, in his fantasy, to objectually imagine the occurrence of what he 
desires in a way that somehow prevents reflection upon its morally 
objectionable aspect.  He is unlikely to be able to do so by straightforwardly 
removing from the fantasy those determinate aspects he finds morally wrong; 
for these are likely to be the very same aspects he finds exciting and 
pleasurable…instead, he imaginatively treats the determinates of what he 
desires as either: (A) immune from moral determinables (e.g. wrong, harmful) 
which he would ordinarily think of as justifiably applied to them; or (B) 
presented in combination with other moral determinables (e.g. neutral, 





Guido’s utopian fantasy is threatened when an ageing actress complains about being 
banished upstairs because she is too old.  Guido’s unshakeable resolve in the face of 
her appeal precipitates insurrection, before he restores order with his whip, this 
wielding of authority clearly expressive of his desire to control things as director.  
Conti and McCormach interpret Fellini’s film in terms of Jungian psychology.
232
 
They rightly observe that Guido is at a point of crisis in his life.   
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On one side there is the realm of light, youth and pleasure to which Guido’s 
childhood nurses, Saraghina [...] Carla, all belong.  Pitted against these 
characters is a world of darkness, death, and fear to which the Cardinal, 
Guido’s mother, the priests and Daumier are aligned.  These two themes are 
perceived as mutually exclusive by Guido.  His crisis is rooted in his inability 
to overcome this duality.
233
   
 
We might add to the former group Mezzabotta, who has left his wife for an attractive 
young lady, and to the latter group Guido’s wife, Luisa.  Guido is torn between Luisa 
and his mistress Carla, between the responsibilities of marriage and the regressive 
pleasure that a relationship with Carla represents.  In his fantasy, we see how Guido 
struggles to resolve this inner conflict.  The women’s rebellion ‘can be seen as 





The sequence ends with Luisa dutifully scrubbing the floor, whilst addressing a 
monologue to Guido (now absent from the scene), in which she insists that she enjoys 
living communally with the other women and expresses regret that it has taken her 
twenty years of marriage to discover how to behave appropriately as his wife.  Thus 
the fantasy — after its elaborate departures from real life — concludes with explicit 
reference to the real-life situation from which it initially arose: the triangle of tension 
between Guido, Luisa, and Carla.  As we dissolve to the present, Guido laments to 
himself, ‘Just a little more patience, Luisa; but perhaps you can’t anymore.’  Here, 
then, the fantasy is not merely an inconsequential idle conjuring, but functions to help 
                                                 
233
 Ibid., pp.302-03 
 
234




Guido to reach a point where he can move towards resolving the tension between his 
desire for his wife and his desire for his mistress: the act of reducing Luisa to a 
fawning, complaisant, dutiful and submissive wife in his fantasy enables Guido to 
recognise how badly he has treated her and to appreciate her more. 
 
Romance 
There are some fantasies which are better described as romantic than erotic.  Between 
rounds during the boxing match in City Lights (Charles Chaplin, 1931), the tramp 
mistakes his trainer for his blind girlfriend.  This is a case of misperception induced 
by his concussion, but here misperception takes the form of fantasy.  He might have 
mistaken his trainer for anyone, but he doesn’t; he creates a fantasy image.  The effect 
is comic precisely because the misperception has the utopian impulse of fantasy.   
 
Erotic 
The majority of cinema’s representations of fantasy are erotic, but under this broad 
heading there are many varieties.  In the fantasy sequence from Subida al cielo, 
Raquel, Oliverio’s wife Albina and his mother all have prominent roles.  The fantasy 
is structured around an opposition between Raquel and Albina.  Oliverio’s 
imagination swings back and forth between a sexual encounter with Raquel and his 
duty towards Albina.  He and Raquel are alone on the bus, which continues on its way 
though there is no driver.  The bus is full of jungle foliage and Raquel strips down to a 
swimming costume.  She beckons Oliverio to the back of the bus and they embrace.  
Outside, the driver and several other passengers form a brass band, providing the 
fantasy with a musical accompaniment (the bus now appears to be stationary).  




the riverbank; he turns and pushes her into the river.  As Albina leaves the riverside, 
looking weary and dejected, Oliverio hastens to her and embraces her tightly.  Though 
she appears tired and upset, she accepts his gesture and it seems they are reconciled.  
However, when they emerge from their embrace, Oliverio finds that he has been 
kissing not Albina but Raquel.  She sticks her tongue out and laughs wickedly.  Now 
she winks at Oliverio as she rises out of the water, wearing Albina’s wedding dress.  
In the manner of a dream, Oliverio’s surrealistic fantasy gives expression to his 
conflicting internal desires, a battle between libido and repression.  In other cases 
there is no such internal conflict; the erotic fantasy is free of any sense of guilt. 
 
A Clockwork Orange presents several brief, but significant, fantasies.  First, there is 
the scene in which listening to Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony conjures for Alex 
images of natural disasters.  Already familiar with the mindless criminal violence of 
Alex and his friends, our misgivings about his character are exacerbated and 
intensified by this subjective insight into his malevolent imagination.  Later, over 
images of Alex in the prison library, his voiceover explains that the prison pastor has 
become fond of him since he began studying the Bible.  Alex’s enthusiastic 
interpretations of scenes from the Old Testament are accompanied by representations 
of his imagination which situate him within the historical scenes: he is pampered by 
scantily clad beautiful women, and participates in the torture of Christ on his way to 
Calvary.  The effect is ironic and mildly humorous: while the pastor imagines Alex 
has discovered religious faith, he is in fact finding vicarious consolation through the 
Bible for sexual and sadistic pleasures which he is no longer free to indulge in reality.  
Alex is subsequently selected to be the subject of a government experiment aimed at 




guarantees that they will never re-offend.  The treatment leaves Alex physically 
incapable, not only of committing crime, but of experiencing pleasure, and even of 
defending himself from violence, because of a chemical reaction that makes him 
physically ill.  By an unfortunate coincidence Alex experiences the same dreadful 
sickness whenever he hears Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony; and it is being unable to 
escape this music that ultimately drives him to attempt suicide.  In the epilogue, when 
the Minister of the Interior visits him in hospital and presents him with the surprise 
gift of a performance of Beethoven’s Ninth through a powerful sound system, Alex 
manifests no unpleasant symptoms, thus demonstrating that he is cured.  The film’s 
final shot, a mental image inspired by the music, presents slow-motion images of 
Alex copulating with a topless woman.  Thus the Ninth conjures the same sort of 
images as Alex experienced before his cure (when he fantasised about Biblical scenes, 
for instance), but — and Kubrick distils Burgess’s moral standpoint to this difference 
— their meaning is no longer the same.  In contrast to the previous fantasy — which, 
with the voiceover, ironically revealed that, rather than being religiously rehabilitated, 
Alex was indulging profane sadistic fantasies (the mental images, therefore, evidence 
of a deviant, incurably criminal mind) — these (equally erotic) images are proof of 
Alex’s mental well-being: he is cured.   
 
In Memorias del Subdesarrollo, Sergio’s young and attractive maid’s description of 
her baptism inspires in him a fantasy, in which the maid’s baptism becomes a utopian 
sexual initiation rite.  Upon returning to the present, we find Sergio examining a 
printed reproduction of a female nude.  As the maid goes about her business, Sergio 
continues to fantasise.  Shedding the pretext of the baptism, he now simply imagines 




While Sergio is the film’s protagonist, he is not an entirely sympathetic character.  
This is evidenced in his relationship with Elena, whom he pursues and seduces before 
rejecting, finding her to be primitive, typical of the backwardness of Cuban people, 
not cultured enough, not western enough, not sufficiently responsive — or capable of 
responding — to his efforts to change her.  Neither can the maid be a suitable partner 
for Sergio: he would soon become bored with her and find her, like Elena, to be 
irremediably inadequate.  Stock writes, ‘the content of a fantasy about a situation S is 
guided by what the fantasist anticipates would be pleasurable in S, at least in the 
negative sense that its content excludes what would inhibit pleasure, or be positively 
displeasurable.’
235
 Thus Sergio’s supposition — which prevents him from making 
advances to her in reality — that the maid is culturally inferior to him, is omitted from 
the fantasy, the sparse elements of which express the utopian yearning of imagination.  
He imagines an uncomplicated sexual bliss with the maid, which he is aware is 
impracticable.  As is clear from his conquest of Elena, Sergio is quite willing to 
pursue women whom he finds attractive.  But Elena disappoints him (‘I’d expected 
more of her.  I thought she’d be complex and interesting’).  Sergio projects qualities 
(in this case, ‘culture’) upon Elena, which he subsequently finds that she lacks, and is 
perhaps, in his opinion, incapable of attaining.  The situation with the maid is slightly 
different, since from the outset Sergio is aware of her profession, her social standing 
and her cultural inferiority, or ‘underdevelopment’.  His fantasies of a sexual union 
with the maid are therefore frivolous; the fantasy aims at transcending the social 
differences between them (which are, as far as Sergio is concerned, and as the Elena 
episode demonstrates, intractable).  If Sergio seriously imagined he could find 
meaningful happiness with the maid, he would make an advance.  Since he feels that 
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happiness with a woman who is so socially and culturally inferior to him is 
impossible, he settles for a momentary image of happiness, an idealistic utopian 
vision of contentment and uncomplicated satisfaction which is imaginary.  
 
Some films present the imagining subject as lecherous.  We find such characters in 
the early surrealist films of Buñuel.  In Un Chien Andalou (1928) the man feels the 
woman’s breasts.  At first she resists, pushing him away, but then remains where she 
is and lowers her guard.  He feels her breasts again and a series of dissolves reveal 
that while he feels her breasts through her clothes, he imagines that his hands are 
touching the flesh of her naked body, and then that he is feeling not her breasts but her 
buttocks.  In L’Âge d’Or (Luis Buñuel, 1931) the man’s character is barely developed 
at all in any conventional sense.  His overriding characteristic is an insatiable sexual 
desire, and apart from his lecherous behaviour, this desire is expressed through 
subjective fantasy.  He has three fantasies involving the woman who is the subject of 
his frustrated affections: first, when they are parted in the mud at the start, he forms an 
image of the woman with a yearning, sensual expression on her face, whilst sitting in 
a bathroom.  His next — and most lecherous — fantasy comes when he is escorted 
through the streets by two guards, and stops at an advertisement which shows a 
female hand with the middle- and fore-fingers depressed over a black surface.  
Adjacent to the hand is a hat.  As he gazes at the picture it comes to life: the hand 
becomes that of a woman masturbating, the hat a patch of pubic hair.  The final 
fantasy occurs when he brings the guards to a halt at a shop window, where he 
admires the photograph of a model posing.  From the photographic image we dissolve 




closing her eyes as though awaiting a sexual encounter.  More powerful than Sergio’s 
idle erotic imaginings, these are images of pure desire. 
 
Cinematic representations of sexual fantasies are predominantly those of heterosexual 
men.  Occasionally, however, we see the fantasies of women.  The fantasy sequence 
which opens Belle de Jour establishes that Séverine is a masochist.  She is riding in a 
landau with her husband Pierre.  After a disagreement, Pierre stops the landau and 
observes as, on his orders, the drivers conduct Séverine into the woods, tie her to a 
tree and flagellate her.  As the driver prepares to take her, Pierre’s voice intrudes from 
the present and the fantasy is abruptly curtailed.  Séverine to some extent stands apart 
from many of the other fantasists here discussed, not only because she is a masochist, 
but because her boredom and curiosity are so great that she rejects the mundane 
passivity of her reality; at Madame Anaïs’s she realises her fantasies, but finds herself 
trapped between her desire for pleasure — though, for her, concomitant with pleasure 
is humiliation and degradation — and the repressive forces of social norms.  She tells 
Husson, ‘I’m completely lost.  I can’t help myself; I can’t do anything about it ... I 
can’t live without this.’  But after Husson’s visit she immediately resigns; and when 
the young gangster, Maurice, whom she met at the brothel, appears at her house, she 
begs him to leave.  After her adventure she desperately wants to return to the security 
of married life with Pierre.  This wish is expressed in her final fantasy, when, at the 
end of the film, Séverine fantasies that Pierre — who is now paralysed, having being 
shot by Maurice — miraculously recovers.  Then Séverine goes to the balcony and 
sees the landau approaching, thus reprising the motif of the opening fantasy sequence.  
This suggests that, despite all that she has lost, Séverine, incorrigible, still cherishes 





All of these wish-fulfilling fantasies arise from the imagining subject’s dissatisfaction 
with the reality of the present.  Cinema’s fantasy sequences give expression to 
repressed, forbidden, or hedonistic impossible desires.  While occasionally the 
objective of fantasy is to magically overcome an intolerable situation, the majority of 
fantasies involve a sexual element.  The function of fantasy is the imaginary 
realisation of that which is, for whatever reason, impractical or impossible in reality.  
We will see in the following chapter that there are some interesting similarities 






Chapter 6. Dream 
Freud’s Die Traumdeutung arguably remains the definitive study of dreams, and so 
will be an important reference point in this chapter.  In this book on dreams, Freud 
mentions the waking fantasy several times.  First of all, like the fantasy, the dream 
unfolds, and its wish is represented as being fulfilled, in the present tense.
236
 
Unconscious fantasies of the dream-day, or of infantile origin, often form the material 
of the dream thoughts.
237
 And Freud asserts that the enigma of the waking dreamer’s 
impression of a complete and elaborate dream, which is experienced in a very short 
sleep of only a few minutes, is explained by the existence of pre-prepared fantasies.
238
 
This is to say that the process of secondary elaboration, by which the waking dreamer 
enforces logical coherence upon his memory of the desultory fragments of his dream, 
is occasionally bolstered by recourse to pre-existing fantasies of the unconscious. 
 
But there are also some important differences between fantasy and dream in the 
relation of the images to consciousness.  In contrast to the fantasy, the development of 
which the imagining-subject, though distracted, in some sense retains control over, the 
imagining subject, generally speaking, has no conscious control over the development 
of his dream.  In L’Imaginaire, Sartre offers a compelling phenomenological account 
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The phenomenology of dreaming 
Dream as fatality 
For Sartre, the dream is distinguished by a characteristic ‘fragility that cannot belong 
to perception’; it is forever ‘at the mercy of a reflective consciousness’.
239
 At the same 
time, to the extent that it is irreal, it is beyond reach; its irreality ‘confers a compact 
opacity and a strength upon it’.
240
 Reflective consciousness is incompatible with the 
rapt fascination of the dream state: ‘So long as the dream endures, consciousness 
cannot determine itself to reflect’
241
; ‘the passage to perception can be made only by 
revolution’.
242
 For there to be knowledge, Sartre insists, there must be ‘reflective 
consciousness’, a consciousness that is conscious of itself as consciousness, a waking 




Consciousness is not only conscious of itself as enchained, but is also 
conscious that there is nothing it can do against itself […] It is not that the 
nonthetic consciousness of imagining ceases to grasp itself as spontaneity, but 
it grasps itself as spellbound.  This is what gives the dream its nuance of fate.  
The events are given as unable not to happen, in correlation with a 
consciousness that cannot prevent itself from imagining them […] each 
moment of the story is given as having an imaginary future, but a future that I 
cannot foresee […] the imaginary world is given as a world without freedom 
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[...] it is the inverse of freedom, it is fatal […] The dreamer does not say ‘I 





Frequently the dreamer himself appears within the dream.  As soon as the dreamer 
appears within the dream everything within the dream assumes a further importance, 
which accounts for the effect of ‘fascination’.  Sartre compares the belief which this 
identification engenders to that of the naïve reader of a novel written in the first 
person: 
 
It is lived as fiction and it is only in considering it as fiction [...] that we can 
understand the kind of reactions that it provokes in the sleeper.  Only, it is a 
‘spellbinding’ fiction […] The dream is not fiction taken for reality, it is the 
odyssey of a consciousness dedicated by itself and in spite of itself to building 




The credulous reader feels not only sympathy, but a sense of belonging.  While the 
dream is ‘a purely represented world’, it is also ‘a world immediately lived […] I am 
taken […] I cannot break the enchantment […] I am obliged to live the fascination of 
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Before proceeding with our discussion of representations of dreams in cinema we will 
now consider some aspects of the relationship between the experience of dreaming 
and watching a film. 
 
Films and dreams 
Amongst the first to theorise the similarities between films and dreams were the 
surrealists.  Though writing several decades after the first wave of surrealist films, 
Jacques Brunius’s discussion is representative of the surrealists’ interest in this 
subject: 
 
The darkness of the auditorium, tantamount to the closing of the eyelids on the 
retina and, for thought, to the darkness of the unconscious; the crowd that 
surrounds and isolates you, the deliciously crass music, the stiffness of the 
neck necessary for the orientation of one’s gaze, provoke a state like being 
half-asleep […] the very technique of film evokes the dream more than 
waking.  The images fade in and fade out, dissolve into each other, vision 
begins and ends in an iris, secrets are revealed through a keyhole, the mental 
image of a keyhole.  The disposition of screen images in time is absolutely 
analogous with the arrangement thought or the dream can devise.  Neither 
chronological order nor relative values of duration are real […] film, like 
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In ‘Surrealism and the Cinema’, Jean Goudal invokes Hippolyte Taine’s notion of the 
‘reductive mechanism of images’, offering an account of the phenomenological 
distinction between dreaming and conscious forms of imagining such as day-
dreaming.  When we are awake, the images of our imagination ‘have an anaemic, pale 
colour’ by which they are distinguished from ‘the vigour and relief’ of perceptions.  
When we sleep, our external perceptions are relaxed, less vigilant: 
 
the reducing contrast no longer existing, the imaginary succession of images 
monopolises the foreground; as nothing contradicts them we believe in their 
actual existence.  Awake, we imagine the real and the possible all at once, 




Goudal stresses this distinction in order to draw a comparison between the state of 
dreaming and viewing a film.  At the cinema, ‘we see a whole host of material 
conditions conspire to destroy this “reductive mechanism of images.” ’ The darkness 
of the auditorium, for instance, analogous to the relaxation of sensory perception 





But the surrealists are by no means alone in considering this subject.  In Le signifiant 
imaginaire (1977) Christian Metz offers an interesting discussion of the relationship 
between film and dream.  According to Metz, ‘the filmic state as induced by 
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traditional fiction films [...] is marked by a general tendency to lower wakefulness’.
250
 
The principal difference between film and dream is that ‘[t]he dreamer does not know 
that he is dreaming; the film spectator knows that he is at the cinema’.
251
 Nevertheless 
there are situations in each where these principles are respectively weakened.  In the 
dream, ‘the degree of illusion of reality is inversely proportional to that of 
wakefulness.’
252
 Certain nightmares and excessively pleasurable dreams result in the 
sleeper awakening.  Certain insomnias can be understood as ‘the work of the ego’, 
wary of ‘the prospect of its dreams’, eschewing sleep.  Where there is ‘a lesser degree 
of violence in the internal conflict and therefore a lesser degree of wakefulness,’ this 
same principle ‘is responsible for the various regimes of consciousness in which the 
subject is sufficiently awake to know that it is only a dream — thus approaching a 
very common filmic situation’.
253
 Conversely, the spectator can be ‘carried away’ by 
the film.  Here Metz draws a comparison with somnambulism.  While the motor 
outbursts of the somnambulist ‘escape reality-testing’, those of the captivated viewer 
‘remain under its control’.  The spectator who ‘begins to act’ is shaken from his 
slumber, ‘restoring the distance between the film and him.’
254
 
    
Just as there are certain times when the spectator is no longer quite aware that he is at 
the cinema, so, conversely, the dreamer may, up to a point, be aware that he is 
dreaming: 
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for instance, in the intermediary states between sleep and waking […] and […] 
at all those times when thoughts like ‘I am in the middle of a dream’ spring to 
mind, thoughts which, by a single and double movement, come to be 
integrated in the dream of which they form a part, and in the process open a 




Metz insists, ‘[i]t is in their gaps rather than in their more normal functioning that the 
filmic state and the dream state tend to converge’.
256
 That is to say, that the 
convergence takes place ‘when the spectator begins to doze off […] or when the 
dreamer begins to wake up.’
257
  Ordinarily, however, film and dream are not 
confused, because the film spectator is awake, while the dreamer is asleep. 
 
It is perhaps because of these various analogies between the phenomenological 
experience of dreaming and viewing a film that film is a medium particularly suited to 
the representation of dreams.  Consider the following excerpt from an account of one 
of his own dreams, by Sartre: 
 
I took refuge in an armour-plated room, but he began, on the other side of the 
wall, to melt the armour-plating with a blowtorch.  Now, I saw myself, on the 
one hand, transfixed in the room and waiting — while believing myself to be 
safe — and on the other hand, I saw the forger on the other side of the wall in 
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the process of cutting.  I therefore knew what was going to happen to the 




Is this effect of cross-cutting in the building of tension not cinematic?  I can attest to 
being aware of similar omniscient narrating techniques, analogous to those of the 
cinema, in my own dreams.  While it must be true that film language, the media we 
consume, affects the form of our dreams, is there not a more profound analogy 
between the forms of films and dreams?  Indeed, is it not, on the contrary, that the 
film — even the classical Hollywood film — borrows something of its structure from 
the dream? 
 
We will now consider some aspects of the formal presentation of filmic 
representations of dreams. 
 
Form 
The dream circuit 
While we have spoken of the ‘imagination circuit’ and the ‘fantasy circuit’ in cinema, 
and we will speak of the ‘hallucination circuit’, generally speaking, there is no such 
thing as the ‘dream circuit’.  Most commonly, either the opening or the closing 
parenthetic shot is omitted.  In classical cinema, the closing parenthetic shot is 
typically absent, narration passing from the dream directly to a new scene without 
showing the sleeper awakening.  Traditionally, the opening parenthetic shot of the 
dreamer in the present is a conventional sign which enables the spectator to 
distinguish dream from reality, and has been considered indispensible.  In modern 
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cinema there are many variations of the traditional transition into dream.  In 8 ½, we 
pass from the present into a dream without a cut.  Guido is lying in bed, his mistress, 
Carla, sitting up beside him reading, when his mother appears in the room, wiping the 
wall.  At this instant we have coexistent dimensions: the world of the present, in 
which Guido and Carla lie in bed, and the dream world, in which his mother is present 
in the room.  
 
Some dreams take the simple form of a conversation: an imaginary being appears, 
with whom the dreamer converses, the entire dream unfolding on the ground of the 
present.  Robinson’s dream in Robinson Crusoe (Luis Buñuel, 1954) unfolds on the 
ground of the present, in Crusoe’s cave.  Crusoe speaks to his father from the 
hammock in which he sleeps.  The distinction between reality and dream becomes 
equivocal when the father disappears out of the cave, laughing wickedly, and Crusoe 
rises from his hammock and grabs his axe, as though in pursuit of his father.  
Offscreen, the father’s haunting words continue: ‘He will not forgive you.  You will 
die like a dog.  You will die.’  Here, the father’s voice is certainly imaginary, but 
when Crusoe then sinks his axe into the ground and repeats his father’s words in 
resigned submission — ‘I will die...I will die...’ — it is clear that we have emerged 
from the dream; Crusoe really did get out of bed and pick up the axe; for a moment, 
he mistook dream for reality.  In such cases as this, dream closely resembles 
hallucination.   
 
The dream in modern cinema 
Classical cinema implicitly adheres to several generally accepted governing principles 





- a film must never begin with a dream sequence; 
- no dream sequence should last more than a few minutes; 
- there should be no doubt as to when a dream sequence begins and ends 
 
Much modern cinema does not recognise these rules.  In the following discussion, we 
consider some formal aspects of dream sequences in modern cinema.   
 
Absence of the opening parenthesis of dream circuit 
The opening parenthesis of the dream circuit is sometimes omitted by the simple fact 
that the film opens with a dream, as in 8 ½.  Two thirds of the way through 
Mulholland Drive we discover that all the events hitherto have been a dream.  In such 
cases one can often distinguish the dream by signs, in the form and content of 
narration.  But sometimes, where the opening parenthesis of the circuit is absent, we 
are unable to discern from the content and progression of a sequence that it is a 
dream, and only the closing parenthesis of the circuit will retrospectively confer this 
status upon it.  In accordance with verisimilitudinal conventions which seem to derive 
from the horror genre, the dream functions as a ruse, deceiving us into believing that 
the dreadful scenes presented are real, only to reveal them to be a dream.
259
 
   
Sometimes, where both the opening and closing parentheses are omitted it is 
impossible to be certain whether or not a given sequence represents a dream.  In Cross 
of Iron (Sam Peckinpah, 1977) we pass from a fast-paced battle scene into what 
appears to be a lengthy dream sequence, without any explicit formal indication.  The 
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sequence establishes that Steiner has been wounded in action and is recuperating in a 
sanatorium.  But here it becomes difficult to distinguish dream-images from reality.  
For instance, several times we see Steiner in civilian clothing, his head bandaged and 
arm in a sling, running through the woods as though he was still on the battlefield.  It 
seems reasonable to understand these scenes as memory images from the recent past: 
a man of action, Steiner is unsuited to the sedentary life at the sanatorium; he has 
become so accustomed to the conditions of war that he has difficulty adjusting to any 
other environment.  Thus we might assume that these scenes depict events which 
actually occurred.  As such, they might be autonomously narrated, or we may attribute 
them to Steiner’s memory.  But consider the scene in which Steiner jumps into the 
river and the Russian boy, whom his troop took in, appears, and throws him a knife.  
At the beginning of the battle sequence which preceded his internment, Steiner 
encountered the boy in the forest and the boy threw him a knife as a gift, before 
leaving.  But almost immediately after this, Steiner saw the boy murdered by Russian 
soldiers.  Thus his encounter with the boy at the river is imaginary; it re-enacts an 
actual event.  There are, then, two possible interpretations of this encounter: either the 
sequence, including the preceding shots of the wounded Steiner running through the 
woods, is entirely imaginary (dream), or Steiner really did run through the woods and 
jump into the river, and the nurse really did wade into the river to fetch him — in 
which case the encounter with the boy is a hallucination.  As the sequence progresses, 
the action passes to a banquet and dance at the sanatorium, and it is unclear whether 
this is part of Steiner’s dream or whether it is a hallucination, presenting Steiner’s 





In Blue Velvet, a sequence which commences as an act of waking imagination is 
subsequently revealed to have been a dream.  On his way home after his first eventful 
evening in Dorothy Vallens’s apartment, Jeffrey takes stock of what he has witnessed, 
and we see a series of images which seem to represent his imaginary construction of 
the evening’s events: on the soundtrack a bestial artificial roar accompanies slow-
motion images of Frank with an open mouth.  Cut to a burning flame; the sound of 
wind and fire are heard in extreme close-up.  Over a dark screen Frank says, ‘Now it’s 
dark.’  Framed in extreme close-up, Dorothy begs Frank, ‘Hit me.  Hit me!’  Then, the 
sound of Frank’s punch coincides with Dorothy’s scream, and Jeffrey wakes up in 
bed, prompting us to reinterpret the sequence as a dream.  One might say that the act 
of joining Jeffrey’s imaginings and his subsequent nightmare establishes a continuity 
between the events themselves, his memory of them, and his subsequent dream: the 
nightmarish quality which pervades all three justifies connecting waking imagination 
and dream in this way.   
 
In Le charme discret de la bourgeoisie (Luis Buñuel, 1972), which consists largely of 
a series of dream-sequences, the opening parenthesis of the dream circuit is in each 
case omitted.  Stephen Kovàcs writes, ‘Buñuel’s dream sequences here grow out of 
real situations and it is only when they end up in peculiar conclusions followed by the 
dreamer waking with a start that we realise these events were the product of human 
fantasy.’
260
 The dreams are disguised as such not only by the omission of the opening 
parenthetic shot of the dream circuit, but, as Harmonie H. Wu observes, by adherence 
to laws of narrative logic and continuity within these episodes.  For instance, dinner at 
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the colonel’s ‘is deliberately constructed to link up in an ultratight transition’ with the 
preceding scene of dinner at the Sénéchals’: 
 
The colonel invites the friends to his house for dinner a week later and states 
his address: “17 rue de Parc.”  The scene cuts from the Sénéchals’ living room 
to the number plate “17” on the colonel’s apartment building as the colonel 
says the number.  The camera then swish-pans to the street sign, “Rue du 
Parc” as the colonel says that.  The transition from the invitation in the 
Sénéchals’ living room to the dinner party one week later couldn’t be more 
clearly mapped out […] The language of cinematic convention locks us into 
the logical next step of the narrative […] The editing is motivated and 




Such slick continuity cues work in tension with an action which, at the colonel’s, 
becomes increasingly bizarre, until Sénéchal awakens and we understand that the 
sequence was a dream.  ‘Nothing therefore prepares us for the increasing strangeness 
of the scene which unfolds’, writes Everett.
262
 Later, when the bourgeois’ dinner is 
interrupted and they are arrested, we shift to a new scene at the police station and, we 
quite logically assume this to be a new present.  However, rather than continuing with 
the story of the incarceration of the bourgeois, the narrative here digresses as one 
officer tells another the story of the ‘Bleeding Sergeant’ and we enter a flashback 
which is subsequently revealed to have occurred within a dream. 
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Dream within dream 
In Le charme discret de la bourgeoisie, Buñuel presents a dream within a dream.  The 
opening parentheses of both dreams are omitted.   In a film such as this it becomes 
difficult to distinguish the ground of the present.  Each time it seems that narration is 
unfolding within the present, but then a character wakes up, and we understand that 
the previous sequence was in fact a dream.  The bourgeois settle down for dinner at 
the Sénéchals’, but they are interrupted when the military colonel and a squadron of 
his men arrive; Mme Sénéchal accommodates them.  After dinner, a young sergeant 
recounts a dream for the entertainment of the guests.  The military personnel then 
depart, leaving the Sénéchals and their friends, but the colonel returns and invites 
them for dinner the following week.  As we have seen, through a slick continuous 
transition, we then shift to the scene of dinner at the colonel’s.  The servant drops a 
salver of food before picking it up and presenting it at table; the bourgeois are 
unimpressed with the food, which seems to be plastic.  Then there is a banging noise, 
a French theatrical convention, signifying that the curtain is about to rise.   Overhead 
lamps illuminate the table.  A curtain opens and the diners find that they are on a 
theatre stage before an audience.  A man beneath the stage, hidden from the audience, 
delivers lines to the diners.  Confounded, the guests hurriedly leave the stage.  Only 
Sénéchal remains; bewildered, he exclaims, ‘I don’t know the lines!’  With this, 
Sénéchal wakes up and tells his wife about the dream.  Thus we are given to 
understand that the bizarre dinner at the colonel’s was a dream, and that we have now 
returned to the present.  We now shift to a social function at the colonel’s, in which 
Rafael, the Ambassador, is the focus of attention.  Various characters speak to him 




colonel insults him, calling Miranda a ‘semi-barbaric country’.  A confrontation 
ensues, and Rafael shoots the colonel.  Then Thévenot wakes and explains to his wife: 
‘I dreamt that I ... no ... I dreamt that Sénéchal dreamt that we were at a theatre ... 
Then we were guests at the colonel’s ... and he quarrelled with Raphael.’   
 
Everett makes the important point — one which is easily overlooked — that when the 
sequence is revealed to have been Thévenot’s dream, there remain several loose ends 
which this cannot account for.  ‘How’, for instance, ‘does Thévenot happen in his 
dream to hear intimate snatches of conversation between his wife and the Ambassador 
with whom (unbeknownst to him) she is having an affair?’
263
 In this film and others, 
Everett writes, ‘Buñuel exploits to the full the natural ambiguity of film, its ability to 
depict all events as equally real.  In so doing, of course, he also foregrounds and 
explores the surrealist belief in the reality of dream and imagination.’
264
 James Tobias 
says of the dream sequences in this film, ‘[w]e cannot judge where they begin until 
we receive an explicit wake-up call that announces that they have ended.’
265
 But here 
the apparent end of the dream (Sénéchal wakes up) turns out to be a false ending.  
When Sénéchal wakes up we understand that the previous sequence was a dream, but 
quite reasonably assume that we then return to the present.  Now, however, we find 
that when Sénéchal woke up we remained within a dream.  The bizarre dinner at the 
colonel’s was a dream within a dream.  But where exactly did Thévenot’s dream 
begin?  If dinner at the colonel’s was Sénéchal’s dream within Thévenot’s dream, 
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then surely the preceding dinner at the Sénéchals’ must also have been part of 
Thévenot’s dream, since it was here that the bourgeois received the invitation to 
dinner at the colonel’s.  The flashback which animates the young sergeant’s account 
of his dream becomes a dream within a dream within a dream.  Victor Fuentes writes, 
‘[i]n its use of interlocking dreams, the last part of the film moves us from one 





Flashback within dream 
We have seen, in the young sergeant’s account of his dream in Le charme discret de 
la bourgeoisie, that sometimes a dream is presented in the form of a flashback.  In this 
case, we later discover that this flashback occurred within a dream of a second 
character, and that this dream occurred within the dream of a third character.  Later in 
the film we find another flashback in an episode which is subsequently revealed to be 
a dream.  When the police arrive at the Sénéchals’ and unceremoniously arrest the 
bourgeois diners, we shift to the police station, where two officers are in conversation.  
Other officers leave the station in a hurry, and the older officer explains that this is 
because it is the 14
th
 of June, ‘The Bleeding Sergeant’s Day’.  As he recounts the 
Bleeding Sergeant’s story, we enter a flashback in which the sergeant tortures a 
prisoner on a grand piano which is rigged up with electricity.  We then return to the 
present, and the officer explains that on the 14
th
 of June the sergeant was killed in a 
demonstration.  Every year since then his ghost has returned to redeem himself.  We 
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then see the scene later that night as the sergeant’s ghost releases prisoners from their 
cells.  But then the police inspector wakes in the present, and it is clear that the 
narrative of ‘The Bleeding Sergeant’s Day’ was a dream.  Thus, occurring within a 
dream, the function of flashback here remains limited to the narrative of the dream, 
and has no relevance to the diegetic world outside of the dream.   
 
But flashback within dream can also establish a back-story to which we grant 
credence, as in Jenny’s flashback during her dream in Raising Cane.  Jenny wakes 
from a dream in the middle of the night and realises that she has given her lover, Jack, 
and her husband, Carter, each other’s presents by mistake.  Jenny’s waking up here is 
subsequently revealed as a false ending — she is in fact still dreaming, but we are not 
yet aware of this.  As she drives to Jack’s hotel in the middle of the night, a flashback 
emerges and her voiceover recounts the story of how she and Jack became lovers.  
But, when subsequently revealed to have occurred within the dream, this flashback 
loses none of its validity.  The fact that the flashback was part of a dream ought really 
to affect its integrity, even if we only establish that it occurred within a dream 
retrospectively.  But this is the only information the film proffers regarding Jenny and 
Jack’s back-story, and, despite the fact that it occurs within a dream, it seems 
perfectly plausible.   
 
Between these two examples there is a significant difference.  In Buñuel’s film, the 
flashback represents an exposition of an imaginary scenario from within an already 
imaginary scenario; in Raising Cane, within a sequence which is subsequently 
revealed to be a dream, the flashback presents a credible back-story which is 




truthful elements and revive actual memories, films which insert flashbacks that are to 
be granted credence within dream sequences, in obliging it to perform an expositional 
function — the function proper to flashback — fail to recognise the psychic 
peculiarities of the dream. 
 
Contingencies of the present 
As in fantasy, aspects of the subject’s physical environment often find means of 
expression in distorted form in the dream-content.  In Die Traumdeutung, Freud takes 
issue with previous theories of dreams, which understand the content of dreams to be 
determined by somatic stimuli.  While he admits the influence of somatic stimuli, 
Freud finds this an inadequate explanation of the source of dreams, since it does not 
account for the distortion of dream-content.  Advocates of this theory ‘have failed to 
explain [...] why the true nature of the external stimulus is not recognised in the 




Sartre seems to refer to the effect of contingencies of the present on dream-content, 
and to the fact of the distortion of the dream-content — though he does not adhere to 
Freud’s explanation for this distortion — when he notes dreams, cited by psychologist 
Pierre Janet, in which a prolonged noise (presumably emitting from a source in the 
sleeper’s present physical environment) ‘can be successively grasped by 
consciousness as standing for a mass of diverse objects but never for itself’.
268
 Thus 
dreaming is distinguished from perception to such an extent that ‘in the dream, 
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consciousness cannot perceive, because it cannot leave the imaging attitude in which 




Consistent with the observations of Freud and Sartre, where elements of the sleeper’s 
present environment find expression in dream-content, it is usually in distorted form.  
In Rosemary’s Baby (Roman Polanski, 1968) the intransigent elderly nun in 
Rosemary’s first dream represents her neighbour, Minnie Castevet.  As she goes to 
sleep, Rosemary can hear Minnie and Roman arguing upstairs.  The words uttered by 
the nun in the dream are in fact Minnie’s words, which reverberate through the wall.  
In the transition to the second — and central — dream, the present retains a presence 
as Rosemary appears in the dream lying on her bed, which now floats on a serene blue 
sea.  And when Rosemary reclines against the boat’s ladder and a pair of hands 
removes her clothes, Guy really is removing her clothes in the present.  Here, the 
environment of the present impinges upon dream-content to an extraordinary extent.  
One would usually expect the sleeper’s immediate physical environment to be 
relatively free of disturbances (or else the sleeper would awaken).  But in this case, 
Rosemary has been drugged and remains unconscious, despite all that she experiences 
in the present.  This is an exceptional case, since much of what Rosemary dreams 
about, she actually experiences in the present: Guy really does remove her clothes; her 
wedding ring really is removed from her finger; while semi-conscious, she really is 
raped by Roman Castevet; the crowd of elderly people who gather to witness the rite 
are real.   
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Resurrecting the dead  
The dead have as much right to existence within the dream as do the living, since here 
all are equally irreal.  (In filmic representations, where the dreamer knows that the 
deceased person who appears in her dream was murdered, this person often exhibits 
the raw wounds from which she perished.)  Freud insists that there is nothing 
extraordinary about the presence of dead relatives in dreams: ‘How often it happens 
that we say to ourselves: “If my father were still alive, what would he say to this?”  
The dream can express this if in no other way than by his presence in a definite 
situation.’
270
 In 8 ½, Guido encounters his father at a site of Roman ruins.  The father 
asks his producer how Guido is getting along, but the producer does not answer.  
Guido says, ‘Father there are so many things I want to say to you.  There’s so much 
that I want to ask you ... ’ But his father promptly disappears.  Though his father is 
dead, Guido unconsciously desires to make him proud.  By reviving his father, the 
dream actualises this possibility, only to then thwart it with the producer’s silence.   
 
Absurd appearance 
In Die Traumdeutung, Freud notes that many previous studies of dreams, unable or 
unwilling to penetrate beyond the bizarre surface appearance of many dreams, deny or 
neglect the possibility that dreams might be meaningful, instead dismissing them as 
nonsense.  For Freud, the absurd appearance of the dream is a product of the process 
of distortion between the latent dream-thoughts and the manifest dream-content: ‘the 
dream-thoughts are never absurd [...] the dream-work produces absurd dreams’.
271
 
Contradictions in the dream-thoughts are distorted, so that they assume an absurd 
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aspect in the dream-content.  More than this, Freud claims, ‘a dream frequently has 
the profoundest meaning in the places where it seems most absurd’, since the most 
significant insights — those which are potentially most damaging to the ego — 




Sartre offers a phenomenological explanation of the specific characteristics of the 
imaging consciousness of the dreamer, which accounts to some extent for the bizarre 
appearance of dreams: 
 
every dream image appears with its own world […] the images remain isolated 
from one another, separated by their essential poverty, subjected to the 
phenomenon of quasi-observation, ‘in the void’; they do not sustain between 
them any relations other than those that consciousness can at each moment 
conceive in constituting them […] there are as many ‘worlds’ as images, even 





Cinema’s most effective dream sequences recognise this aspect of dreams.  The first 
part of the central dream sequence in Rosemary’s Baby takes place on the deck of a 
boat, but when Rosemary descends the boat’s ladder, instead of entering the cabin, 
she arrives in a large room with a bed.  In Accattone (Pier Paolo Pasolini, 1962), the 
dreamer is summoned by the Neopolitan thugs who assaulted his girlfriend, but upon 
reaching them he discovers in their place several corpses amongst a pile of rubble.  
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In the previous chapter we saw an instance of role transgression within a fantasy in 
Subida al cielo, but this phenomenon is far more common in the dream.  People 
whom the dreamer knows often appear in dreams with different identities; or two or 
more discrete individuals are combined in one person.  Freud discusses this 
phenomenon in an analysis of one of his own dreams: 
 
R. Is my uncle.  What can that mean? [...] My father [...] used always to say 
that uncle Joseph had never been a bad man, but, after all, he was a simpleton.  





In Farenheit 451 (François Truffaut, 1966), Montag works for the fire brigade, which, 
in this bleak vision of the future, no longer extinguishes fires, but burns books.  But 
he begins to think differently about his profession when he starts to read some of the 
books that he finds.  One day the fire brigade discover a library in a house they raid.  
The old woman chooses to perish with her books rather than live without them.  Later, 
in his dream, Montag recreates this scene, but replaces the old woman with Clarisse, a 
young woman whom he has recently befriended.  In fact, Clarisse and the old woman 
knew each other, and Montag seemed to suspect this when they raided the old 
woman’s house; without having met her, he seemed to recognise her.  By identifying 
Clarisse with the old woman in his dream, Montag confirms that there is a connection 
between the two women, and thus, significantly, establishes that Clarisse reads books.  
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The film opposes Clarisse to Montag’s wife, Linda, both of whom are played by Julie 
Christie but who have contrasting personalities.  Linda desires nothing more than to 
sit and watch television and socialise with her like-minded friends, while Clarisse has 
her own personality; she is a real person.  After beginning to read, Montag becomes 
increasingly alienated from Linda, and at the same time draws closer to Clarisse.  
Given that witnessing the old woman’s death caused him great anxiety, in identifying 
Clarisse with the old woman, the dream thus expresses Montag’s growing attachment 
to Clarisse and concomitant estrangement from Linda. 
   
Symbolism 
Aspects of the dreamer’s real life are usually expressed in the dream only in distorted 
form.  In the central dream episode of Rosemary’s Baby, several characters mention 
that Rosemary is unwell, having been ‘bitten by a mouse.’  This clearly represents 
Minnie’s chocolate mousse, with which Guy poisoned Rosemary and which Minnie, 
in her idiosyncratic New York accent refers to as ‘mouse’.  Sometimes dream 
symbolism is particularly transparent.  In Dead Ringers (David Cronenberg, 1988) the 
bond between identical twins Bev and Eliot is threatened when Bev falls in love with 
Claire and refuses to share her with Eliot.  While asleep beside Claire, Bev dreams 
that Eliot is in bed with them and that he and Eliot are physically joined at the 
stomach.  When Claire attempts to separate them by biting into the monstrous fleshy 
growth by which they are joined to one another, this clearly symbolises the breech she 
is establishing between them.   
 
Having discussed formal aspects of cinema’s dream sequences, we will now consider 







According to Freud every dream, even those whose effect is unpleasant and whose 
content produces anxiety, is a wish-fulfilment.
275
 Freud devotes a brief chapter to 
uncomplicated wish-fulfilment dreams, which are most prevalent in children.  
Generally speaking, it is rare to find cinematic representations of such simple wishes, 
but there are some.  In Born on the Fourth of July Ron recovers in a veteran’s hospital 
after being wounded in action.  His legs are shot and it is doubtful whether he will 
walk again, but he is determined.  With the encouragement of the hospital staff, he 
builds his upper body strength and gains confidence and hope as he gradually 
becomes more mobile on his crutches.  Assuredly conveying himself through the 
ward, Ron gets carried away and falls, badly breaking his leg.  From this image of 
dashed hope we enter a dream sequence in which a young, clean-shaven, fresh-faced 
Ron appears in the ward amidst a crowd of other patients, all of whom are in 
wheelchairs and appear quite still.  Ron rises from his wheelchair, and the other 
patients watch him walk amongst them.  Approaching the camera, he begins to run 
and smiles joyfully.  Cut to the present, where a long-haired, unshaven Ron is 
strapped to his bed, staring at his vomit on the floor, desperately pressing a button for 
assistance.  In the subsequent scene a doctor informs him that he will never walk 
again.  Ron’s dream of rising from his chair and walking, indeed running out of the 
ward, thus represents the fulfilment of an impossible wish.  Young, short-haired, 
clean-shaven, fresh-faced, fit and healthy, the Ron of the dream is the pre-war Ron.  
Despite his proud patriotism, he would give anything to return to this time.   
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While the majority of wish-fulfilling waking fantasies contain an erotic element, this 
is true of only a minority of dreams.  And many erotic dreams are distinct from wish-
fulfilling erotic fantasies to the extent that unequivocally wish-fulfilling erotic dreams 
are rare.   
 
Freud’s theory of wish-fulfilment in dreams is complex.  Usually the wish derives 
from unconscious infantile sources, which have long since been repressed by the 
development of the ego and its mechanism of censorship.  In the state of sleep this 
censorship is relaxed, enabling unconscious ideas to rise to the level of the 
preconscious.  But the censorship is not entirely relaxed during sleep.  Its residual 
operation defends it against wishes which might do it damage, by distorting the ideas 
which it receives from the preconscious.  Thus the wish-fulfilling tendency in many 
dreams is unrecognisable prior to a thorough analysis.  The intensity of the distortion 





Far from being obvious wish-fulfilments, many dreams contain some undesirable 
element, expressive of the dreamer’s deep anxieties.  In Esta Noite Encarnarei no Teu 
Cadáver, when Joe learns that one of the women whom he has killed was pregnant, he 
is plagued by guilt, and dreams that a supernatural being drags him from his bed down 
into a Dantean underworld, as punishment for killing the unborn child.  In The 
Conversation, Harry is deeply troubled by the thought that his work could lead to 
violence.  He dreams of meeting the young woman, one of the interlocutors of the 
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conversation he has recorded, whom he tries to warn that she may be in trouble (‘He’d 
kill you if he got the chance’).  He then finds himself in the hotel room where he 
discovers horrific blood stains and sees a bald man (the client who contracted him to 
record the conversation) attack the young woman.   
 
In Wild Strawberries, Isak has a chilling dream in which he witnesses a coffin spill 
onto the ground when a horse-drawn carriage collides with a lamppost.  He 
approaches the corpse lying in the street half out of the coffin, and discovers that it is 
himself.  The dead Isak comes to life and tries to drag the living Isak into the coffin.  
The dream thus expresses Isak’s anxiety about aging and death.  In his subsequent 
examination dream, the examiner asks Isak to identify a bacteria through a 
microscope, but he is unable to; he is asked the meaning of a passage of Latin, but 
cannot translate it.  Among the few assembled witnesses at the examination are the 
young trio of travellers who are accompanying him and Marianne on their journey.  
Their presence in the dream suggests that Isak is unconsciously anxious at the thought 
of having his faults exposed before these young people who so admire him.  Isak is 
instructed to examine a patient and offer a diagnosis.  After he has declared the patient 
dead, the woman comes to life and laughs wickedly at his error.  The examiner 
accuses Isak of being ‘guilty of guilt’ and accompanies him to a scene from his past in 
which he witnessed his wife’s infidelity in the woods.  The penalty for his life’s sins, 
the examiner explains, is simple: loneliness.  We discussed earlier the dream in 8 ½, 
in which Guido’s (dead) father asks his producer how his son is getting along.  This 
reveals Guido’s continuing unconscious anxiety to realise the recognition and 
approval of his father.  We might better understand this dream, and Isak’s 




‘typical’ form of anxiety dream, which revives infantile memories of transgression 
and punishment, but which also, paradoxically, offers the dreamer consolation:  
 
These are the ineradicable memories of the punishments we suffered as 
children for misdeeds which we had committed — memories which were 
revived in us on [...] the gruelling examination at the two critical junctures in 
our careers as students […] we dream of our matriculation [...] whenever we 
fear that we may be punished by some unpleasant result because we have done 
something carelessly or wrongly [...] whenever we feel the burden of 
responsibility [...] the anxiety-dream of examination occurs when the dreamer 
is anticipating a responsible task on the following day, with the possibility of 
disgrace; recourse will then be had to an occasion in the past on which a great 
anxiety proved to have been without real justification, having, indeed, been 




For Isak the ‘responsible task on the following day’ is his anniversary ceremony; for 
Guido it is the production of his film.  Isak clearly regrets certain aspects of his 
behaviour and decisions he made in the past, both in his youth and during his 
marriage — these are the things that he has done ‘carelessly or wrongly’. 
 
Where the dreamer has a masochistic personality, the dream can be simultaneously 
wish-fulfilling and anxiety-producing.  In Belle de Jour, Séverine’s dream, in which 
Husson flings wet mud in her face while her husband Pierre observes, functions both 
as a masochistic wish fulfilment and as a symbolic expression of the guilt she feels at 
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her secret life as a prostitute: spending her afternoons working at a brothel is like 
having muck thrown in her face; it makes her feel dirty.  At the same time, as her 
fantasies reveal, she has a masochistic personality and enjoys this feeling.  Husson’s 
role in the dream — as he flings mud at Séverine, he insults her: ‘You old bag!  
Scum!  Maggot!  Flea-bite!  Fellatiomane!  Spermofalsie!’ — anticipates his 
subsequent discovery of her secret when he meets her at the brothel and subsequently 
declares that he will tell Pierre, who is now paralysed.  The dream thus expresses 
Séverine’s subconscious anxiety that Husson will discover her secret and inform 
Pierre. 
 
Occasionally we find a complete shift of emphasis within the dream.  In Nayak 
(Satyajit Ray, 1966), the film star’s dream appears to be a straightforward wish-
fulfilment: finding himself in a land of paper money, he revels amongst the mounds of 
notes.  There is no diegetic sound, only a dreamy nondiegetic musical 
accompaniment.  But then the mood changes: the music ceases and the sound of an 
eerie wind emerges.  The dream assumes a nightmarish aspect (and expressionist 
form) as skeletal hands emerge from the mounds of money, holding the receivers of 
ringing telephones.  Finally, the film star becomes submerged within the piles of 
money, and is sucked into it, as though into a swamp, until he is entirely submerged.  
When he subsequently recounts the story of his career to the female journalist, the 
symbolism of the dream becomes quite explicit: in becoming a film star he has 
compromised his artistic integrity for money and fame.  Here, an apparently simple 






Dealing with matters of great importance 
Sometimes the unconscious forces of dream assist a detective in his investigation.  In 
Episode 2 of Twin Peaks (ABC, 1990) Agent Cooper has a dream, in which the 
murdered Laura Palmer whispers to him the name of her killer.  Upon waking he — 
inevitably — cannot remember the killer’s name, but the dream nevertheless provides 
clues which ultimately form the point of departure for his investigation (‘Crack the 
code, solve the crime’).  Cooper is a professional detective, but, as we have seen, 
there are others who, for various reasons, are obliged to assume the role of detective.  
Fear X opens with a dream in which, from his window, Harry observes a blonde 
woman in the snow approach the house opposite.  At first this sequence seems 
innocuous, but when Harry later recalls the dream, it comes to assume profound 
significance.  He senses that he may find information concerning his wife’s murder in 
the house opposite: he observes the house and finally breaks in and steals some 
photographic negatives which eventually lead him to his wife’s killer.  Rather than 
taking Harry for a mystic, who makes decisions based on the interpretations of his 
dreams, it seems that the opening dream sequence revives a half-forgotten perception 
— Harry really did see a blonde woman approach the house opposite; the dream 
merely reminded him of this.   
 
In investigating his wife’s murder, Harry becomes a vigilante detective, but there are 
others whose search goes back further, excavators of their own pasts who search for 
clues in their dreams.   In Twelve Monkeys (Terry Gilliam, 1995) James Cole is — or 
believes he is — a time traveller from the future.  He repeatedly experiences the same 
dream, which he believes recreates a scene he witnessed as a child, in which a man is 




psychiatrist, Cole tells her that she is the woman in the dream.  His conviction that he 
is from the future accounts for the fact that in the dream she is an adult and he a child, 
while, in the reality of the present, they are roughly the same age.  It subsequently 
emerges that the man who is shot in the dream is, in fact, Cole.  Thus, while he does 
not yet realise it, in the dream, as a child he witnesses his own death.  Ultimately the 
film posits two possible interpretations: either Cole is insane and by dying at the 
airport he fatally realises the content of the dream which has so obsessed him, or we 
grant credence to the science-fiction plot, in which case the dream really does revive 
Cole’s childhood memory of witnessing his own death.  Having thus unwittingly 
witnessed his own death as a child, in the repeated dream which revives this memory, 
Cole is prey to an extraordinary sense of déjà vu.  When he identifies Catherine as the 
woman in the dream it becomes apparent that the dream is somehow related to his 
investigation of the Army of the Twelve Monkeys.  His uncanny feeling becomes 
increasingly intense with each dream, until finally he fulfils his destiny and is killed at 
the airport.   
 
In distinguishing dreams from fantasies, Freud claims that in the fantasy the 
‘conceptual content’ is ‘thought’, while in the dream it ‘is transformed into visual 
images, to which we give credence’.  He goes on to state that ‘this transformation of 
ideas into visual images does not occur in dreams alone, but also in hallucinations and 
visions, which may appear spontaneously in health, or as symptoms in the 
psychoneuroses.’
278
 In the comprehensive theoretical exposition at the end of Die 
Traumdeutung, Freud introduces a topographical model of the psychic apparatus to 
present the directional movements between sensation and motility through the 
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systems Unconscious, Preconscious and Conscious.  The direction of the dream is 
regressive in that it travels from perception to motility, converting ideas into images.  
During the day, the ego is protected against images from the unconscious by the fact 
of the ‘uninterrupted sensory current in a progressive direction’.
279
 During the night, 
this current is stopped; the direction of psychic activity becomes regressive, and 
images from the unconscious reach consciousness, though they are distorted due to 
the residual operation of the censorship of the ego.  This concept of the regressive 
direction of psychic activity in the dream both explains why it gives expression to 
infantile wishes, and accounts for the vivacity of its images, which are primarily 
visual.  Freud explains, 
 
that which is older [...] is at the same time formally primitive and, in the 
psychic topography, nearer to the perception-end […] dreaming is on the 
whole an act of regression to the earliest relationships of the dreamer, a 
resuscitation of his childhood, of the impulses which were then dominant and 




But, Freud stresses, this regressive direction of psychic activity is not unique to the 
dream.  We find this regression also in ‘morbid waking states’, in which ‘[r]egression 
occurs in spite of the uninterrupted sensory current in a progressive direction’:  
 
The hallucinations of hysteria and paranoia, as well as the visions of mentally 
normal persons, I would explain as corresponding, in fact, to regressions, i.e. 
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to thoughts transformed into images; and would assert that only such thoughts 
undergo this transformation as are in intimate connection with suppressed 




Here, then, Freud posits a psychic connection between dreams and states of madness.  
Writing not long after Freud, Bergson, too, posits a relation between dreams and 
madness, understanding both in materialistic terms:  
 
these threads so beautifully stretched from the periphery to the periphery, are just 
what ensure by the solidity of their connections and the precision of their 
interweaving the sensori-motor equilibrium of the body [...] Relax this tension or 
destroy this equilibrium: everything happens as if attention detached itself from 
life.  Dreams and insanity appear to be little else than this [...] we must suppose in 
deep sleep, at least a functional break in the relation established in the nervous 
system between stimulation and motor reaction […] in every way dreams imitate 
insanity.  Not only are all the psychological symptoms of madness found in dreams 
[...] but insanity appears also to have its origin in an exhaustion of the brain, which 
is caused, like normal fatigue, by the accumulation of certain specific poisons in 
the elements of the nervous system [...] Is it not likely [...] that the loss of mental 
equilibrium in the insane is simply the result of a disturbance of the sensory-motor 
relations established in the organism?  This disturbance may be enough to create a 
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Without adopting Freud’s psychoanalytic methodology or completely embracing 
Bergson’s materialism, we will content ourselves to accord that there is a connection 
between the images of dreams and states of madness and hallucinations, which is the 
subject of the final chapter. 





Chapter 7. Hallucination 
Misperception 
We distinguish misperception from hallucination for reasons which we shall discuss 
below.  Some comments from Bergson on the nature of perception will help us to 
better understand the phenomenon of misperception: 
 
there is no perception which is not full of memories.  With the immediate and 
present data of our senses we mingle a thousand details out of our past 
experience.  In most cases these memories supplant our actual perceptions, of 
which we then retain only a few hints, thus using them merely as ‘signs’ that 
recall to us former images.  The convenience and the rapidity of perception are 
bought at this price; but hence also springs every kind of illusion.
283
   
 
The notion that perception contains memories, and that memories are realised in a 
movement which resembles perception, provides a theoretical grounding from which 
we may explore the psychology of the phenomenon of misperception.  Richardson 
notes that ‘confusions between the inner world of images and the outer world of 
percepts are present in individuals who are neither neurotic nor psychotic but well 
within the range of healthy psychological functioning.’
284
 Instances of misperception 
in cinema are relatively rare.  In Sabotage, after learning of her younger brother 
Stevie’s almost certain death on a blown up bus, Winnie faints.  When she regains 
consciousness, a crowd of children have gathered around her and she repeatedly sees 
Stevie’s face amongst them.  Later, after killing her husband, who was responsible for 
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Stevie’s death, Winnie walks down the street, resigned to turning herself in, but still 
suffering from shock.  A boy approaches her, carrying some film cans: it’s Stevie!  
She goes to embrace him, but it is not Stevie — it was a misperception.   
 
In his critique of Hume’s theory of the image, which distinguishes images from 
perceptions on grounds of ‘intensity’, Sartre distinguishes misperceptions from mental 
images: 
 
How is it that we never take our images for perceptions? But sometimes we 
do, it will be said [...] I may take a tree trunk for a man.  No doubt.  But this is 
no confusion of image and perception.  It is a false interpretation of an actual 
perception.  There is no case […] in which an image of a man suddenly 




In Chapter 5 we discussed Mallory’s fantasy of the petrol-pump attendant in Natural 
Born Killers, which is borne from and perpetuated by a present perception.  Cases 
such as this appear similar to but are in fact distinct from misperceptions.  Mallory 
knowingly and deliberately imagines Mickey in place of the pump attendant.  In cases 
of misperception, by contrast, while the person who misperceives realises that he or 
she is mistaken, the brief moment of misperception is nevertheless genuine.  There is 
a momentary belief here which is lacking in the deliberate deceptions of the fantasist. 
 
Generally speaking, misperceptions are distinguished from genuine hallucinations in 
their relation to the imagining subject’s actual perceptions.  In the above case from 
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Sabotage, one person is mistaken for another; the imagining subject imagines 
something where in fact there is something else, some existing object which 
resembles the imagined object.  On the other hand, hallucinations seem to emerge ex 
nihilo; the hallucinating subject imagines something where there is nothing.  But 
surely he perceives something.  Sartre writes, hallucination ‘is accompanied by a 
provisional collapse of perception’
286
; and ‘the real and the imaginary cannot coexist 




But in filmic representations of imagination the distinction between the real and the 
irreal is less clear.  There are many cases in which aspects of the imagining subject’s 
physical environment and situation influence, and are manifested in, the hallucination.  
We have seen that contingencies of the present sometimes find expression in fantasies 
and in dreams (though usually in distorted form); we find this phenomenon in many 
hallucinations also.   
 
Form 
Contingencies of the present 
In A Matter of Life and Death (Michael Powel and Emeric Pressburger, 1946), a pilot, 
Peter Carter, is shot down, but due to heavy fog the attendant angels fail to take him 
to heaven.  By the time an envoy, Conductor 53, finally comes for him, he has fallen 
in love with June, the American woman to whom he spoke on the radio in the 
moments before his aircraft crashed.  In a magnificently English insistence on fair 
play and proper respect for the rules, he refuses to proceed to the afterlife on the 
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grounds that he has fallen in love due to a mistake from above.  He demands the right 
to appeal for his life.  The trial imminent, Peter sits with the conductor on the stairway 
to the other world and discusses the possible candidates for his defence counsel.  He 
finds fault with each of the conductor’s suggestions, and finally flees from him, 
descending the steps.  The haunting circular piano motif on the nondiegetic score 
increases in tempo and dynamics, creating a dizzying effect, which is compounded by 
an increasingly closer and wobbly camera framing.  The conductor calls after him: 
‘Peter, Peter!  Come back!’  As he descends further, Peter becomes more and more 
weary.  From a close-up of Peter, exhausted and anguished, the image dissolves to 
him regaining consciousness in the present in Frank’s library; the conductor’s voice 
becomes that of June, calling, ‘Peter, Peter!  Come back!’  It is no coincidence, either, 
that Peter’s appeal in the other world coincides exactly with his operation in the 
present.  And after the trial, when one surgeon congratulates another, who replies, ‘An 
interesting case’, it is clear that the surgeons and nurses of the operating theatre in the 





Many hallucinations commence as misperceptions — an object or person 
misperceived becomes the point of departure for an imagining.  In Odd Man Out, 
having been wounded fleeing the bank robbery, escaped convict Johnny is abandoned 
by his brothers, and takes refuge in an empty concrete room.  When a little girl enters 
to retrieve her football, Johnny hallucinates: taking the girl for a prison guard, he 
imagines that he is back in jail.  He recounts to the guard a terrible dream in which he 
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robbed a bank and was shot fleeing the scene, before realising that he is not in prison, 
his interlocutor is not a prison guard but a little girl, the robbery actually happened.   
 
Before proceeding further with our discussion of hallucinations in cinema, we shall 
consider Sartre’s phenomenological account of hallucination. 
 
Sartre’s phenomenology of hallucination 
In Imagination: A Psychological Critique, Sartre sets down what he considers to be 
‘an unimpeachable given’ for a new theory of the image: 
 
I cannot possibly form an image without at the same time knowing that I am 
forming an image; and the immediate knowledge I have of the image as such 
may become the basis for judgements of existence (of the type of ‘I have an 




Nevertheless, in the ‘pathology of imagination’ which he elaborates in The Imaginary, 
Sartre examines various other relationships between the attitude of consciousness and 
the irreal object.  He postulates that hallucination may represent ‘a radical upheaval of 
the attitude of consciousness with regard to the irreal’, and ‘a change of attitude in the 
face of the irreal can appear only as the counterpart of a weakening of the sense of the 
real.’
290
 For the duration of the hallucination, perception ‘collapses’. But when the 
hallucination has passed, the subject perceives once more.  Thus it seems ‘natural that 
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Sartre describes the hallucinatory consciousness in terms of ‘disintegration’.
292
  The 
normal unity of consciousness remains, but ‘this unity forms the indifferent ground on 
which the rebellion of spontaneities stands out’: 
 
there is no longer a harmonious and continuous development of thought, 
realised by the personal synthesis and in the course of which other thoughts 
can be posited as possible, which is to say momentarily envisaged without 
being realised.  But the course of thought, while it still claims to be a coherent 
development, is broken at each instant by adventitious lateral thoughts that can 





In ‘genuine hallucinations’ this disintegration ‘is much more thoroughgoing’: 
 
these new forms of synthetic connection are incompatible with the existence 
of a personal synthesis and oriented thought […] perception becomes dark and 
foggy: object and subject disappear together […] there is only the sudden 
formation of a partial and absurd psychic system.  This system is necessarily 
partial because it cannot be the consciousness, nor a thematic unity, and it is 
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precisely for this reason that the system appears.  It is given in its very 





We will now briefly consider Richardson’s cognitive account of hallucination. 
 
Cognitive theory of hallucination 
While hallucinations ‘are most frequently associated with such pathological 
conditions as the functional and organic psychoses,’ writes Richardson, ‘they do 
occur in otherwise normal subjects.’
295
 Cognitive psychologists have examined 
hallucinations in normal subjects under conditions of sensory deprivation.
296
 
However, hallucinations produced in this way are often distinct from those associated 
with psychoses in that ‘it is more frequent for the subject who obtains imagination 
images under conditions of perceptual isolation to be aware that what he sees or hears 




Richardson distinguishes hallucination from other forms of mental imagery in that in 
most cases it is based on a delusion.  He writes, 
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When a person continues to act as if he believed in his projected image, even 
after having been shown that it must be false, we speak of him as deluded […] 
In the normal person a realisation that an image has been confused with a 
percept will occur more or less quickly depending upon such factors as the 
motivation and the opportunity to check upon the experience.  If the person 
has a delusion into which the experience can be fitted the motivation to check 
will be absent.  If the person with a delusion is forced to resolve the 
dissonance between his experience and an objective demonstration of its 
falsity, he is most likely to provide a rationalisation that will permit a 
continued belief in his delusion.  A somewhat similar situation exists for the 
relatively normal person who believes in ghosts […] The percept-like 
experience is recognised as non-material, but is not recognised as being a 
subjective phenomenon.  The ‘ghost’ is perceived within a reference frame 




The related issue of not being able to distinguish images from perceptions raises 
interesting questions about the general imaging capability of those persons who 
experience hallucinations.  Richardson cites the work of several researchers which 
suggests that, in ordinary circumstances, people who hallucinate generally have 
trouble distinguishing images from perceptions: ‘visual hallucinations are more likely 
to occur in persons who have vivid imagination images, but who lack any general 
ability to differentiate an inner world of quasi-sensory events from an outer world of 
genuine sensory events.’
299
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These phenomenological and cognitive theories are relevant to the following 
discussion of filmic representations of hallucination, in which we distinguish between 
symbolic hallucinations, drug-induced hallucinations, recognised hallucinations, and 
genuine hallucinations.   
 
Hallucination in cinema 
Symbolic hallucinations 
The primary function of some few filmic representations of hallucination appears to 
be symbolic.  The hallucination is represented as being experienced by an imagining 
subject, but at the same time it is a symbolic expression of this character’s madness.  
Symbolic hallucinations both signify and symbolise madness, in that they express 
something of the destiny of the imagining subject in relation to his milieu.  
Richardson stresses, ‘the content of an hallucination typically reveals some aspects of 
the patients’ anxieties or conflicts, just as dreams may do.’
300
 Nowhere is this 
proposition demonstrated more vividly in cinema than in symbolic hallucinations.  In 
Repulsion (Roman Polanski, 1965) Carol murders her suitor and disposes of his body 
in the bathtub.  Later, wandering in a confused state, she enters the bathroom and 
turns away from the corpse, as though unwilling to recognise what she has done.  As 
she backs into the hall, hands emerge from the wall to grab her; one hand grabs her 
breast.  It seems that these hands at once represent the images of Carol’s imagination, 
and are at the same time a figure, a metaphor, to represent her mental torment.  At 
first Carol seems merely to be somewhat dreamy.  Her exchanges with her suitor are 
peculiar, but appear inconsequential.  He is keen; she seems perpetually distracted.  
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However, Carol subsequently murders him as well as her landlord when he tries to 
take advantage of her.  The significance of the hands emerging from the wall is easily 
understood: Carol is irremediably frigid.  She is not merely indifferent to the suitor’s 
advances, but is repulsed, mortified at the thought.   
 
In The Conversation, when Harry finally enters room 773, he searches for signs of a 
violent struggle but finds nothing; the room is immaculate.  He searches particularly 
closely in the bathroom, yanking back the shower curtain as though expecting to find 
something behind it, before carefully examining the plughole in the bath.
301
 He then 
lifts the toilet seat, and when he flushes the toilet, the scene changes.  Sinister 
nondiegetic music enters as the toilet overflows with blood.  Harry is plagued by guilt 
at the thought that the young couple whose conversation he recorded might be harmed 
as a consequence of his work.  Finding no signs of the violent struggle he feared and 
anticipated, he finally flushes the toilet, thus symbolically disposing of any lingering 
doubt and guilt over the assignment.  The bowl overflows with blood.  The 
hallucination functions symbolically: though there is no discernible evidence of the 
consequences of his work, Harry cannot escape the doubt and guilt that is an 
imperative of his occupation; there is something dirty in his profession, which he is 
unable to cleanse himself of. 
 
Near the end of Shock Corridor, after his involvement in fellow patient Trent’s ‘race-
riot’, Johnny is finally allowed to socialise with the other patients again.  As he walks 
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the corridor, the soundtrack presents his inner thoughts: he curses the fact that, though 
Boden told him it, he can no longer recall the killer’s name.  Johnny then sits down 
next to Pagliacci and suffers a prolonged hallucination.  A thunder storm howls 
through the hospital.  Johnny desperately bangs on the doors, trying to escape, and 
finally shrieks, writhing on the floor.  A lightning bolt strikes him down (symbolic of 
his electric convulsive therapy), and as he convulses in spasms on the floor, colour 
images of the cascades of a vast waterfall are inserted.  Back in the present, Johnny 
remains seated next to Pagliacci, screaming.  He is shocked to find that neither he nor 
Pagliacci are wet.  He looks to the right and sees the other inmates going about their 
business.  Not only was the rain a hallucination, but so, too, were Johnny’s actions: he 
didn’t desperately bang on the doors, break a chair or writhe on the floor; in fact, he 
did not move for the duration of the hallucination.  Thus this seems to be a genuine 
hallucination (Johnny believes in the reality of the images), which at the same time 
functions symbolically, signifying Johnny’s collapse into insanity.  We noted in the 
previous chapter how, occasionally, dreams enable the dreamer to work through 
matters of great importance, to reach decisions.  This is true here of Johnny’s 
hallucination.  Amidst the images of the hallucination are flash-inserts of four 
characters.  The first three — Stuart, Trent and Boden — are the principal witnesses 
in Johnny’s investigation into Sloane’s murder; and the fourth face ... is that of Wilks.  
Once the hallucination has subsided, suddenly, Johnny remembers the killer’s name: 
Wilks! Amidst the tumultuous disorder of his hallucination, a moment of sublime 








Related to the symbolic hallucinations discussed above, there are some sequences 
which seem to offer a figurative realisation of drug-induced inebriation, but which do 
not, in fact, constitute representations of actual mental images.  The sequence 
depicting Bob’s high near the beginning of Drugstore Cowboy (Gus Van Sant, 1989) 
effectively demonstrates this.  Bob is the leader of a small gang who obtain narcotics 
by robbing pharmacies.  At the start of the film, as they flee from a robbery, Bob 
injects opiates in the back of the car.  As his voiceover describes the pleasure of his 
inebriation, a series of objects — a spoon and needle, a cow, a tree, a man riding a 
bicycle, a sheep — float from left to right across the screen, superimposed over his 
face in close-up.  Bob’s face recedes, leaving only a blue sky with clouds, over which 
objects continue to pass — a house, a spinning aeroplane.  Then Bob’s face reappears, 
and the objects float back in the opposite direction, confirming that the apex of his 
euphoria has passed.  Rather than understanding these floating objects as 
representations of the mental images of his imagination, it seems that they offer a 
figurative expression of the experience of his rapture.   
 
In his essay The Doors of Perception (1954) Huxley describes his experiences after 
taking a quantity of mescaline.  While Huxley cites the scientific investigations of 
researchers such as Jaensch and Havelock-Ellis, his own argument uses scientific fact 
as a stepping stone towards the elaboration of a mystical perspective.  He writes,  
 
in one way or another, all our experiences are chemically conditioned, and if 




purely ‘aesthetic’, it is merely because we have never troubled to investigate 




In past times, the visions of God-fearing men were brought about by a combination of 
factors which produced chemical alterations in the body: 
 
When they were not starving themselves into low blood sugar and vitamin 
deficiency, or beating themselves into intoxication by histamine, adrenaline 
and decomposed protein, they were cultivating insomnia and praying for long 
periods in uncomfortable positions, in order to create the psycho-physico 
symptoms of stress.  In the intervals they sang interminable psalms, thus 
increasing the amount of carbon dioxide in the lungs and the blood-stream, or, 
if they were Orientals, they did breathing exercises to accomplish the same 
purpose.  Today we know how to lower the efficiency of the cerebral reducing 




Mescaline disengages the subject’s concern with the quotidian aspects of biological 
survival — which ordinarily reduces our perceptual and phenomenal experience to 
that which is biologically useful — enabling access to ‘the mind’s Antipodes’, to 
‘Mind at Large’.  The hallucinations in Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas (Terry 
Gilliam, 1998) seem to come close to a filmic actualisation of the kinds of drug-
induced hallucinations which Huxley describes — the effect of the drugs is not so 
much to induce subjective visions as to distort perceptions of the objective world. 
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In general, however, the hallucinations of characters who are under the influence of 
narcotics are, from our perspective, less interesting than genuine hallucinations, since 
here the psychic state, of which the mental images are a manifestation, is brought 
about artificially, and in most cases deliberately.  Our concern is rather with psychic 
states — and the mental images which are a manifestation of such states — which are 
brought about by specific narrative situations which are not reducible to the 
consumption of narcotics.  For these reasons, some of the most interesting drug-





Then there are those who suffer excessive or unanticipated side-effects from 
prescriptive medication.  In Donnie Darko (Richard Kelly, 2001), the hero 
hallucinates while watching an American football match with his father and some 
friends.  A liquid form protrudes from his father’s stomach and continues to stretch 
away from him.  His father announces that he is going to get a beer, and the liquid 
form seems to anticipate his movements, guiding him to the refrigerator.  Elsewhere 
Donny has hallucinations of a man in a bunny rabbit suit named Frank who 
prophesies that the world will end in one month, and instructs Donny to commit 
serious acts of vandalism and violence.  In many ways Donny is presented as a normal 
teenage boy.  At the same time, however, he takes Prozac for his mental health 
problems and it is possible that his hallucinations are induced by the medication.  It 
seems clear enough that Donny does not here confuse reality with the irreality of his 
imaginings.  He knows that the liquid form protruding from his father’s stomach is 
                                                 
304





not actually there, just as he knows that Frank does not exist.  But the most 
compelling representations of hallucination are those in which, for its duration, the 
imagining subject appears to believe in the reality of her hallucinations.   
 
In Videodrome, exposure to the rogue signal of an illicit television show causes Max 
to hallucinate.  When his secretary, Bridely, ejects the cassette from his VCR, Max 
rushes over, shouting, ‘Don’t touch that!’ and slaps her face.  For an instant, Bridely 
becomes Nikki (Debbi Harry).  Max slaps Nikki and she becomes Bridely once more.  
When Max apologises, Bridely is confused: ‘Hit me?  You didn’t hit me.’
305
 Max is 
not insane, but he is attracted to explicit erotic and sadistic material.  In the meeting 
with his colleagues at the start of the film, he dismisses the pilot of a Japanese show 
as ‘soft’.  His quest for ‘something...tough’ leads him to Videodrome, and his 
exposure to the show’s signal causes his hallucinations.  But the fact that he is 
attracted to Videodrome in the first place posits Max as deviant.  Convex confirms 
that the show will affect anybody who watches it,  
‘But ... why would anybody watch a scummy show like Videodrome?  
Why did you watch it, Max?’  
‘Business reasons,’ Max replies, sheepishly.   
‘But what about the other reasons?  Why deny you get your kicks out 
of watching torture and murder?’   
Thus, Max is deviant; he is attracted to prohibited objects, exposure to which causes 
his hallucinations.  The hallucinations are punishment for his deviance.  Here 
Videodrome acts as an artificial stimulant, a narcotic substitute, and Max’s surrender 
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to the sensually undulating cassettes is suggestive of addiction.  But Max’s 
hallucinations are to be understood within the verisimilitudinal context of science-
fiction, which proffers outlandish justifications for such experiences.  More relevant 
to our discussion of madness and representations of mental images are hallucinations 
which occur in films with a more naturalistic aesthetic.   
 
In Track 29, having been sexually assaulted when she was fifteen and obliged to give 
up the resulting baby, twenty years later Linda imagines — in an alcohol-induced 
crisis — that her son Martin comes to the U.S. from England to track her down.  In 
the first scene Martin introduces himself to Linda and her friend, Arlene, in a café.  In 
an uncanny way he is particularly drawn to Linda.  Perturbed by Martin’s interest, 
Linda departs.  The first indication that Martin is not real comes when, at night, Linda 
anxiously watches him standing outside the house.  She wakes her husband, Henry, 
inviting him to have sex, but Henry wants to sleep.  Until this point we have no reason 
to doubt that Martin exists.  He has come to America in search of his mother.  In the 
diner he is drawn to Linda by some uncanny force; he seems to sense that she is his 
mother.  Now he appears outside her house.  However, when Linda says, ‘He’s come 
back.  He’s outside and he’s waiting,’ Henry’s response — ‘Oh no, he isn’t’ — 
suggests not only that he has heard about Linda’s meeting Martin — though they do 
not discuss it — but that Linda regularly makes such claims, and that Henry no longer 
pays any notice.  The subsequent scene between Linda and Martin in the bar confirms 
that Martin is an imaginary being, and that Linda’s encounters with him are delusional 
hallucinations, the immediate cause of which seems to be alcohol abuse, which 
aggravates latent repressed guilt and anguish dating back to the traumatic episode of 




him, her legs parted, she mentally relives her sexual encounter with the bumper-car 
man.  While she speaks, a waiter approaches and asks if she needs anything.  As he 
returns to his colleague at the bar we see Linda from his perspective, sitting alone.  
‘She’s talking to herself with tears in her eyes!’ the barman explains.
306
 Linda is quite 
drunk when she and Martin return home.  With Henry away at a model train 
convention, in her stupor Linda imagines that Martin smashes his train set.  From the 
bottom of the stairs she glimpses the destruction and turns away in horror.  She 
summons Arlene and confides to her that she may have wrecked Henry’s train set.  
Henry then arrives home and assures Arlene that Linda is ‘loco’, before going upstairs 
to find his train set intact.  
 
From our perspective, drug-induced hallucinations are most interesting where, as in 
Linda’s alcohol-fuelled hallucinations of Martin, the drugs aggravate or exacerbate a 
latent neurotic state.   
 
Recognised hallucinations 
In most drug-induced hallucinations, the imagining subject knows that he 
hallucinates.  But there are other cases in which an imagining subject who is free of 
narcotics knows that he hallucinates.  In normal consciousness ‘every perception is 
given as able to be observed; every thought is given as able to be pondered’.
307
 On the 
other hand, the partial systems of hallucinatory thought   
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can in no way be observed […] they are always given with a ‘furtive’ 
character that is constitutive of their being: their essence is to be ungraspable 
[…] They are the word that one hears but cannot listen to, the faces that one 




Sartre nevertheless believes that hallucinations are accompanied by a ‘nonthetic’ 
consciousness of their irreality.
309
 But this nonthetic consciousness ‘does not pass into 
the memory since […] the memory of the perceived object delivers us an irreality in 
the same way as a reality’.
310
 The hallucinatory object will thus ‘retain a neutral 
character in memory.’
311
 The subject may have an awareness of the irreality of the 
hallucinatory object, but in memory it will reappear with all the force of actual 
perception: 
 
the essential characteristic with which the irreal object is delivered by memory 
is externality in relation to the current personal consciousness.  It is given as 
having been unforeseeable and not able to be produced at will […] This 
externality and this independence are evidently very close to those of an object 
of the real world.  At the same time, however, the object retains the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
308
 Ibid., p.157, Sartre’s emphasis 
 
309
 In a general review of Sartre’s use of the term ‘nonthetic’ in his early phenomenological work, I 
understand it to mean pre-reflective. 
 
310
 L’Imaginaire, p159 
 
311










In some of cinema’s representations of hallucination, the imagining subject seems to 
recognise the irreality of the hallucinatory images, but remains powerless to prevent 
them.  We have seen how, in Esta Noite Encarnarei no Teu Cadáver, upon learning 
that he has inadvertently killed Jarinda’s unborn child, Joe’s imperious self-assurance 
in his natural superiority is threatened.  Henceforth, he is plagued by guilt and haunted 
by her curse (‘This night I’ll possess your corpse’).  Joe is tormented, understanding 
his guilt to be a manifestation of an irrational phylogenetic weakness, the only means 
of overcoming which is propagation.  After Laura, his chosen pro-creative partner, 
dies in labour, Joe hallucinates, imagining Jarinda before him with a snake wrapped 
around her shoulders.  She cackles demonically and declares,  
‘This is the moment you dreaded.  Tonight I’ll possess your corpse to 
avenge the body you destroyed!’ 
‘You are not real!’ Joe exclaims.  ‘There is no reincarnation!  You’re a 
figment of my imagination, my tormented mind.  You lie in the lake, rotting 
and disgusting.  You’re a mere lifeless vision!’   
Thus Joe recognises the irreality of Jarinda’s image, but in refuting her existence, he 
nevertheless speaks aloud — as though affirming her existence — addressing her 
directly in the second-person (‘you’).  Joe’s torment is a lucid illustration of the 
conflict in his consciousness.  On the one hand he rejects all religious superstition; on 
the other hand he is plagued by guilt and visions of his victims, which undermine the 
integrity of his nihilistic philosophy. 
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In Solaris (Andrei Tarkovsky, 1972), the planet Solaris generates imaginary beings 
from the memories of the astronauts while they sleep.  Kris is initially bewildered to 
find his wife, Hari, who committed suicide ten years earlier, resurrected.  He 
subsequently comes to understand her presence as an opportunity for redemption.  
This brings him into opposition with the scientist, Sartorius, and their arguments raise 
some interesting questions about the empirical status of the visitors.
313
 Are these 
hallucinations, or do they, within the verisimilitudinal context of the film, actually 
exist?  The fact that it is not only Kris who sees Hari (his visitor) but Snauth and 
Sartorius can interact with her also, indicates that these are something more than 
hallucinations.  Indeed the existential status of the visitors is better understood in the 
context of representations of ghosts, who are also frequently portrayed as being 
perceived simultaneously by more than one character.  Just as ghosts exist within the 
verisimilitudinal context of the supernatural, so do the visitors of Solaris exist in their 
science-fiction context.  The visitors are not hallucinations; within the reality that the 
film presents, they exist.  Hari has memories, and experiences emotions.  On the other 
hand, the visitors are not human.  On her arm, Hari bears the mark of the hyperdermic 
needle with which she killed herself; Kris blasts her into space, but another Hari 
appears; Hari tries to kill herself by drinking liquid oxygen, but her body regenerates 
itself.   
 
The visitors exist but are not human.  They cannot exist apart from the ocean of 
Solaris.  Nevertheless, there are some aspects of the astronauts’ experiences which are 
comparable to the experiences of hallucination which we have so far discussed.  In his 
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recorded message Gibrian, Kris’s astronaut colleague who killed himself, says, ‘Kris, 
know that this isn’t madness.  To be more exact, all this has to do with conscience.’  
In the discussion in the library, Hari defends Kris, accusing Snauth and Sartorius: 
‘You treat us as something alien, interfering.  Yet we are you yourselves, your own 
conscience.’  Linda’s hallucinations of Martin in Track 29 and Joe’s hallucinations of 
Jarinda in Esta Noite Encarnarei no Teu Cadáver are also expressions of guilty 
conscience.  Solaris is a love story about a man who feels guilt over his wife’s suicide 
ten years earlier.  The science-fiction context enables his memory of her to become a 
physical reality, facilitating a romance between the living and the dead; Kris falls in 
love with a memory.   
 
Virtual reality 
Influenced by post-modernist theory, some science-fiction genre films present 
dystopian visions of the near future, in which reality is indistinguishable from illusion.  
There was a wave of such films as the millennium approached — Twelve Monkeys 
(1995), Strange Days (Kathryn Bigelow, 1995), The Truman Show (1998), The 
Matrix (Andy and Lana Wachowski, 1999), eXistenZ (David Cronenberg, 1999).  In 
the alternative near future of 1999 which Strange Days presents, a new technology 
called the ‘wire’ has emerged on the black-market.  An intricate recording device is 
placed over the subject’s head which records this person’s experiences.  Using a 
playback device, a consumer can then experience a few minutes from another 
person’s past, as though they were that person.  These illicit recordings of actual 
perceptions are consumed as vicarious experience, technologically enhanced 
representations of imagination — a superior, more vivid, more realistic, more visceral 





As we have seen, the narrative of Twelve Monkeys is open to dual interpretations.  On 
the one hand we grant credence to the science-fiction narrative, and James Cole is a 
time traveller from the future, sent back to 1990 to gather information about the Army 
of the Twelve Monkeys, who in 1996 will be responsible for releasing a deadly virus 
into the atmosphere which will kill five billion people and force the remainder of the 
earth’s inhabitants into the earth’s core.  In which case the tooth which he extracts 
really does contain a tracking device, with which the people in the future track his 
movements.  That he is from the future also explains the fact that he is able to predict 
that the boy in the news, who is believed to have fallen down a well, is actually hiding 
in a barn, and that the bullet extracted from his leg is from World War I.  The 
alternative explanation is that Cole is a paranoid schizophrenic and all of the above is 
a meticulously constructed fantasy world.  In which case, the scenes presenting the 
future — which Cole believes is the present — in which he is briefed by scientists on 
his mission, are hallucinations.  At the outset Cole is convinced that he is a time 
traveller from the future, while his psychiatrist, Catherine Railly, believes he is 
deluded, but nevertheless has ‘the strangest feeling’ she has met him before.  
Subsequent narrative developments — he vanishes in the woods when the police close 
in to arrest him, the bullet extracted from his leg — convince Catherine of the veracity 
of his claims, while Cole comes to believe that he is ‘mentally divergent’.  Upon 
returning to the future, he challenges the scientists at his bedside: ‘You people don’t 
exist.  You can’t travel back in time!...You’re not here, you can’t trick me.  You’re in 
my mind.  I am insane and you are my insanity.’  Thus Twelve Monkeys presents a 
dual structure which opposes the science-fiction narrative of a time-traveller with the 




interpretation on the spectator; rather, the spectator’s understanding may shift from 
one interpretation to another and back again.  Indeed, it seems the intention is to keep 
both interpretative poles in something approaching a state of perpetual oscillation.  
(Nevertheless, one feels Gilliam would sooner admit the fantasy of time travel than 
the reality of madness.) 
 
eXistenZ opens with a seminar attended by computer game enthusiasts.  Game 
designer, Alegra Gellar, introduces her new game, eXistenZ, and invites twelve 
volunteers to play.  But the demonstration is sabotaged when an assassin shoots her.  
The security guard, Pikel, helps her to escape.  Alegra fears that her game was 
damaged in the disruption and the only way to know for sure is to play the game with 
Pikel.  When they finally plug themselves into her pod and enter the game, it seems 
we leave the present and enter the imaginary game world of eXistenZ.  In the game 
they discover a diseased pod.  Submitting to a ‘game urge’, Alegra ports into the pod, 
and immediately senses that something is wrong.  When Pikel cuts the cord to free her 
from the pod, mayhem breaks out and they again exit the game.  Back in the hotel 
room, Alegra believes they have brought the disease back from the game; Pikel is 
confused (‘How can a game event emerge into real life?’).  A band of militants 
suddenly appear and destroy Alegra’s pod.  Pikel reassures her, explaining that he 
thinks they are still in the game.  In an abrupt finale, Pikel reveals to Alegra that it has 
been his mission all along to assassinate her; Alegra kills him and raises her hands 
triumphantly, proclaiming victory in the game.  Only now, in the film’s epilogue, do 
we finally arrive in the present: everything hitherto has occurred in the imaginary 
world of the computer game, ‘Transcendence’.  Alegra, Pikel, and everyone they have 




designer, Yuri, discreetly confides to his assistant his anxiety about the ‘anti-game 
theme’ of the demonstration.  On their way out, Pikel and Alegra assassinate Yuri.  At 
the door they encounter the young Chinese who played the waiter in the game.  He 
begs them not to shoot, before asking, ‘Tell me, are we still in the game?’  This final 
line thus self-reflexively acknowledges the film’s theme of uncertainty about the 
integrity of reality in an age of cyber-technology.  
 
Duped from the outset, we imagine that the opening scene of the seminar represents 
the present and that when Alegra and Pikel play eXistenZ we leave the present and 
enter an irreal world.  The epilogue reveals that the entire narrative has unfolded 
within an imaginary game world.  Upon reflection, this makes perfect sense.  From 
the outset (what we take for) the present is characterised by an artificiality which is 
only amplified when the heroes enter eXistenZ.  The signs are present throughout, but 
we have disregarded them: the gun with which the young assassin shoots Alegra is 
made of bone, and the bullet is a tooth (the gun which Pikel, in eXistenZ, 
subsequently constructs, and with which he kills the Chinese waiter, is also made of 
bone and fires teeth).  The narrative draws excessive attention to the process of 
character nomination: when Alegra first speaks Pikel’s name, he asks ‘How did you 
know my name?’ and she points out that he is wearing a name badge; Alegra calls the 
gas station attendant by the name on his badge, ‘Gas’, a generic game-name.  In 
eXistenZ, Alegra stresses that it is often necessary to use a character’s name when 
addressing him/her.  When urging Pikel to play eXistenZ, Alegra says, ‘the only way 
to find out if the game is damaged or not is to play eXistenZ with someone friendly.  
Are you friendly or not?’, thus repeating verbatim the phrase that she had used 




explains that it is sometimes necessary to deliver a specific line for the game to 
proceed.  Thus, when the epilogue reveals the first part of the film to have been part 
of a game, we recognise Alegra’s repetition of her question — ‘Are you friendly or 
not?’ — as characteristic game behaviour.  When Pikel and Alegra return from the 
game to the hotel room, it becomes increasingly apparent that what we have taken for 
the present is in fact an imaginary game world.  This aspect of eXistenZ, by which the 
film dupes the spectator into accepting an irreal world for reality, calls to mind the 
elaborate tricks of Le charme discret de la bourgeoisie and The Saragossa 
Manuscript, only here it is not a dream which we mistake for reality, but the virtual 
reality of a computer game.   
 
In these three films from the nineties, one can discern significant consistencies around 
themes of technology, imagination and memory.  From the ‘wire’ experience of 
Strange Days to the virtual reality of eXistenZ, in the modern or futuristic worlds that 
these films present, technology supplants human imagination.  But aside from these 
interesting modern developments in representations of imagination, generally 
speaking, characters who experience hallucinations can broadly be divided into types.  
 
Psychics 
The presence of characters who possess psychic powers virtually dictates 
representations of imagination.  We ought to distinguish here between premonitory 
acts of imagination — logical, though perhaps paranoid, extrapolations from the 
evidence of a present situation — and the irrational force of psychic power.  When, 
for instance, in Suspicion Lina has a vision of Johnny murdering Beaky, this is not a 




originates in a reasonable process of logical deduction.  By contrast, the visions of 
psychic characters emerge inexplicably from an irrational source.  The other 
important distinction is that the lucid premonitions of characters such as Lina may or 
may not be realised (Johnny doesn’t push Beaky from the cliff.  And though Beaky 
subsequently dies, we cannot be certain that Johnny killed him), while the visions of 
the psychic invariably actually transpire — either simultaneously with the experience 
of the vision or at a subsequent time. 
 
At the end of the Twin Peaks Pilot episode (ABC, 1990), sitting on her couch in a 
meditative repose, grieving mother Sara Palmer experiences a vision in which she 
assumes the perspective of a figure walking through the forest at night, lighting the 
way with a torch.  She shrieks as she visualises a gloved hand retrieving her 
daughter’s necklace from beneath a rock.  In The Shining, able to ‘shine’, Danny sees 
ghosts and shares a telepathic ability with Mr Halloran.  When Halloran is showing 
Wendy around the provisions room he turns to Danny and asks, ‘How’d you like 
some ice cream, Doc?’  Halloran now continues speaking to Wendy, and it is clear 
that she did not see or hear his exchange with Danny: Halloran did not speak, but 
nevertheless — inexplicably — communicated his question to Danny.   Shortly 
afterwards, Halloran really does invite Danny for an ice cream.  Thus, this is not 
simply an act of imagination, but of telepathy.  Later, as Jack becomes increasingly 
psychotic at the Overlook, Halloran has a portentous vision warning of trouble at the 
hotel.  We see a shot of the open door of room 237 and then a shot of Danny, 
catatonic and dribbling, accompanied by a high-pitched sound effect with a heartbeat 





In The Fury, Gillian has several visions involving Robin, a boy, whom she has not yet 
met, who shares her powers.  Her visions are dependent upon physical contact; the 
person with whom she is in physical contact — deliberately or coincidentally — 
becomes a vehicle for the emergence of her visions.  In each case, the experience is 
physically distressing for the person from whom she draws the vision.  Her visions 
depict events that occur elsewhere and which seem to be concurrent with her acts of 
imagining.  In The Deadzone, Johnny also experiences psychic visions when he 
makes hand to hand contact with a person.  Like Gillian, Johnny is overwhelmed by 
his visions and tightly grips the arm of the person from whom he draws the vision; as 
with Gillian’s visions, the person whose hand is gripped, in the present, frequently 
becomes anxious, and tries unsuccessfully to free her hand.  But Johnny’s visions do 
not cause excessive physical harm to the person from whom they are drawn; rather, 
the visions seem to cause Johnny himself distress.  (He explains to his father, ‘When I 
have the spells, it’s like I’m dying inside.’)  The visions represent: events which 
occurred in the distant past (Dr Weizak as a child being smuggled to safety in the 
midst of a WWII skirmish), scenes from the recent past (the young woman murdered 
in the gazebo), something which is occurring in the present or will occur in the 
immediate future (the girl in the burning house), and even more distant futures 
(Stillson as President).   
 
The majority of cinema’s psychic characters are to be found either in the context of 
the horror genre — where their powers are more or less vaguely associated with 
supernatural forces (The Shining) — or in a science-fiction context — in which case 
their powers are explained as, for instance, a medical experiment that went wrong or 




of all psychic visions in cinema involves an essential violence.  The visions lacerate 
conscious attention, usually involuntarily, and the experience is often traumatic for 




Another group of characters who experience hallucinations are war veterans who are 
suffering from war neuroses or post-traumatic stress disorder.  In A Matter of Life and 
Death, after the first hallucinatory episode in which he meets Conductor 53 and 
rejects the ruling that he has died, in his subsequent hallucinations Peter receives the 
conductor again, prepares for his appeal, and finally attends the trial itself; 
meanwhile, in the real world, he is cared for by June and his doctor, Frank.  Peter 
seems to recognise the irreality of his hallucinations but cannot prevent them.  On 
several occasions when the conductor visits him, time in the present halts.  These 
exchanges occur within the physical space, but outside the time of the present.  After 
his first meeting with the conductor, while Peter sleeps in the armchair in Frank’s 
library and Frank and June play table tennis, the conductor appears again.  Peter rings 
the bell to alert Frank that he is having ‘a visit’, but the bell makes no sound.  When 
he rushes out to tell Frank and June, he finds them frozen still.  They will not become 
re-animated and hear the bell until the conductor departs.  At the end of this second 
visit, the conductor announces that he’d like to borrow Peter’s My Best Chess Games 
book, and in the exchange that follows (‘It’s not mine; it belongs to the doctor — Oh, 
doctors! — What about them? — They give me a great deal of trouble in my job’) the 




his job doctors cause him ‘a great deal of trouble’, explicitly articulates the central 
opposition: Dr Reeves/conductor, living/dead, reality/hallucination.   
 
The film makes abundantly apparent the gulf between Peter’s hallucinatory world and 
the reality of the present.  However, the developments Peter reports in the 
hallucinatory world correspond to the development of his illness, so that the world of 
the hallucination becomes a parallel universe, in which the trial for Peter’s life is a 
figure for the actual mortal threat which his illness poses.  In conversation with Dr 
McQueen, Frank emphasises the elaborate intricacy of Peter’s hallucinations: 
 
The boy has a fine mind...That’s the trouble; it’s too good a mind.  A weak 
mind isn’t strong enough to hurt itself...And he’s had several talks with this 
heavenly messenger, hallucinations of course, but you never saw such an 
imagination!...Here’s the interesting point: he never steps outside the limits of 
his own imagination...Nothing he imagines is entirely fantastic; it’s invention, 
but logical invention. 
 
Frank’s insistence that within Peter’s madness there is reason is consistent with the 
seventeenth-century English philosopher John Locke’s understanding of madness:  
‘“Mad men,” explained Locke, “put wrong ideas together, and so make wrong 
Propositions, but argue and reason right from them.” ’
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 But despite his 
hallucinations, and despite his internment in an asylum, the film’s treatment of Peter’s 
madness remains discreet throughout.  June and Frank are utterly supportive from the 
outset.  Frank takes care to encourage Peter, not only by behaving as though his 
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hallucinations were real, but by remaining positive throughout, even when Peter is on 
the point of despair (when, with the trial imminent, he has still not appointed a 
defence counsel).  Frank approaches the whole affair with characteristic English 
confidence, and determined optimism.  Peter is never treated as a madman.  It is taken 
for granted that his condition is temporary.  His illness is never understood outside the 
context of the fact that he is a war hero.  Frank’s irrepressible assurance in Peter’s 
eventual recovery to a great extent tempers our appreciation of the severity of his 
condition.   
 
Though A Matter of Life and Death (1946) confronts the pressing contemporary issue 
of war neuroses, the theme is raised in the context of a light-hearted romantic fantasy.  
We find a very different depiction of a veteran’s post-war experience in Born on the 
Fourth of July (1989).
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 The film presents the story of Ron Kovic, a paralysed 
Vietnam veteran, who, after a difficult return to life in the United States, eventually 
becomes an instrumental figure in the anti-war movement.  The scene we are here 
concerned with is when Ron hesitates while speaking before the local community at a 
veterans’ day parade, and is unable to continue.  In order for us to appreciate the full 
significance of this scene, an excursus is necessary to establish some relevant themes 
and narrative events.  The beginning of the film presents a substantial overview of 
Ron’s life in small town America, prior to going to fight in Vietnam.  As a child he 
played war games with his friends in the woods, waved the American flag at a 
veterans’ day parade as he perched on his father’s shoulders, and hit a homerun at 
baseball.  Upon leaving school he enlists.  His friend Stevie cautions him, ‘You could 
get killed over there.’  Ron’s experience of war is harrowing.  Nervous and 
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frightened, his platoon fire upon a house, massacring women and children whom they 
imagined were enemy soldiers.  They retreat under enemy fire, and Ron accidentally 
kills one of his own soldiers.  Subsequently, Ron is shot, leaving him paralysed from 
the waist down. 
   
During his convalescence, Ron’s exchanges with the black male nurses mark 
significant points in challenging his blind patriotism.  Upon seeing news coverage of 
anti-war demonstrations on television, he expresses his disgust to nurse Willie: ‘Love 
it or leave it you fuckin’ bastards! ... They’re burning the goddamn flag, man!’  Later, 
Willie tries to tell Ron about the civil rights movement: 
 
You don’t know shit about what’s really happening in this country.  It ain’t 
about burnin’ the flag and Vietnam, man.  Why we fight for rights over there, 
when we ain’t got no rights at home?  It’s about Detroit and Newark, man.  
It’s about racism, man! 
 
We have seen that during his convalescence, walking on his crutches, Ron gets 
carried away and falls, badly breaking his leg.  Having been left strapped to his bed, 
staring at his own vomit, when the nurses finally respond to his distress calls, Ron is 
abusive.  He shouts at Marvin,  
‘I am a Vietnam veteran.  I fought for my country.  I deserve to be 
treated with ... decency! ... I earned that right you fuck!’  
‘Vietnam don’t mean nothing to me, man, any of these other people,’ 





Upon returning home, Ron’s patriotism, his belief in the war, is slowly vitiated 
through his day to day experiences, as he gradually realises that the American people 
— many of the local community, and even members of his own family — are against 
the war.  His ex-school-friend Stevie, explains, ‘People here, they don’t give a shit 
about the war [...] It’s all bullshit anyway [...] Got the shit kicked out of us, for what, 
huh? [...] It was you who bought that communist bullshit, Ronnie.’  At a family 
dinner, Ron condemns the anti-war demonstrations, appealing to his mother, ‘They 
burned the flag and they demonstrated against us ... They have no respect ... People 
are dying every day over there and nobody back here even seems to care.  It’s a bunch 
of goddamn shit if you ask me ... love it or leave it.’  His younger brother Tommy 
excuses himself and when Ron enquires what the matter is, he is astounded to learn 
that Tommy ‘doesn’t believe in the war’.  Affronted, Ron challenges him: ‘You 
wanna burn the flag? ... You wanna bring down this country?  Love it or leave it 
Tommy.  You know, you can just love it or leave it.’  Tommy leaves and Ron shouts 
after him, ‘I volunteered, Tommy!  You don’t know what you’re talking about!  
Where were you?  Were you there?  Were you there?  You can just love it or leave it, 
Tommy!’  At various points throughout the film, from before the war until this scene 
at dinner, Ron has recourse to his patriotic mantra, ‘love it or leave it!’  While he 
seems to genuinely mean it when he impotently chastises the anti-war demonstrators 
on the hospital television, by the time of his argument with Tommy, Ron’s futile 
repetition of this slogan has become pathetic, and signifies the wilting stagnation of 
his political outlook in relation to mainstream American public opinion. 
 
During his public address to the assembled local community at the 4
th
 July veteran’s 




the baby’s crying continues on the soundtrack, at no stage does it appear on screen.)  
The sound of a helicopter emerges, gaining prominence.  The baby’s screaming is 
reverberated and becomes horrific.  As Ron looks out at the crowd, the expressions on 
the faces of the audience — knowing solidarity, uncomfortable embarrassment, pity, 
respect, anxiety, encouragement — reveal varied positions on the ethics of the war, 
though all are united in their sympathy for Ron.  The baby’s horrific screaming 
continues.  The sound of the helicopter, now prominent, comes into focus, and though 
we do not see it and no one in the crowd looks up to the sky, the trajectory of the 
sound suggests that a helicopter is passing overhead.  As its sound gradually recedes, 
we cut to the sky, and the camera pans across clouds in a blue sky, but we see no 
helicopter.  There is no helicopter.  It appears the baby’s crying evokes memories of 
the women and children he and his platoon massacred in Vietnam.
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 While the 
original sound of the crying baby may be genuine, its horrific distortion is certainly an 
image of Ron’s imagination.  This moment marks a significant point in the narrative.  
The process by which Ron’s blind patriotism and ideological commitment to the war 
are brought into question, as we have seen, is a slow one.  Many years later, after a 
gradual but profound transformation of his outlook, Ron becomes a significant figure 
in the anti-war movement.  This scene of him clamming up during his veteran’s day 
address, in which he is expected to deliver a rousing patriotic message to the local 
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Genuine hallucinations and states of madness 
In cinema, representations of imagination frequently provide access to the subjectivity 
of deranged characters.  While characters whom we would take to be ‘normal’ or sane 
may experience misperceptions or drug-induced visions, genuine hallucinations are 
typically experienced by characters who are deranged, or who are, for whatever 
reason, becoming, or temporarily become, deranged.  In The Bodyguard (Mick 
Jackson, 1992), singer and actress, Rachel Marron, is the target of a psychopath and 
recipient of a number of threatening letters, all composed from letters cut from 
magazines and newspapers.  At the Oscars, Rachel is presenting an award with an 
Englishman.  When the Englishman opens the envelope to read the nominees, we cut 
between close shots of Rachel and the envelope being opened.  Then, as the envelope 
is opened, in place of the card listing the nominees, Rachel momentarily imagines 
another of the threatening letters she has been receiving.  She flees the stage in 
hysterics.  This scene is the culminating point of the pressure on her: the obsession 
with security, the threats upon her life, have driven Rachel to the point where she sees 
things that are not there. 
 
In Odd Man Out, Johnny hallucinates while hiding out at the artist’s studio.  The 
sound becomes reverberant and the camera movement creates a dizzying effect while 
framing him in close-up.  A point-of-view shot presents his distorted perspective — 
an expressionistic, obscured view of the artist’s studio, populated by ghoulish 
portraits.  One by one the portraits come off the wall towards him in limpid, 
hologram-like forms, assembling themselves in rows before him.  Then Johnny has a 
vision of Father Tom, the priest whom he knew as a child; he addresses the vision 




congregation.  But the fact that he has been shot and has lost blood only partly 
accounts for Johnny’s delirium; we must also consider that, prior to this, the film 
presented him as being psychologically flawed: en-route to the robbery there are the 
expressionistic, oblique-angled point-of-view shots of the cityscape from the moving 
vehicle; and at a crucial moment, as the gang flee the bank after the robbery, Johnny 
suffers another spell — he freezes, seizes up, cannot place one foot before the other to 
descend the steps to the getaway car.   
 
In Fire Walk With Me Laura Palmer is sexually abused by a monstrous creature, Bob.  
Bob is a horrific construction of her imagination, by which she hides from herself the 
fact that her father, Leland, is abusing her.  Usually Laura sees Leland as Leland, but 
at certain moments — when he sexually abuses her, and when she returns home to 
discover him in her bedroom — he appears as Bob.  If Laura is deranged, it is 
certainly not her fault, but the fact is that she has constructed an alternative reality 
(she is sincere when she tells Harold, ‘Bob is real’).  The film chronicles the gradual 
disintegration of this psychic construct, culminating in her horrific confrontation with 
Bob/Leland in the derelict railway car.  Laura’s delusion is clearly something quite 
distinct from the instances of misperception discussed at the start of this chapter.   
 
We find an analogous case in Spider.  Mr Clegg is lying in bed when his door opens 
and, instead of Mrs Wilkinson (Lynn Redgrave), the female staff nurse at the care 
home at which he is resident, the young Yvonne Wilkinson (Miranda Richardson) 
enters — his father’s mistress, the tart in the leopard-skin coat, swigging spirits from a 
bottle.  Again we must distinguish this from cases of misperception such as Winnie’s 




health problem, and his horrific misperception prompts him to posit an identity 
between the two women.  Henceforth he sees Yvonne Wilkinson in place of Mrs 
Wilkinson; he forms a genuine belief that Mrs Wilkinson is Yvonne Wilkinson.
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This identifying of one person with another, to the point that the mistaken person 
assumes a complete corporeal identification with the other, is a case of delusional 
mistaken identity.  Clegg’s identification of the two women is ultimately revealed to 
be a horrific mistake: Mrs Wilkinson is not Yvonne Wilkinson: when Clegg enters her 
room at night and stands over her with a hammer and chisel, she appears as she had 
originally (Lynn Redgrave).   
 
In Raising Cain, Carter (John Lithgow) is a schizophrenic who is dominated by his 
nastier twin persona, Cain (John Lithgow).  Since Cain is a manifestation of Carter’s 
imagination, Carter is the only character who is able to interact with him.  Here De 
Palma takes the representation of madness to an extreme, by offering a literal 
embodiment of schizophrenia.  But Dr Waldheim, the film’s expert psychoanalyst, 
explains that Carter’s is a case of multiple personality disorder.  Cain regularly 
appears in order to perform an act or take a decision which Carter could not effect 
alone, but when Cain is about to murder the young mother in the public toilets, a 
young boy appears and says, ‘I know what you’re going to do.  It’s a bad thing, and 
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 All this is complicated by the fact that Spider’s mother and Yvonne Wilkinson are both played by 
Miranda Richardson.  This seems to imply that perhaps Yvonne Wilkinson never existed at all, that, 
jealous of his mother’s affection for his father, the young Spider created Yvonne Wilkinson in order to 
separate off and demonise the aspects of his mother that were unrelated to her exclusive devotion to 
him.  For an interesting discussion of the young Spider’s confused understanding of his mother in her 
relation to him and to his father, and how this confusion is manifest in the film in the opposition 
between the mother and Yvonne Wilkinson and the subsequent identification of the father’s mistress 
with the supervisor at the adult Clegg’s care home, see:  
 
Skalr, J. & A. Sabbadini (2008) ‘David Cronenberg’s Spider: Between confusion and fragmentation,’ 







I’m going to tell.’  Carter’s subsequent interview with Waldheimer confirms that this 
was Josh, a further personality, and therefore another embodiment of Carter/Cain’s 
imagination.   
 
If our discussion is to be comprehensive, we must also consider to what extent 
religious visions and experiences with ghosts can be classified as hallucinations. 
 
The divine 
In Bad Lieutenant (Abel Ferrara, 1992) the hero quickly gets into serious debt 
gambling on the baseball World Series.  Already owing $60,000, he tells his bookie 
friend he wants to put $60,000 on the final game.  His friend is concerned for him and 
tells him he cannot take the bet.  He leaves him his contact’s number so that he can 
place the bet himself.  Aware of the gravity of the lieutenant’s situation, he is clearly 
anxious that the debt should not increase, and reminds the lieutenant that there is a 
$50,000 reward for the policeman who catches the men who raped and profanely 
assaulted a nun in a church.  Clearly, the lieutenant ought to cut his losses and focus 
on the case — if he could secure the reward money, the $10,000 he would still owe 
the bookie might be raised somehow — but by now the lieutenant has lost touch with 
reality and is spiralling out of control in a drug- and alcohol-fuelled death drive.  In a 
stupor, he phones the bookie and insists that he accept his bet, threatening that if he 
doesn’t, he will receive no payment whatsoever.  As he listens on and off to the final 
game of the series on his car radio, it slowly becomes clear that his team has lost.  He 
now owes $120,000 to a ruthless bookmaker whom he has no means of paying.  In a 
desperate state, he arrives at the church to plead with the raped nun to give him 




bookmaker $50,000 his life might be saved).  He tells the nun that, since the culprits 
are juveniles, their punishment will be lenient; he will ensure that real justice is 
exacted.  It might be that he says this just in order to encourage her to talk; but, if his 
claim is sincere, this suggests that, despite his own dire personal problems, he is not 
interested in the reward money, has more or less accepted his fate, and is now 
somehow trying to make amends for his misdeeds and abuse of power by doing 
something which he understands to be honourable.  However, the nun insists she has 
forgiven her attackers, advises him to pray to God, and leaves.  The lieutenant drops 
to his knees and cries out in impotent desperation.  Then a vision of Christ appears 
before him, wearing a crown of thorns and bleeding from the wounds of the Passion.  
The lieutenant addresses Him, begs Him to speak, then repeatedly cries accusingly, 
‘Where were you?’  He apologises, admits to his wrongdoing and laments that he is 
weak.  He begs Christ to help him, crawls towards Him on his hands and knees and 
kisses His bloody feet.  He looks up to find an old black woman looking down at him.  
It seems that the lieutenant, in his drug-, alcohol- and gambling-fuelled crisis, 
imagines a vision of Christ where in fact an old woman is standing.  In a sense, his 
desperate prayers are answered, because she provides the breakthrough for the case.  
She identifies the culprits and leads him to them.  Thus, it seems, all is not lost — the 
lieutenant will receive the reward money after all, and the money, though it would by 
no means solve all of his problems, might just save his life.  However, after smoking 
crack with the two culprits and then censuring them at gunpoint in the car, he takes 
them to a coach station, gives them the shrine full of money that he earlier obtained 
from an acquaintance, and orders them to board the bus and leave the city because 
‘your life ain’t worth shit in this town.’  He thus renounces the reward money that 




young men, trying to at last do something good, lets them go free — a warped act of 
redemption that is not without a perverse nobility.  A short while later, in the film’s 
final shot, he is gunned down in his car. 
 
We will subsequently see that ghosts are often seen simultaneously by more than one 
character.  Such a phenomenon challenges any thesis which would hope to explain 
away such experiences as purely imaginary.  The same is also true of many 
representations of divine visions.  In the second half of La voie lactée, we follow the 
story of Rodolphe and François, two heretics from another century.  Having 
interrupted a ceremonial disinterment to voice their heretical views, they flee into the 
woods, pursued by those who are enforcing the contemporary religious dogma.  There 
they change into clothes that they find at a riverside, and proceed through the woods, 
outfitted as hunters.  In the pocket of the clothes he has stolen, Rodolphe discovers a 
crucifix, attached to rosary beads.  He hurls them into the air and François shoots the 
beads with his rifle.  Later, while they rest, a glorious light appears before them in the 
trees.  They rise before a vision of the Virgin Mary, suspended amidst the trees, 
magnificently illuminated.  Rodolphe kneels before her and she returns to him the 
rosary beads that François had earlier shot from the tree.  When the vision recedes, 
François attempts to subdue his friend, reasoning, ‘You’re tired.  It was a 
hallucination.’  But Rodolphe is certain that it was the Virgin Mary, and presents to 
him the rosary beads as irrefutable evidence of the divine reality of the vision.  Thus 
two characters experience a religious vision simultaneously.  If an individual believes 
he has such an experience, one can always argue that he only imagined that this was 




easily explain away such experiences as imaginary.  Representations of ghosts raise 
the same issue. 
 
Ghosts 
Should we understand belief in and interaction with ghosts as manifestations of 
imagination?  Ghosts are often portrayed as essentially benevolent beings that are 
visible only to certain privileged characters, though they are capable of acting upon, 
affecting, or haunting characters who cannot see them.  To argue that since, 
empirically speaking, ghosts do not exist, representations of ghosts in film must 
therefore be manifestations of imagination, is to neglect the obvious fact that films 
have no compulsion to respect the laws of empirical reality.  If ghosts are merely 
imaginary beings, the hallucinations of mentally unstable characters, this fails to 
explain how they can affect those living characters who cannot see them.  Rather, this 
latter is evidence of the fact of their actual existence within the vraisemblance of the 
film.  Tom Ruffles’ book Ghost Images (2004) will be an important point of reference 
throughout this section.   
 
To grasp the relevance of ghosts to the present study, the question boils down to this: 
in the reality the films present, are ghosts purely imaginary beings, or do they actually 
exist?  Whether the films present ghosts as existing or not, perception of and 
interaction with ghosts is typically limited to certain privileged characters.  The 
question, then, is: are these privileged characters merely imagining, or not?  This 
depends on the readiness of the filmmakers to admit the possibility of the 
supernatural.  Some films leave us in no doubt that ghosts exist within the reality that 




of the young couple are visible only to the teenage girl, this cannot account for the 
adventures which the couple undertake alone — as, for instance, whenever they 
attempt to cross the threshold of their property, they enter a nightmarish, 
expressionistic, threatening landscape, populated by gruesome creatures.  None of this 
has anything to do with the daughter’s imagination.  By contrast, in less fantastic 
depictions, emphasis is often placed on the mental fragility of those characters who 
perceive ghosts.  In practice, both explanations often apply at once: ghosts exist, but 
those characters who interact with them are impressionable, vulnerable, or somehow 
unhinged. 
 
Ruffles enumerates thirteen opposing categories according to which ghosts can be 





In the absence of unambiguous evidence it may be necessary to assign a level 
of probability based on the evidence.  Doubt can be caused by failure to 
distinguish between objective apparitions and internally generated images that 




Cases of ‘selective appearance’, when only one person is able to see a ghost though 
other people are present, ‘hint strongly at mental disturbance.’
320
 Filmmakers often 
play on the tension between opposing subjective and objective interpretations: ghosts 
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‘can be rendered differently, and their subjectivity emphasised, by point of view, 
which can make them seem subjective even when there is evidence that they are 
objective.’
321
 Ruffles notes that ‘[a] film might try to balance these possibilities so 
that it is not clear if phenomena are objective or subjective’, citing The Innocents 
(1961), Jack Clayton’s adaptation of Henry James’s tale The Turn of the Screw, as the 
most compelling example of such a procedure.
322
 The Turn of the Screw 
323
 is 
certainly a useful reference point in our discussion of cinema’s representations of 
ghosts.  While looking after two children, Miles and Flora, the governess, Miss 
Giddens, becomes utterly convinced of the existence of the ghosts of their former 
governess, Miss Jessel, and her lover, Peter Quint.  She is convinced that both of the 
children can see the ghosts, who have corrupted them, and that the four of them 
together perform unspeakable acts of depravity.  The effectiveness of the tale is all in 
the careful way James constructs the story, admitting a fundamental ambiguity as to 
the question of the existence of the ghosts.  James imposes nothing; the reader is 
permitted the space to interpret the story as she pleases: either the ghosts of Quint and 
Miss Jessel exist or they do not.  But it is the possibility that the ghosts may not exist 
that makes the tale truly harrowing.  Near the end, when Flora takes refuge in Mrs 
Grose, instinctively cowering away from Miss Giddens in fear and suspicion, James 
suggests — a more unsettling notion than the actual existence of the ghosts — that all 
of Miss Giddens’s suspicions, speculations, hypotheses, and interpretations of the 
most minute and apparently inconsequential gestures and actions, represent the 
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meticulously constructed imaginary reality of a paranoiac.  It is those ghost stories 
which tend toward this latter interpretation which most interest us.   
 
Let us consider more closely these few characters who are so privileged as to be able 
to see and interact with ghosts.  What do they have in common?  Are they 
psychologically predisposed to the perception of ghosts due to some kind of trauma, 
or spiritual perspicacity?  If ghosts are to be interpreted as subjective, writes Ruffles, 




The bereaved   
Characters who encounter ghosts are frequently suffering from a recent 
bereavement.
325
 In The Ghost and Mrs Muir (Joseph Mankiewicz, 1943) Captain 
Gregg, whose house the young widow Lucy Muir moves into, is visible only to her.  
While Ruffles argues that Gregg’s ghost is objective, I feel that this is one of the 
many films in which there is a tension between subjective and objective 
interpretations of the ghost.  Though Gregg initially tries to repel her from his house, 
he and Lucy ultimately develop a relationship.  Gregg helps her to regain confidence; 
he dictates to her the stories of his life at sea, which Lucy subsequently publishes.  
Gradually Gregg encourages Lucy to exercise greater liberty.  Then, shortly after 
seeing Lucy and her suitor Farley kiss, Gregg leaves in the middle of the night, saying 
goodbye to Lucy while she sleeps.  He must go now and let her live her life; she has 
chosen life.  Finally he approaches her bed, instructs her to listen carefully (although 
she is asleep), and tells her that he has been a dream: he is not real; she wrote the 
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book, not him.  Later, when Lucy’s grown-up daughter, Anna, visits her, Lucy is 
startled when she mentions Captain Gregg, and confides that she was in love with 
him.  Lucy explains that Gregg was a dream, he wasn’t real.  He used to speak to her 
sometimes; he was there for about a year. ‘But how could we both have the same 
dream?’ Anna asks.  Lucy explains that she probably told Anna her dream, and Anna 
adopted it as her own.  Thus Gregg appears to be a manifestation of Lucy’s 
imagination, a companion who assisted her through the initial years of widowhood, 
and then left when she was ready to continue her life without his assistance.  But this 
cannot account for several occurrences in the film which, Ruffles argues, point 
towards the objective existence of Gregg’s ghost.  In one scene, though they cannot 
see him, Gregg forcefully repels Lucy’s bothersome in-laws from the house, this 
suggesting that he is a selectively witnessed ghost rather than Lucy’s subjective 
hallucination.  Ruffles notes that in the dénouement, in which the young Lucy rises in 
spirit form from the elderly Mrs Muir’s body to finally be reunited with Gregg’s 
ghost, Lucy’s spirit ‘could have no meaning in terms of her point of view, only the 
audience’s, suggesting that it is objective, and that Captain Gregg also exists.’
326
   
 
In Fanny och Alexander (Ingmar Bergman, 1983) ghosts are a manifestation of the 
child Alexander’s imagination.  Ruffles identifies it as a common trope that ghosts are 
frequently only perceived by children in films: ‘This plays on the idea that psychic 
ability is something that children possess, losing it as they become hardened by age 
[…] one needs purity of heart and a certain openness and innocence untainted by 
doubt to see them.’
327
 Alexander encounters the ghost of his dead father Oscar several 
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times.  When Oscar’s ghost first appears, it is Fanny who sees him first of all.  She 
fetches Alexander, and they both see him together.  As with the divine visions in La 
voie lactée, attempts to understand the seeing of ghosts as purely imaginary 
experiences are undermined by a sequence such as this, in which two characters see 
the ghost simultaneously.  Ruffles puts forth the logical general rule that the more 
people who see a ghost, ‘the more likely is its reality to be accepted.’
328
 Henceforth it 
is only Alexander who sees ghosts (although the Grandmother encounters Oscar in a 
dream).  Oscar’s ghost appears at significant moments in Alexander’s life: he next 
appears when Edvard the Bishop leads the family in a prayer, after Emilie has 
announced that she will marry him; he reappears at the wedding, while his mother 
recites her vows.  Staying with his Uncle Isaac, who has rescued the children from the 
Bishop, at night Alexander again encounters Oscar’s ghost, and begs him to kill the 
bishop.  We then cut to a scene between Emilie and the Bishop, in which Emilie 
allows him to drink a bowl of soup which is drugged.   
 
The ‘gifted’ 
The other group of characters who encounter ghosts can be broadly classified as the 
‘gifted’.  Such characters possess a supernatural gift — though this ability is 
sometimes presented as a curse.  In Dragonwyck (Joseph Mankiewicz, 1946), the 
existence of ghosts is associated with a family legend; the ability to perceive ghosts is 
determined by blood.  Miranda goes to stay with her distant relative Nicholas at his 
family’s castle, Dragonwyck.  She soon learns from the servant, Magda, that the 
castle is haunted by Nicholas’s grandmother, a singing, harpsichord-playing ghost.  
Magda advises her that if and when the ghost should return and play the harpsichord, 
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only Nicholas and his daughter Katrine will be able to hear her.  The night Nicholas 
poisons his wife, the ghost appears, and Katrine listens on the stairs.  As Magda 
predicted, Katrine is able — as is the spectator — to hear the music, but Miranda, 
who comes to investigate, hears nothing. 
 
In The Shining, while exploring the endless corridors of the Overlook Hotel, Danny 
encounters the ghosts of the daughters of former caretaker, Delbert Grady, whom 
Grady butchered with an axe.  Danny’s unhinged father, current caretaker Jack, also 
sees ghosts from Grady’s era.  Since Jack is clearly deranged, the rich parallel world 
of the 1920s which he visits might be understood as a fantastic imaginary 
construction.  But again, such a hypothesis cannot account for various occurrences, as, 
for instance, when Grady (a ghost) apparently unbolts the door to let Jack out of the 
storeroom in which Wendy has locked him.  This intervention undermines any 
understanding that Grady is a purely imaginary being; he here becomes an agent, 
intervening in the present of the diegetic world.  Later, when Wendy encounters a 
wounded guest, apparently one of Grady’s victims, this too points to the actual 
existence of the ghosts, since, unlike Jack, Wendy is not deranged.  Ruffles observes, 
‘the film could be showing both subjective and objective phenomena but failing to 
cue the audience as to which is which.  Where the two are incompatible, their clash 
could be regarded as a post-modernist game.’
329
 The perceived positional status of the 
ghosts undergoes change as the film develops.  It seems at first that the ghosts are 
products of Danny’s imagination, but by the end, when Wendy sees ghosts, the reality 
of the ghosts is unequivocal.
330
 
                                                 
329
 Ibid., p.183 
 
330
 Films which represent angels raise similar questions about the positional status of these beings.  At 





We have seen that in Fanny och Alexander, Alexander’s exchanges with Oscar’s 
ghost are a consequence of his bereavement and the excesses of his childish 
imagination.  But it is not only Oscar’s ghost that Alexander encounters.  While his 
encounters with the ghost of his father are calm and relaxed, Alexander is haunted by 
other ghosts of his imagination.  He tells the maid of his encounter with the ghosts of 
the bishop’s dead wife and children, in which they told him that the bishop had locked 
them up, and that they perished trying to escape by tying sheets together and 
descending from the window.  Upon learning of this, the bishop canes Alexander and 
locks him in the attic, where he really does encounter the ghosts of the bishop’s two 
dead daughters, who give him a hostile reception, correcting his story about their 
deaths and expressing their concern about Alexander’s hostility towards Edvard.  The 
children are finally freed of the bishop’s tyranny when their uncle helps them to 
escape, and Edvard subsequently perishes in a fire.  But in the epilogue, the bishop’s 
ghost appears behind Alexander, and malevolently trips him over and then kicks him 
while he is on the ground, cautioning him, ‘You can’t escape me.’  Alexander’s 
experiences with ghosts are the product of his childish imagination, and here Bergman 
captures an aspect of imagination peculiar to childhood, which is soon completely 
forgotten, but which, as we have seen in our discussion of the bereaved, can, in 
certain circumstances, be partially or temporarily revived in adult life. 
                                                                                                                                            
contemplating suicide when a man jumps from the bridge into the river; George dives in and rescues 
him.  As they dry themselves off the stranger explains that he is an angel, who was sent to prevent 
George from killing himself.  He then takes George on a tour of the town, showing him how different 
the community would have been — how much poorer — if he, George Bailey, had not lived.  Of 
course, one could argue that this sequence represents a protracted hallucination, which functions to 
help George through his crisis.  However, the opening sequence — in which an angel is assigned to 
help George in his time of need, for which he will be rewarded with a pair of wings — clearly 
establishes that the film unfolds in a verisimilitudinal context that posits angels as existing.  It follows 
that the last half hour of the film is not George’s hallucination but, within the verisimilitudinal context 






Having thus considered the existential status of ghosts in a range of films, I maintain 
that, as opposed to the full-blown supernatural, in which ghosts become agents in the 
diegetic world, the representations which most interest us are those where ghosts 
seem to be products of a character’s imagination.  From our perspective, films which 
depict ghosts are less interesting to the extent that they admit the presence of the 
supernatural (The Shining), and more interesting to the extent that the perception of 
ghosts is psychologically determined.  (In practice this means that the perception of 
ghosts is limited to one character.) 
 
From our brief tour of cinema’s ghosts we conclude that the capacity of ghosts to 
intervene in the physical environment of the present, and the fact that ghosts are 
sometimes perceived by more than one character, oblige us to admit the actual 
existence of ghosts within these films.  It is not enough simply to say that ghosts are 
the imaginary creations of the bereaved or the gifted.  While one might argue that the 
few characters who are so privileged as to be able to perceive and interact with ghosts 
are often presented as being mentally fragile, in most cases this cannot account for the 
specific interventions of ghosts in the physical environments of these films.  While, as 
in the various representations of imagination which we have hitherto discussed, there 
does seem here to be a relation between imagination and madness, any such 
connection is tempered, since these narratives unfold within a generic framework 






Conclusion to Part II 
We have proposed the hypothesis that many representations of imagination in film — 
the imagined voices of the reasoning pragmatist, the obsessive questioning of the 
paranoiac, the various states of fantasy, dream, drug-induced visions, and genuine 
hallucinations — are, to a greater or lesser extent, discernible traces of madness.  But 
is it absurd to posit a connection between the fantasies and pragmatic imaginings of 
ordinary characters and states of madness.  Here we must consider precisely what 
constitutes an ‘ordinary’ character, and whether there is not already, in the most banal 
and unexceptional imaginings, a germ of madness.  Indeed, one might measure states 
of madness by the extent to which the subject is able to maintain control of the images 
that occur to her. 
 
While fantasies are essentially spontaneous, the subject nevertheless retains control 
over the content and development of her fantasy.  In her imaginings the fantasist 
escapes reality, but the development and perpetuation of the fantasy at each step 
requires intentional willing.  While the fantasy may rightly contain fantastic elements, 
each such element is intended.  The fantasist reserves a pre-reflective knowledge of 
the fact that she is imagining.  While on the one hand one need only consult one’s 
experience to recognise that though fantasies develop in what we might call an 
‘intentional’ fashion, and that, by definition fragile and vulnerable, the fantasy at each 
moment teeters on the threshold of annihilation — since it may be shattered 
instantaneously according to the immediate demands of the present — on the other 
hand, the appearance of fantasies, their coming into being, their very existence, is 
altogether less easy to account for.  (To demonstrate this we need only consider the 




but her train of associative thought, prompted by the reading matter, has followed a 
different track.  We can thus identify here a conflict within consciousness.  The reader 
might have preferred to continue reading uninterrupted, but, in spite of herself, this 
intention is undermined.)     
 
Closer to madness, it seemed, was the ‘fascination’ and ‘fatality’ of dreams.
331
 Often 
giving expression to deep wishes or anxieties, dreams nevertheless frequently appear 
to us as bizarre, irrational, nonsensical.  According to Freud the absurd appearance is 
only superficial.  During sleep the powerful defence system of the ego — which, 
always alert in waking consciousness, would prevent any such passage — is relaxed, 
enabling ideas which would otherwise not surface, to force their way into 
consciousness.  But, such is the strength of the ego’s censorship that it is only half-
relaxed.  It remains functioning to the extent that it distorts the repressed (infantile) 
wishes which arise from the unconscious.  This is the function of the dream-work.  
Dream-content often appears bizarre and irrational, but one nevertheless perceives 
that it is somehow meaningful.   
 
The visions of characters who are under the influence of narcotics also seemed to us 
to manifest traces of madness.  Unlike the dreamer (who is, in Sartre’s terms, in a 
state of ‘unreflective consciousness’),
332
 the hallucinations of the inebriated subject 
are experienced by a waking consciousness.  Such hallucinations seem to manifest 
madness more comprehensively than do dream images.  Someone may object that the 
fantasist is conscious also.  But this is a different mode of consciousness altogether: 
the visions of the fantasist are wholly her creation, the development of the fantasy 
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entirely her responsibility.  And if, as a consequence of some contingent circumstance 
in her physical environment, she is obliged to curtail the fantasy, this will occur 
instantaneously.  By contrast, while typically the inebriated subject — excepting those 
cases in which she is unknowingly or unwillingly drugged — makes a conscious 
decision to become intoxicated, once a state of hallucinatory inebriation is reached, 
there is no turning back: her visions overwhelm her and she must endure the effects of 
her intoxication for its duration.  Since the subject cannot instantly return to sober 
consciousness, the hallucinatory visions of the inebriated subject may manifest 
madness more completely than do either the waking fantasy or the dream. 
 
Closer still to madness are ‘genuine hallucinations’.  Unwilled (unlike the visions of 
the fantasist), appearing without chemical intoxication, the presence of such images 
signifies a pathological state.  It is here that we find the most lucid connection 
between imagination and madness.  The relation between themes of madness and 






In Part I, maintaining a formal perspective, we found that by no means all 
representations of the past represent the mental images of memory.  Flashback-for-
narrative represents an autonomous animation of a recounted narrative.  By 
comparing flashback duration to the time which seems to elapse in the present, we 
found that flashback-for-memory represents an analogue of the mental images of 
memory.  We therefore distinguished act of memory from flashback-for-memory, act 
of memory representing the mental images of memory.  Since hitherto neither 
filmmakers nor critics have insisted on this distinction, we found that the prompts and 
functions for act of memory were often consistent with those of flashback-for-
memory.  Detectives and innocent men such as Hitchcock’s heroes, whom 
circumstances compel to become detectives, remember for pragmatic purposes.  Then 
there are nostalgic subjects, such as Isak in Wild Strawberries.  But when the 
remembering subject becomes fixated with the past, memory comes to signify 
obsession.  Here we began to distinguish different character types — the obsessive, 
the guilt-ridden subject, the paranoiac, the pathological subject — and to argue that 
there was a relation between representations of mental images and themes of 
madness.  Throughout Part II this became our central developing argument. 
 
It is no surprise to find a correlation between representations of imagination and 
themes of madness.  But then there are other characters — detectives, the suspicious 
who become paranoid, guilt-ridden subjects, war veterans who suffer ‘flashbacks’, the 
bereaved who are visited by apparitions, characters who take hallucinogenic drugs, 
etc. — who find themselves in situations which engender mental images.  There is so 




narrative.  We know that all characters are capable of thought, and we thus assume 
that they can and do produce mental images according to the exigencies of their 
situation.  It is not necessary, desirable or practical to know what each character is 
thinking at all times.  Access to a character’s thought is reserved for privileged 
characters.  In providing access to what a character is thinking, cinema has various 
means: the close-up, the actor’s eye movements and facial expressions, the reaction 
shot, what she says (though, of course, this may contradict what she thinks).  The 
most reliable access to a character’s subjective thoughts is through representations of 
mental images.  Just as cinema selects certain actions for presentation and excludes 
others which are deemed unimportant, so, of all possible mental images it presents but 
a few.  We have identified a definite correlation between filmic representations of 
mental images and themes of madness.  Leaving aside for a moment those images 
which clearly signify madness, we find that mental images in cinema perform a gamut 
of other functions.  Nevertheless, it seems to us that we cannot separate these other 
functions — pragmatism, guilt, obsession, paranoia, etc. — and the forms by which 
mental images are manifest — imagined voices, fantasy, dream, hallucination — from 
the context of cinema’s representations of madness.  Indeed we feel that the majority 
of cinema’s representations of mental images are best understood in this context.  At 
what point does the pragmatic thought of the detective — speculations and imaginary 
hypotheses, associations of different points of past — become paranoia or obsession?  
And if these latter are traces of madness, what of the subject who finds herself in a 
situation where such responses are not entirely irrational?  If you are in no danger, yet 
you imagine that sinister forces oppose you and conspire against you, then you are 
clearly paranoid, and such thoughts may be interpreted as traces of madness.  If 




so?  Such thoughts become rational only in response to an extreme situation.  Thus 
extreme situations — whether these are brought about by the subject’s own errors, 
misjudgements, crimes, or sins, or whether her situation is imposed on her from 
without — engender behaviour and thought processes which would otherwise signify 
insanity.  We might, then, consider to what extent one’s mental health is influenced 
by the exigencies of one’s situation.   
 
In the course of our discussion we have identified the various functions which mental 
images perform with basic character types.  Let us review these.  The nostalgic 
subject and the fantasist are both dreamers.  Both are dissatisfied with the reality of 
the present and seek to escape it, the one in an idealised past, the other in utopian 
fantasy.  The fantasist idly conjures utopian scenes, typically of romantic or sexual 
fulfilment, which she is unable to realise in reality.  The nostalgic subject is often 
guilt-ridden: life has been a disappointment, she has made wrong decisions and been 
guilty of imprudence; she is dissatisfied with her situation and would like to escape it 
but is unable to undo her errors; she idealises the past and is disposed simply to 
reminisce.   
 
The detective’s use of memory is pragmatic.  She returns to and examines the past in 
light of the present, takes one past image and compares it with another, seeks out 
continuities between several different points of past, establishes metonymic chains of 
association between memories — all in order the better to understand the present.  
She creates hypotheses, imagines herself where she is not and cannot be, conjectures, 




imaginary conversations.  She considers the clues, assembles evidence and 
embellishes available facts with imagination.   
 
But there are many forms of detection.  The search may be entirely personal, 
introspective.  The introspective subject revisits the past, reapproaches the same 
memory from different angles; she imagines past events at which she was not present, 
attempts to reconstitute the past by combining actual memories with imagined past 
scenes, based in part on knowledge and in part on logical speculation.  She, too, 
juxtaposes different memories, establishes chains of association between different 
pasts.  She, too, is in search of the truth, though not always to act in the present, but 
rather to better understand and to come to terms with the past. 
 
The less control one exerts over the images that appear to one, the more one can speak 
of these images as manifestations of madness.  When the detective’s pragmatic 
speculations become excessive, she lapses into paranoia.  The paranoiac obsessively 
recalls words uttered, fragments of phrases, images or gestures, searching for hidden 
meanings (often where there are none).  She withdraws from her memories but is 
always lured back to them; she re-approaches her memories from different angles, 
aims to illuminate obscure aspects.  With each new development in the present she 
obsessively returns to the past, reinterpreting it in light of the present.  A voice from 
the past may startle her: she is about to open a door, but recalls a past utterance and 
changes her mind, suddenly overwhelmed by irrational doubt.  Like the detective, she 
composes hypothetical situations, rehearses imaginary conversations.  But while the 
detective’s hypotheses are based on logical probabilities, the imaginary conversations 




hand, her speculations are sometimes not without foundation; sinister forces really do 
oppose her, such that paranoia is a reasonable response to her situation.  Here we see 
how ordinary characters can, in extraordinary situations, come to manifest symptoms 
of madness. 
 
The guilt-ridden subject is haunted by the past.  She recalls words and phrases uttered, 
images and gestures.  She would like to escape, but finds the past every way she turns.  
The past seeks her out, creeps up on her, devours her from within.  She rehearses 
imaginary dialogues with a voice of conscience; she may be prey to hallucinations, 
haunted by apparitions of her victims; occasionally her manifestations of guilt precede 
the guilty acts themselves.  Amongst these guilt-ridden subjects are cinema’s 
Raskolnikovs, those who imagine they can live with their crimes, but find that they 
cannot.   
 
Then there are those characters who experience visions.  Psychic and telepathic 
visions are generally limited to the horror and science-fiction genres.  Such visions 
emerge from an irrational source, though science-fiction films often provide some 
outlandish justification for them.  In films which depict ghosts, either ghosts exist, or 
they are imaginary beings, who are perceived only by imaginative children or the 
bereaved, or the psychologically unhinged.  But here the imagining of ghosts and the 
existence of ghosts are often combined in a generic context in which verisimilitudinal 
standards of naturalism are attenuated.  Drug-induced hallucinations are most 
interesting to the extent that they expose some latent aspect of the imagining subject’s 
neurosis.  Usually drug-induced hallucinations are experienced by characters who 




spontaneous hallucinations.  The hallucinating subject has lost control of the images 
that occur to her.  Either she recognises the irreal as such, but is powerless to escape 
it, or the real and the irreal become for her indiscernible. 
 
We have achieved a great deal in our exploration of cinema’s representations of 
mental images, but there is much that remains to be done.  Cinema’s representations 
of mental images will be better understood in the context of such representations in 
other art forms.  A survey of art, literature and theatre would surely enrich our 
argument.  To better understand cinema’s representations of mental images requires 
us to situate our discussion in a broader historical context.  To what extent are there 
continuities between representations of mental images in the various arts?  
Consideration of works of literature, theatre and art would provide a contextual 
groundwork which might well place everything in a new light, prompt us to 
reorganise categories, enable us to sketch outlines of the historical development of 
representations of mental images and the extent of the differences between such 
representations which the ontological specificity of the various arts impose.  But as 
well as aspiring toward a broader historical perspective, we should not ignore recent 
developments.  In our discussion of eXistenZ and Strange Days in Chapter 7 we 
identified an interesting new development, by which the human imagination is 
supplanted by modern technological alternatives.  What effect has new technology 
had on the representation of mental images?  Indeed, more generally, what effect will 
virtual reality technology have on the status and function of human imagination?  Has 
not cinema and the ‘flashback’ influenced our understanding of memory, if not the 





But besides all this there are other, it seems to me, more important questions which 
transcend the scope of this study.  In discussing cinema’s representations of mental 
images, we have explored interesting aspects of the process, experience, function and 
representation of memory and imagination.  This is to say that, leaving the ‘cinema’s 
representations of…’ aside for a moment, the point of departure for this study was an 
initial interest in the image as a psychic reality.  In extrapolating from this kernel a 
study of cinema, we encountered a fork in the road.  Attracted by the bright lights of 
the screen, we advanced without looking back and, throughout, we have considered 
onscreen representations of mental images.  The other path, which we did not choose, 
leads to the spectator who, like the characters on the screen — the detectives, 
dreamers, paranoiacs and obsessives — is a thinking — remembering, imagining — 
being, and though, in viewing the film, she is fascinated by the continuum of images, 
submerged in a rich bath of sound, she does not cease thinking.  Each of us knows 
from experience that in watching a film, like the reader who finds that she has not 
understood the passage she has read while daydreaming, our attention may 
occasionally drift from the story.  We continue to remember, imagine and fantasise 
while watching films, not only through the characters onscreen, but apart from them.  
A look, an expression, a tone of voice, an utterance, some notable — though often 
tenuous — similarity to her past experience can prompt a recollection or imagining in 
the spectator.  The spectator’s attention drifts from the unfolding narrative, her 
thoughts float in a nebulous zone, impervious to time or place.  Inspired by an aspect 
of the film, she revisits some past scene of her life, and it can happen that by the time 
her attention returns to the screen she has understood some long-forgotten scene of 
her past in a new light.  Perhaps an aspect of the film momentarily rekindles in her a 




these possibilities depend to a large extent on the life experience, the mien, the 
personality of the individual spectator, but it is clear that this does not necessarily 
have to do with ‘good’ films.  Jean-Louis Schefer, Victor Burgin, Jonathan 
Rosenbaum, and to some extent Stanley Cavell, each in his own way, have gone some 
way to exploring this territory.
333
 In this study we have marched headlong in another 
direction, and our achievements are therefore remote from those of spectatorship 
studies.  We have focused throughout on the evidence of the films themselves, but not 
because we are sceptical of the value of spectatorship’s most profound subjectivism.  
On the contrary, our concentration on filmic examples is a simple consequence of the 
path we chose at the fork in the road.   
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